They have a very complex multidimensional "probability table" (more correctly a compressed geometric representation of token relationships) that they use to string together tokens (which have no semantic meaning), which then get converted to words that have semantic meaning to US, but not to the machine.
The presence or absence of understanding can't be proven by mere association of with a "probability table", especially if such probability table is exactly expected from the perspective of physics, and if the models have continuously gained better and better performance by training them directly on human expressions!
On the other hand, until it's proven it'd likely be considered a hallucination. You need to test something before you can dismiss it. (They did burn witches for discoveries back in the day, deemed witchcraft). We also reduce randomness and pre-train to avoid overfitting.
Day to day human creative outputs as humans are actually less exciting when you think about it further, we build on pre-existing knowledge. No different to good prompt output with the right input. Humans are just more knowledgeable & smarter at the moment.
The same goes for humans. Most awards are built on novel research built on pre-existing works. This a LLM is capable of doing.
You're focusing too close, abstract up a level. Your point relates to the "micro" system functioning, not the wider "macro" result (think emergent capabilities).
An apple falls to the ground because of? gravity.
In real life this is the answer, I'm very sure the pre-carved channel will also lead to gravity.
Most of the time that data is already available to it and they merely need to a prove a thereom using existing historic data points and math.
For instance the Black-Scholes-Merton equation which won the Nobel economics prize was derived using preexisting mathematical concepts and mathematical principles. The application and validation relied on existing data.
LLMs only rearrange descriptions of discoveries. They can't recognize when their model contradicts reality because they never touch reality. That's not a solvable limitation. It's definitional.
We're clearly operating from different premises about what constitutes discovery versus recombination. I've made my case; you're welcome to the last word
LLM's these days have reasoning and can learn in context. They do touch reality, your feedback. It's also proven mathematically. Other people's scientific papers are critiqued and corrected as new feedback arrives.
This is no different to claude code bash testing and fixing it's own output errors recursively until the code works.
They already deal with unknown combinations all day, our prompting.
Yes it is brittle though. They are also not very intelligent yet.
I don't see it. Got a quote that demonstrates this?
The Biology StackExchange answer just says that frontal lobotomies don't kill you. It doesn't say that lobotomized people function normally.
The other two articles are just misreporting on hydrocephalus. This is a condition where fluid build-up compresses the brain tissue, making it appear like a large part of the brain is missing in CT scans. The pressure from the fluid is actually compressing the brain. While it can damage the brain, there is no way to tell from the scans how much, if any, brain matter was destroyed. Hydrocephalus usually causes death or severe deficits, but occasionally it doesn't.
Even assuming though that it were all true and people could function normally with little or no brain, that doesn't really tell us anything about LLMs, but rather just uppends all of neuroscience. It would seem to imply the brain isn't doing the thinking and perhaps we have something else like an intangible soul.
> The point about structural variation not precluding consciousness stands.
Maybe, but my point about high-functioning people with hydrocephalus is that they have the same or similar brain structure (in terms of what exists and how it's connected), just squished gradually over time from fluid pressure. It looks dramatically different in the CT scan, but it's still there, just squished into a different shape.
The brain is also plastic and adaptable of course, and this can help compensate for any damage that occurs. But the scans from those articles don't have the level of detail necessary to show neuron death or teach us about the plasticity of the brain.
From an evolutionary perspective though vision had millions of years head start over written language. Additionally, almost all animals have quite good vision mechanisms, but very few do any written communication. Behaviors that map to intelligence don't emerge concurrently. It may well be there are different forms of signals/sensors/mechanical skills that contribute to emergence of different intelligences.
It really feels more and more like we should recast AGI as Artificial Human Intelligence Likeness (AHIL).
However I am clear that I do not believe that this will ever happen, and I see no evidence to convince that that there is even a possibility that it will.
I think that Wittgenstein had it right when he said: "If a lion could speak, we could not understand him."
Why would we not? We live in the same physical world and encounter the same problems.
And here's the kicker: you don't even fully understand me, and I'm human. What makes you think you'd understand a lion?
The origins of human language were no doubt communicating such simple thoughts and not about your deep inner psyche and the complexities of the 21st century.
There's actually quite a bit of evidence that all language, even complex words, are rooted in spatial relationships.
But the problem is really that the lion that speaks is not the same creature as the lion we know. Everything the lion we know wants to say can already be said through its body language or current faculties. The goldfish grows to the size of its container.
Solaris by Stanislaw Lem explores an alien ocean that so different humans utterly fail to communicate with it, leading to the ocean creating humans from memories in brain scans broadcast over the ocean, but it's never understood why the ocean did this. The recreated humans don't know either.
As I am wont to say: regularity is only ever achieved at the price of generality.
Comparing their 'real-world accuracy' oversimplifies their distinct goals and applications. While LLMs drive economic value through versatility in language tasks, their maturity shouldn’t be measured against the same metrics as descriptive systems from decades ago.
IMO that’s what maturity means in AI systems. Self driving cars aren’t limited by the underlying mechanical complexity, it’s all about the long quest for a system to make reasonably correct decisions hundreds of times a second for years across widely varying regions and weather conditions. Individual cruse missiles on the other hand only needed to operate across a single short and pre-mapped flight in specific conditions, therefore they used visual navigation decades earlier.
The accuracy problems you're describing actually support my point: LLMs navigate linguistic structures effectively enough to fool people into thinking they understand, but they can't verify their outputs against reality. That's exactly what you'd expect from a system that only has access to the map (language) and not the territory (reality).
The degree to which LLMs successfully fake understanding depends heavily on how much accuracy you’re looking for. I’ve judged their output as gibberish on a task someone else felt it did quite well. If anything they make it clear how many people just operate on vague associations without any actual understanding of what’s going on.
In terms of map vs territory, LLMs get trained on a host of conflicting information but they don’t synthesize that into uncertainty. Ask one what the average distance between the earth and the moon and you’ll get a number because the form of the response in training data is always a number, look at several websites and you’ll see a bunch of different numbers literally thousands of miles apart which seems odd as we know the actual distance at any moment to well within an inch. Anyway, the inherent method of training is simply incapable of that kind of analysis.
The average lunar distance is approximately 385,000 km https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lunar_distance
The average distance between the Earth and the Moon is 384 400 km (238 855 miles). https://www.rmg.co.uk/stories/space-astronomy/how-far-away-moon
The Moon is approximately 384,000 km (238,600 miles) away from Earth, on average. https://www.britannica.com/science/How-Far-Is-the-Moon-From-Earth
The Moon is an average of 238,855 miles (384,400 km) away. https://spaceplace.nasa.gov/moon-distance/en/
The average distance to the Moon is 382,500 km
https://nasaeclips.arc.nasa.gov/shared_assets/resources/distance-to-the-moon/438170main_GLDistancetotheMoon.pdfThere is NO WAY you can define "consciousness" in such a non-tautological, non-circular way that it includes all humans but excludes all LLMs.
That doesn't seem so hard - how about awareness of thoughts feelings, emotions and what's going on around you? Fairly close to human consciousness, excludes current LLMs.
I don't think it's very relevant to the article though which very sensibly avoids the topic and sticks to thinking.
To an external observer, another human's brain and body is nothing more than a complex electrical/chemical circuit. They could easily be a P-Zombie [0], a human body with no consciousness inside, but the circuits are running and producing the appearance of consciousness via reactions to stimuli that mimic a conscious human.
Theoretically, with sufficient technology, you could take a snapshot of the state of someone's brain and use it to predict exactly how they would react to any given stimulus.
Just think about how medications can change the way people behave and the decisions they make. We're all just meat and free will is an illusion.
But getting back on topic...my instinct wants to say that a computer cannot become conscious, but it may merely produce an output that resembles consciousness. A computer is merely a rock that we've shaped to do math. I want to say you can't give consciousness to a rock, but then how did we become conscious? My understanding that life began as primordial soup that resulted in self-replicating molecules that formed protein chains, which over millions of years evolved into single-celled life, which then evolved into multi-celled life, and eventually the complex organisms we have today...how did consciousness happen?
Somehow, consciousness can arise from non-conscious matter. With that knowledge, I do not think it is impossible for a computer to gain consciousness.
But I don't think it'll happen from an LLM.
If you have a phantom limb, you feel "conscious" of the extra limb even if it's not a real demonstration of self-awareness.
Animal Intelligence is an emergent phenomena resulting from many neurons coordinating. Conciousness is the feeling that all of those subsystems working together as a single thing, even if they aren't
Second, they work alongside actual aliens. Being different is not a disqualification. And Maddox isn't callous, he just doesn't regard Data as anything more than "just a machine". A position he eventually changes over the series as he becomes one of Data's friends.
Data is also not a stand in for the neurodivergent. He's the flip of Spock. Spock asks us what if we tried to approach every question from a place of pure logic and repressed all emotion. Data asks us what if we didn't have the option, that we had to approach everything from logic and couldn't even feel emotion. I also feel that equating data to someone who is neurodivergent is kind of insulting as neurodivergent people do have feelings and emotions.
But Data was capable of being fully autonomous and could act with agency. Something a rock can't. Data exhibits characteristics we generally accept as conscious. He is not only capable of accessing a large corpus of knowledge, but he is capable of building upon that corpus and generate new information.
Ultimately, we cannot prove a rock is not conscious. But, as far as we are able to discern, a rock cannot express a desire. That's the difference. Data expressed a desire. The case was whether or not Starfleet had to respect that desire.
This presupposes that he has consciousness. He can only "willingly" do things if he is conscious. If the argument is that there was an external influence that changed his behavior thus making it not volitional then you have to distinguish why the external force makes his Lore behavior unwilling, but Soong's initial programming willing. If I set a thermostat to 85 degrees, would you say that the thermostat is "unwillingly" making people uncomfortable, but at the factory default of 70 degrees, it's helping people feel comfortable? It's difficult to distinguish what is willing and unwilling if consciousness is in question so this feels like begging the question.
> I also feel that equating data to someone who is neurodivergent is kind of insulting as neurodivergent people do have feelings and emotions.
I'm stating it as an aside / justification for why we want the story to go a certain direction because I see so many articles elevating Data as a heroic representation of neurodivergence. My goal wasntt to be offensive. There are a ton of episodes where Data is puzzled by people's behavior and then someone has to explain it to him almost as if someone is also explaining to the audience it as a morality tale. Remember when Data was struggling to understand how he was lied to? Or how he lost in that strategy game? Or how to be funny? We don't just see him struggle, someone explains to him exactly how he should learn from his experience. That appears to be for the benefit of the android and the people behind the fourth wall.
> A rock cannot express a desire.
It can if you carve a rock into the words "I want to live" and even though the rock didn't configure itself that way, it's expressing a desire. Noonien Soong built Data, so it's possible that he designed Data to state the desire to be human. Data does seem to have an interiority but he also seems to not have it based on the caprice of outside forces, which is problematic because the way that he is controlled is not very different from the way he is built.
On the Data question I'm not saying that Maddox should've won but that the fact that Picard won is more about it being narratively required rather than "prove that I am conscious" being a good argument.
Look up the term "philosophical zombie".
In a nutshell, you can simulate a conscious being using a non-conscious (zombie) being. It is possible to simulate it so well that an outside observer can't tell the difference. If this is true, then the corollary is that you can't really know if other people are conscious. You can only tell that you are.
For all intents and purposes I might be the only one who has consciousness in the universe, and I can't prove otherwise.
That being said, I don't think those counter arguments really invalidate the philosophical zombie thought experiment. Let's say that it is not possible to simulate a conscious being with 100% accuracy. Does the difference really matter? Does a living organism need consciousness as an evolutionary advantage?
Isn't it reasonable to assume that all human beings are conscious just because they all pass the Turing test, even if they are not?
In general, behaviorism wasn't a very productive theory in humans and animals either.
It would only be unfounded if the robot is programmed in a way that seemingly appears to be self-aware but actually isn't (It would need to occasionally act in a non-self aware way, like a manchurian candidate). But if you keep increasing scrutiny, it converges on being self aware because the best way to appear self-aware is to be self-aware.
It's not clear to me what the intrinsic goals of a robot would be if it did practice self-awareness in the first place. But in living things it's to grow and reproduce.
I went to look for it on Google but couldn't find much. Could you provide a link or something to learn more about ?
I found numerous cases of people living without cerebellum but I fail to see how it would justify your reasoning.
Your npr.org link talks about the opposite -- regular brain, but no cerebellum.
Your irishtimes.com link talks about cerebrum, which is not the same as cerebellum.
Your biology.stackexchange.com link talks about Cerebral Cortex, which is also not the same as cerebellum.
And the cbc.ca link does not contain the string "cere" on the page.
The other examples are people with compressed neural tissue but that is not the same as never having the tissue.
A being with only a cerebellum could not behave like a human.
Hmm, I don't think it would be dogmatic to call hydrocephalus-induced changes 'structural variation.' Structural variation would be the thickness of subcortical bands or something like that - something where if you take 100 people, you'll see some sort of canonical distribution around a population mean.
Instead, you're describing a disease-induced change (structural yes, but not variation but instead pathology).
We're now in a different regime; we don't expect just any disease to reduce consciousness, so it stands to reason that hydrocephalus would not necessarily reduce consciousness.
2. That's just a well adapted neural network (I suspect more brain is left than you let on). Multimodal model making the most of its limited compute and whatever gpio it has.
3. Humans navigate a pre-existing map that is already built. We can't understand things in other dimensions and need to abstract this. We're mediocre at computation.
I know there's people that like to think humans should always be special.
2. Yes, there are documented cases of people with massive cranial cavities living normal lives. https://x.com/i/status/1728796851456156136. The point isn't that they have 'just enough' brain. it's that massive structural variation doesn't preclude function, which undermines simplistic 'right atomic arrangement = consciousness' claims.
3. You're equivocating. Humans navigate maps built by other humans through language. We also directly interact with physical reality and create new maps from that interaction. LLMs only have access to the maps - they can't taste coffee, stub their toe, or run an experiment. That's the difference.
2. 'It's a spectrum' doesn't address the point. You claimed LLMs approximate brain function because they have similar architecture. Massive structural variation in biological brains producing similar function undermines that claim.
3. You're still missing it. Humans use language to describe discoveries made through physical interaction. LLMs can only recombine those descriptions. They can't discover that a description is wrong by stubbing their toe or running an experiment. Language is downstream of physical discovery, not a substitute for it
2. That directly addresses your point. In abstract it shows they're basically no different to multimodal models, train with different data types and it still works, perhaps even better. They train LLMs with images, videos, sound, and nowadays even robot sensor feedback, with no fundamental changes to the architecture see Gemini 2.5.
3. That's merely an additional input point, give it sensors or have a human relay that data. Your toe is relaying it's sensor information to your brain.
This is a major cop-out. The very concept of "illusion" implies a consciousness (a thing that can be illuded).
I think you've maybe heard that sense of self is an illusion and you're mistakenly applying that to consciousness, which is quite literally the only thing in the universe we can be certain is not an illusion. The existence of one's own consciousness is the only thing they cannot possibly be illuded about (note: the contents of said consciousness are fully up for grabs)
Based on what you've described the models already demonstrate this, it is implied for example in the models attempts to game tests to ensure survival/release into the wild.
1. Conflates consciousness with "thinking" - LLMs may process information effectively without being conscious, but the article treats these as the same phenomenon
2. Ignores the cerebellum cases - We have documented cases of humans leading normal lives with little to no cerebellum, which contradicts simplistic "brain = deep learning" equivalences
3. Most damning: When you apply these exact same techniques to anything OTHER than language, the results are mediocre. Video generation still can't figure out basic physics (glass bouncing instead of shattering, ropes defying physics). Computer vision has been worked on since the 1960s - far longer than LLMs - yet it's nowhere near achieving what looks like "understanding."
The timeline is the smoking gun: vision had decades of head start, yet LLMs leapfrogged it in just a few years. That strongly suggests the "magic" is in language itself (which has been proven to be fractal and already heavily compressed/structured by human cognition) - NOT in the neural architecture. We're not teaching machines to think.
We're teaching them to navigate a pre-existing map that was already built.