Why on earth would mass intercept be necessary or even help in that?
If you got scammed by someone, then you can contact the police and hand over your message history. Why would the cops be interested in someone else's message history for this?
Lawful interception is not "mass intercept."
It's the ability to surveil traffic from/to a clearly identified party, upon a judicial order for specific reason, for a limited time.
ChatControl, on the other hand, is mass interception. I'm against it. Most people in the EU are against it. But to prevent things like ChatControl coming up over and over again, a basic tool to combat Internet crime is required.
Now we have found “lawful intercept” can easily just become mass surveillance, and not just by the people who are meant to use it but other parties too. We saw this with CALEA which was used by China (and who knows who else) for espionage and spying for years before anyone realised.
You make a system for the “good guys” and it always turns out adversary, criminal groups etc. will gain access, even if the “good guys” don’t start acting like bad guys themselves.
Technology made mass surveillance easy, so every lawful intercept becomes mass surveillance as well as vulnerable to scammers, criminals and foreign intelligence.
And we don’t have any way of making lawful intercept possible without that unfortunately.
The problem is nobody uses them to combat crime on the internet. They use them for stupid shit usually or stuff that involves lots and lots of money.
We're jumping the gun here. We already have a fire bomb, and we're not using it, but we're going ahead to developing the nuke. Makes no sense.
Chat Control seeks to execute on each and every device before/after encryption so it has access to the data pre/post encryption.
If the servers don't have it, what do you do? You go to the end points, you issue a warrant, and there's your unencrypted data.
What if they don't wanna do that? I don't know, that's out of scope.
People refuse warrants all the time. You know what we DON'T do? Say, "fuck it" and no longer require warrants.
Again, let's look at good old mail. I can encrypt mail. I can write in ciphers.
Okay, now FedEx gets a warrant. They give me the mail. I can't read it. Uh oh. What do I do? I go to the sender and recipient, and I issue warrants. Problem solved.
That's how we do things, that's how weve always done things, and that's the only reasonable way to do things. We don't say "hey post office, open up every letter and read it. And if it sounds suspicious, tell us". We don't do that.
Okay, so everyone understands that and there's no confusion. When we go online, suddenly there's confusion. Is it confusion, or is the confusion a viel for authoritarian?
There's a different set of laws for that...
But, in a jurisdiction with a functioning rule of law, these abuses can be spotted and remedied.
Doing the same for mass surveillance (such as ChatControl) or state-sponsored malware is much harder.
I'm advocating against ChatControl and malware, and proposing existing lawful interception frameworks as an alternative. But, apparently it's not my day :)
The reason we know is because authorities were able to place listening devices into the rooms that they were in, or surveil them from other buildings.
I’m still unconvinced that this make’s law enforcement’s job so hard that something has to give.
Something does have to give: the constant demands for interception capabilities on end-to-end encrypted protocols. Those demands must be thoroughly destroyed every time they rear their head again.
If you needed any indication for how these pseudo-charities (usually it's a charity front and a commercial "technology partner") are not interested in the public good, SafeToNet, a company that up until last year was trying to sell a CSAM livestream detection system to tech companies to "help become compliant" ("SafeToWatch") now sells a locked down Android phone to overprotective parents that puts an overlay on screen whenever naked skin can be seen (of any kind). It's based on a phone that retails for 150 pounds - but costs almost 500 with this app preinstalled into your system partition. That's exceptionally steep for a company that up until last year was all about moral imperatives to build this tech.
It's just local image hashing and matching? Or is this only one implementation idea?
If you're the victim, just hand over the relevant chats yourself. Otherwise, just follow the money. And if the attackers are sitting in a country whose banks you can't get to cooperate, intercepting chat messages from within that country won't do you any good either.
Also, if someone has malicious intent and is part of a criminal network, the people within that network would hardly feel burdened by all digital messages on all popular apps being listened in on by the government. These people will just use their own private applications. Making one is like 30min of work or starting at $50 on fiverr.
The challenging regulations around technically anonymous crypto currencies require you to actively make trackable arrangements with your financial service providers. VERY few people will ever do this, and therefore if anything suspicious were to occur, all you've achieved is putting yourself on the suspect list preemptively.
Because if lawful interception of in-transit messages is not possible or permitted, hacking either the client or the server becomes the only option.
You may enjoy reading https://therecord.media/encrochat-police-arrest-6500-suspect.... Or just downvoting me. Or both.
Of the serious criminals, the only ones you'll be catching are those with low technical knowledge (everyone else will just be using their own applications) and the Venn diagram of those with little tech knowledge and those whose digital privacy practices could deceive law enforcement resembles AA cups against a pane of glass.
Regarding Encrochat, it is no surprise that an (unintentional?) watering hole gathered up a bunch of tech-illiterate, the fallacy is that those people wouldn't have been caught if they weren't allowed to flock to a single platform for some time.
Would some people have not been caught until much later or even not at all? Sure, but if LE would do its job (and not ignoring, or even covering up, well known problem areas and organizations for years to decades), only those of low priority.
Is that little gain worth creating a tool to allow Iran or similar countries to check every families' messages if they suspect some family member might be gay?
Hard nope.
> Or just downvoting me.
Don't worry, I rarely do that and that's not just because I can't...
The two sides in this debate seem to be talking at cross purposes, which is why it goes round and round.
A: "We need to do this, however it's done, it was possible before so it must be possible now"
B: "You can't do this because of the implementation details (i.e. you can't break encryption without breaking it for everyone)"
ad infinitum.
Regardless of my own views on this, it seems to me that A needs to make a concrete proposal
Apps like Signal don't entirely fall within the scope of these, which is the cause of the current manic attempts to grab more powers.
My point is that these powers grabs should be resisted, and that new services should be brought into the fold of existing laws.
The prevailing opinion here seems to be that, instead, state hacking should be endorsed. Which, well...
If you want to prosecute people send physical goons, which are of limited quantity, rather than limitless, cheaper and better by the day pervasive surveillance of everybody and everything.
OK, sorry to keep repeating myself here, but... I strongly oppose any kind of "panopticon" like ChatControl.
What I would like to see, is, say, Signal complying with lawful interception orders in the same way that any EU telecoms provider currently does.
So, provide cleartext contents of communications to/from a cleary identified party, for a limited time, by judicial order, for a clearly specified reason.
> pervasive surveillance of everybody and everything
This is exactly what lawful intercept laws are supposed to prevent. And yeah, of course, abuse, but under a functioning rule of law there are at least ways to remedy that, unlike with mass surveillance and/or malware...
Those statements simply aren't compatible.
Right now, Signal is designed by cryptography experts to provide the best privacy we know how to build: messages are only readable by you or the intended recipient. "Lawful intercept" necessarily means some additional third party is given the ability to read messages.
It doesn't matter what kind of legal framework you have around that, because you can't just build a cryptosystem where the key is "a warrant issued under due process." There has to be a system, somewhere, that has access to plaintext messages and can give law enforcement and courts access. The judges, officers, technicians, suppliers, and software involved in building and using this system are all potential vectors by which this access can be compromised or misused -- whether via software or hardware attacks, social engineering, or abuse of power.
Maybe your country has "functioning rule of law", and every single government official and all the vendors they hire are pure as snow, but what about all the rest of us living in imperfect countries? What about when a less-than-totally-law-abiding regime comes into power?
You're proposing that we secure our private conversations with TSA luggage locks.
No -- that's an incredibly reductive summary, and the attitude you display here is, if left unchecked, exactly what will allow something equally ridiculous like ChatControl to pass eventually.
There has been plenty of previous debate when innovations like postal mail, telegraph traffic and phone calls were introduced. This debate has resulted in laws, jurisprudence, and corresponding operating procedures for law enforcement.
You may believe there are no legitimate reasons to intercept private communications, but the actual laws of the country you live in right now say otherwise, I guarantee you. You may not like that, and/or not believe in the rule of law anymore anyway, but I can't help you with that.
What I can hopefully convince you of, is that there needs to be some way to bring modern technology in line with existing laws, while avoiding "9/11"-style breakdowns of civil rights.
What is most striking about our "mandated microphone" analogy is the utter futility of it. Criminals have no issue breaking the law, and hence have no issue outfitting a room with no microphones in which to carry out their dealings. The same is true of any law targeting encrypted chats.
If people speak up and say "take away our rights" at a referendum, let that be their decision, not a political backroom deal.
[1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1232/oj
[2] Article 10 at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.h...
Lawful intercept laws exist in most, if not all, EU countries.
It's just that super-national overlay services like Signal don't entirely fall within the framework of those.
So, there is now a choice: expand interception powers indefinitely (a.k.a. ChatControl, which, to make things crystal-clear, I'm 100% against), or bring new services into the fold of existing legislation.
Lawful interception is not proactive: it requires a judicial order to collect plaintext communications from/to specifically identified individuals (resident in the country demanding the interception), for a limited time and for a specific purpose.
ChatControl, which I strongly argue AGAINST would sort-of be what you describe. But: I. Am. Arguing. AGAINST. That.
Eve, a police officer has evidence that Alice and Bob are messaging each other about crimes and obtains a warrant to require Charlie to intercept their communication. Charlie has no ability to do so because it is encrypted with keys known only by Alice and Bob.
If you want a different result, someone has to proactively change part of this process. Which part should change?
One option is to mandate that any encrypted messaging software also give a key to the government or the government's designee, but someone using open source software can modify it so that it doesn't do that, which would be hard or impossible to detect without a forensic search of their device.
Another option is to mandate that a service provider like Charlie's only deliver messages after verifying that it can decrypt them. This, too is hard to enforce because users can layer additional encryption on top of the existing protocol. Signal's predecessor TextSecure did that over SMS.
Both of those options introduce a serious security vulnerability if the mechanism for accessing the mandatory escrowed keys were ever compromised. Would you like to suggest another mechanism?
If you have the ability to run custom software—even if it’s a bash script—you can develop secure alternatives. And even if you somehow restrict open source messaging, I can just use good old pen-and-paper OTP to encrypt the plaintext before typing it in, or copy/paste some other text pre-encrypted in another program. But even then, all this will do is kick off a steganographic arms race. AI generated text where the first letter of each word is the cyphertext may be nearly impossible to identify, especially at scale.
If anything like this were to pass, my first task would be making a gamified, user-friendly frontend for this kind of thing.
Don’t give them any ideas!
I don't know what you mean by this.
> But please note that I did not list "online banking becoming impossible" as a likely outcome.
No, but it should be a likely and maybe even desired outcome, especially if a justification for surveillance is the prevention of online banking fraud among other crimes.
> Merely malware continuing to be state-sponsored, or certain communications to be surveilled.
Norms and mores change over time, so the only conclusion is that "certain communications" will become "all communications" at some point in the future. I'd love to be proven wrong.
Yeah, but laws tend to be more constant, and lawful interception laws are, 100% guaranteed, a thing, right now, in the country where you live.
They apply to telegrams, postal mail, telephone conversations, and a whole bunch of other things nobody really does anymore. They don't really apply to the things people do tend to do these days.
ChatControl is an incompetent attempt to remediate the lapses in law enforcement that this has caused. I strongly oppose it. But I also strongly oppose the idea that the Internet should be off limits for any kind of law enforcement, unless it is through dubious mechanisms like state-sponsored malware.
Your "slippery slope" argument is much more compelling in the absense of extended lawful interception than in the situation where Signal messages would somehow be equated to postcards or SMS messages...
And how in the world can we have safety if relational trust is suffocated before it can even take root?
Please use your imagination! Those aren't the only options if we embrace trust as essential rather than looking at any need for it as a liability.
That anyone thinks this blatantly obvious attack on free speech is actually going to be used only for law enforcement is wild to me.
Do you want the police to regularily intercept and check your signal chats for fraud and crime so this does not happen, or what is the point here?
No, that's not how lawful intercept laws work.
I want police to be able to obtain a judicial order to intercept, for a limited time, in cleartext, the (Signal chats, or whatever other encrypted communications) of identified parties reasonably suspected to be involved with criminal activity.
ChatControl is not that, and it's one of the reasons it's a nonstarter.
They already have that in most (?) jurisdictions by now.
With a warrant, they can install a virus on the device that will then do targeted surveillance.
ChatControl is bad, because it is blanket surveillance of everyone without warrant.
Yeah, and that sponsors an entire malware industry!
I don't really know how I can make my position any clearer, but...
-Malware: bad!
-ChatControl (encryption backdoors): bad!
-Inability to do any kind of law enforcement involving "the Internet": double-plus bad!
-Enforcement of existing lawful interception laws in the face of new technology: maybe look at that?
You could state in plain words what do you propose as an alternative.
I read what you wrote, but have no idea what you propose.
It's literally the last item in my list?
But to further clarify: I would like existing lawful interception laws to be extended to services like Signal.
Not in the sense that any EU country should be able to break Signal crypto (as ChatControl proposes, and which I think is an utterly ill-advised idea), but that competent law enforcement agencies should be able to demand unencrypted Signal communications from/to an identified EU party, for a limited time and purpose, upon a (reviewable) judicial order.
Most, if not all, EU countries currently have similar laws applying to telegrams, snail mail, email, telephony and whatnot. If you don't like those either, that's fine, but that's the status quo, and I would like to see that extended to services like Signal, as opposed to incompetently dumb measures like ChatControl...
Or would you go extreme and outlaw decentraliced encrypted communication alltogether?
Should Thailand be granted access to enforce their lease majeste laws, for example? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A8se-majest%C3%A9_in_Th...
Who gets to decide what gets made available to who?
We're taking about ChatControl here, so law enforcement of EU countries, under their respective laws, into which EU law should have been incorporated
> Should Thailand be granted access to enforce their lease majeste laws
Same answer as "should Thailand be granted arrest rights to enforce <whatever>": they submit a legal assistance request to the country where the alleged crime occurred.
In the case of a lawful interception request for "lease[sic] majeste" reasons, I'm pretty sure this would be immediately rejected.
But, if not, the EU subject of such interception would have lots and lots of avenues to get redress.
Again, and I'm getting sort of tired from repeating myself: "lawful interception" does not mean "indiscriminate surveillance at the whim of whomever" -- it is a well-defined concept that has been used to determine which telegrams and mail pieces to open and which telephone calls to record for ages now. Your country absolutely does it, as we speak, no matter where you live. It's just that modern technology has far outpaced the scope of this legislation, and things like ChatControl are (incompetent) responses to that.
ChatControl is not a good idea, and has very little chance of becoming reality. But to stop dumb proposals like this from coming up over and over again, something has got to give.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_global_telecommunications... https://unshakled.org/salt-typhoon-the-unintended-consequenc... https://group2000.com/articles/a-wake-up-call-for-securing-l...
-ChatControl, as it is currently defined, is not going to happen, because it's absolutely stupid and would make impossible, amongst other things, online banking
-Yet, there is a growing and legitimate demand for lawful interception of 'chat' services. I mean, "sure, your bank account got emptied, but we can't look into that because it happened via Signal" just isn't a good look
-So, something has got to give. Either 'chat' services need to become 'providers of telecoms services' and therefore implement lawful interception laws, or the malware industry will continue to flourish, or something even more stupid will happen
Pick your poison.