After the 1992 Consensus [1], the Taiwanese government still considered the Mainland its territory (again under a One-China Interpretation), but also acknowledges the CCP's interpretation of One-China. In practice, this meant they officially abandoned plans to re-take the Mainland, and focus on maintaining the status quo of peace and stability.
Interestingly, the Taiwanese government also used to lay claim to Mongolia in addition to the Chinese Mainland.[2]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Consensus [2] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2024/08/25/20...
It's whose government will get to run the whole thing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembl...
Everything else is just bonus to them. Semiconductors, supporting nationalism, you name it.
Taiwan isn't about military proximity. It's about access shipping access. Try open up a map. Despite China having a vast coastline, they do not have access to the open seas. Every one of their shipping lanes requires passage through another nation's waters.
If a heavy conflict were to erupt, China's supply chains would be cut off via naval blockade. It's a huge risk to China, and one they've attempted to ameliorate via the Belt and Road Initiative.
That changes if they acquire Taiwan. Taiwan's importance is not of offensive, but defensive primacy.
Or possibly the 30+ fast attack submarines sinking every military or resupply vessel in the region, augmented by a colossal amount of rapidly-deployed naval mines.
Taiwan doesn't buy them much in this regard. Why would China be permitted to use sea freight at all in a "heavy conflict" scenario? Why not just sink these vessels near their origin - why allow Brazilian soybeans to even make it out of the hemisphere?
I didn’t realize that Okinawa is halfway between the Japanese mainland and Taiwan, and the Japanese territorial waters extend right up to the Taiwanese EEZ on account of Japan’s far-flung southern islands.
It's also political: China hates that there's a Western-style democracy full of "Chinese rebels" on an island 80 miles from their doorstep. They also don't like the cozy relationship between the Taiwanese and US militaries.
This doesn’t really hold up when looking at a map that includes Okinawa and Batanes.
Now granted, China is getting there but their navy is still mostly brown water (by design). And in any Taiwan / SCS conflict they would have an advantage because they can use their land assets, especially air force and land based anti ship rockets, on top of their navy.
The US land bases in the region are few or dependent on the grace of the host countries. Depending on political situation they might not Ok strikes against China if a conflict occurs for fear of being drawn into the war and angering China if the US loses. The only one Id be 100% on is Japan, they’d fight China to the last.
TLDR is the potential regional balance is increasingly lop sided in favour of PRC with gap widening, i.e. US+co can't preposition hardware at relevant rate. PRC hinted their cruise missile gigafactory has capacity to exhaust/target entire current US+co hardware inventory + stockpiles with few months production. A few more months enough to comprehensively shatter critical infra of US partners in 1IC. Hence why JP likely won't fight, because ultimately they're just a larger TW, also dependant on energy and calorie imports, and main islands also entirely within umbrella of PRC mainland fires. Mainland China is much better postured to operation Starvation JP than US from Marianas (25% further, and still needed logistics from CONUS) was during WW2. And if JP gives PRC excuse to fight them then PRC will (LBH be somewhat eager) to fight to the last JPnese. If JP doesn't, then they... well survive, maybe even still keep US protection. Most likely they'll only lose Senkaku when regional dynamics reconfigure. IMO current sign of JP not fighting is stronger than JP will fight... i.e. not opening main islands to distributed AGILE basing - US basically said they need JP in TW scenario, but they need to disperse all across JP not just Okinawa and Ryukyu's for survivability and JP action so far (since Trump1) is to not. It doesn't matter what JP politicians say for security theatre, IMO JP not committed until they start heavily militarizing main islands.
Any form of government is going to make mistakes.
Going to war and killing people is "a mistake". Let me rephrase it for you:
The fact that democracies are the same murderous criminal fucks when it suits their goals as are dictators. Yes the have more problem having their population to approve it but do they give a flying fuck?
Democracies aren't perfect, but they can change, admit mistakes and adapt.
In a democracy ideas are ingrained in public psyche for support. Be it Muslims/Jews/Christians good/bad, immigrants evil, abortion bad all become part of a large percentage of people's belief and changing that requires equally herculean efforts.
In autocracy, people are generally kept aloof of such decisions so you can always switch enemies from Eurasia to Eastasia and no one cares. In case of China, the value of Taiwan/Arunachal/... is mostly egoistical, based on some notion that Qing China boundaries must be restored. If tomorrow a new leadership comes and makes EU kind of setup with Taiwan, people will have no say and most won't care.
I don’t think this is an “if” situation, but rather a “when”. There is no question in my mind - it’s simply too attractive to China. It may not come through all out war, but they will eventually claim what they feel is theirs. They operate on much more manageable time scales.