I currently have two-factor setup on two accounts. I won't say there's no hassle involved--authorizing a machine via SMS so that I can login and generate an app-specific password is a chore--but the peace of mind is well worth the hassle.
Did you also know that you can re-assign your Apple ID to an existing e-mail address? Like, say, one you have two-factor enabled for? Now people can socially engineer Apple's flawed policy all day but they'll need to steal my phone, too.
EDIT: Also, if you don't have backups, you might as well just delete everything yourself right now and use that as motivation to prevent the same thing from happening again. Hackers, tornadoes, spontaneous combustion and ghosts are all conspiring to destroy your data sooner or later.
Part of the reason I think two-factor authentication is a usability burden is because each "identity provider" wants to use its own protocol. Google uses an Android app. PayPal sent me a card. My brokerage has a keychain token available. Other companies use a "soft" RSA token that runs on Windows. But if everyone agreed on a protocol, then I could have everything in one place, which would make two factor authentication significantly more enjoyable to use. (I know there are standards: the question is, who other than Google follows them? :)
I believe Google Authenticator is based on open standards and open source, so people could standardize on it if they wanted too.
The standards implemented are bonafide RFCs - HOTP (counter-based) was published in 2005, no less. I'm not sure how much lower the barriers for integration could be.
It is an open standard protocol, but I don't know in practice how many companies have compatible implementations.
I designed Authy with that in mind. I wanted a way to have a 1 token for all accounts. Maybe we will add support for Google Authenticator, so you could import your Google Auth token into the app.
They are Google-generated passwords with a user label. And if you use 2-factor authentication, they are the weakest link in the chain since they provide full access to a google account except for access vectors with 2-factor authentication. In addition, every app can use such a password, not just the app you created the password for …
2-factor authentication is great and certainly recommendable but you should not fool users by using the false term 'application-specific passwords'. In addition, more complex Google-generated password would be appreciated.
Also this password doesn't give you full access to your Google account. You cannot log into Google web apps this way (AFAIR). Thus you won't be able to mess with account settings (passwords etc). Before you can change critical account settings Google asks you to provide your traditional password again.
Your comment is a bit harsh if not FUD.
Using one of these so-called application-specific passwords, you can delete calendars, mails and contacts. That is critical enough for most users.
An additional concern is the usual 30-day authorization you give in order to avoid entering your 2-factor token again and again. Is there any way to de-authorize such a 30-day authorization?
Anyway, I don't rule out that my perspective might be too strict. For must users, the whole Google 2-step authentication system is probably a very important step towards improved security.
If a hacker gets a hold of an old backup of mine, which includes a Pidgin configuration file I forgot to delete, which holds a plaintext password, can he get into my account with that?
If you weren't using application specific passwords, of course, it would have been your actual Google password in that Pidgin config.
It's a little disappointing that the app-specific password isn't more secure, but it's certainly not less secure than foregoing them.
App-specific passwords are bypasses of 2-factor auth. Use them selectively and with care, revoke ones you're not using anymore. And replace them from time to time.
If you value security more than convenience don't use application specific passwords. Google certainly allows for that by only consuming their services through a secure web interface. Is there another mainstream e-mail provider who supports that?
However, if you would like to use apps, gtalk, pidgin, etc. Google will still let you and it will still be more secure than before (revoke specific passwords, etc.).
If one of your application specific passwords (ASPs) is compromised your e-mail content will be compromised but NOT your account as long as your phone / token generator are under your control, allowing you to recover access by your own means. That is a big difference.
A quick search shows that others share my concern about ASPs: http://webapps.stackexchange.com/questions/13317/how-does-ap... http://tech.kateva.org/2011/07/massive-security-hole-in-goog... https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/chromebook-central/z...
Off the top of my head, I don't even know if it's possible to ensure my iPhone or GalaxySII is using SSL/TLS for it's POP/IMAP connections (or if an attacker with brief access to my device could switch it to plain-text-passwords then sniff it's authentication on the local wifi).
A kludge, sure, but a possibility.
ASPs are certainly less secure than 2FA, but they only permit services access, rather than account administration access.
2FA is slightly more hassle for the knowledge that you are effectively protected against a wide range of attacks. It's very worth it.
2-step authentication is great but the (wrongly) so-called application-specific passwords are definitely the weakest link in the chain. They do not allow for a full takeover of a Google Apps account but there is still a lot of damage possible.
If you use the same generated password for every application, then you're not in that much better a situation than you would be otherwise. If you use different identifiers for each application, you can identify exactly where a breach happened from by last login time, and disable that password entirely.
It'd make me a lot more comfortable if I could lock each password down to a specific Google service (for instance: generate an OTP for Pidgin, and enable it only for Google Talk), they were a lot longer, and had special chars + numbers in them.
The point about permitting a password to be used for only certain services is absolutely a valid one, though.
Edit: To add to my reply, I have never used the remember password for Pidgin in the past, however enabling 2 step auth require me to do that. It'd be great if Google could somehow allow only the first associated app with a password for subsequent uses. Technically that looks very challenging (if at all possible).
The inflexible account ordering in Authenticator is bugging me, since I recently added a 5th account (not 5 google accounts) and my phone only shows 4 at a time. I don't know if you have any influence over the people maintaining the app, but it looks trivial to fix, given the comments.
It's similar to @mat's problem - Amazon assumed the CC last 4 digits was "non identifying", Apple assumed they were.
How much effort do you suppose your phone company expends securing your voicemail or call forwarding? I'll bet it's less than would be considered "industry best practice" for securing your corporate dns records…
First, let me explain a little bit of background on this "hack". From the article, they had 4 problems with their process that allowed them to get hacked badly:
1. AT&T was tricked into redirecting my voicemail to a fraudulent voicemail box;
2. Google's account recovery process was tricked by the fraudulent voicemail box and left an account recovery PIN code that allowed my personal Gmail account to be reset;
3. A flaw in Google's Enterprise Apps account recovery process allowed the hacker to bypass two-factor authentication on my CloudFlare.com address; and
4. CloudFlare BCCing transactional emails to some administrative accounts allowed the hacker to reset the password of a customer once the hacker had gained access to the administrative email account.
I'm not really sure what #3 is and #4 is irrelevant to our discussion, so I'll concentrate on points #1 and #2.
From #1, it follows that the attackers were able to obtain the phone number associated with the two factor auth. How did this work? My assumption is that it was a very targeted attack.
The article starts the attack at June 1st, 2012, but I believe (read: assume) that the attackers probably met the target of the attack beforehand and obtained his/her business card (with a cellphone number), which allowed them to perform #1 above.
So, given that this attack required a physical piece of paper (i.e. a business card) to be acquired from the target, it is not a stretch of imagination to say that if another attacker wanted to obtain the last 4 digits of someone's credit card, all they need to do is follow the person to a restaurant or gas station and get a payment receipt -- every receipt has the last 4 digits written on it. Some have the first four.
Therefore, I don't believe it was Amazon's fault for assuming the last 4 digits are non-identifying, but rather Apple's fault for assuming they are. To be clear, hindsight is 20/20, so I think it was relatively reasonable for Apple to assume that. However, I do expect Apple to change this policy in the future.
(And, there are many alternative and easier ways to acquire most people's cellphone number - no need to meet someone or get them to give you a business card… But your point still stands…)
It's true about a cellphone number -- from what I heard about his attack outside of this article, this a very targeted attack, and the attacker knew exactly what kind of data to expect in the GMail account, which is what led me to conclude that the attacker probably knew or met the victim, but likewise, good point about obtaining the cell in other ways.
The app works very good on both Android and iOS (I personally use the iOS app because I flashed new ROM all the time and sometimes Titanium Backup of the app doesn't work). I tried the SMS a few times, the message normally arrives within one minute.
I went to a different computer that had previously had Chrome synced using ASP, switched to my account, and went to settings. At the top, I get this error message: "Account sign-in details are out of date. Sign in again" That's good since ASP was revoked. But then I go down to advanced settings => passwords, and they're all still visible?!?! That's just WRONG! If the ASP login credentials have been revoked, access to all locally stored passwords need to be revoked too!
Any idea what's going on? This seems like a flaw. The 2-factor authentication is still great though.
(insert your answer below)
I would also recommend putting an unlock pattern on your phone to protect in case your phone is stolen.
1) You still need to enter your password every time you log in.
2) You can add backup phones that can be called/texted with the verification codes
3) You can print out back-up codes that will always work (once)
4) If your phone is stolen and is using an application-specific password, you can revoke that password for that application.
If your phone gets stolen and it's logged in to your google mail without a lockscreen pin/code, then yeah - the thief can read your mail, 2fa won't help. They can also run your Authenticator app and see the current 6 digit number, but that's not useful without the password as well.
(I'm not sure how easy it is to extract the Google password from an Android or i phone - I wonder if you can just switch them to non-TLS POP3 or IMAP and have them send a cleartext password over an unencrypted wifi connection?)
However, I think google services use XMPP if I'm not mistaken. In which case the password is never actually transmitted over the air. XMPP uses Digest access authentication[1]. Short version: the server would first send a challenge to the client. The client hashes the challenge with a hash of the password and returns the result. The server performs the same operation and compares. So even with a MITM you'd get nothing. Furthermore, the client itself would never need to store the password either.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digest_access_authentication
They can wreck havoc, but they cannot change your password and steal your account.
The root problem in this story is that things are just too damn interconnected these days. And we're encourage to interconnect them even further (using cellphones to authenticate email, in this case).
Edit: I think that my reply is not harsh enough. After reading the comments more closely, I see that this a typical IT response to IT failure. 1. Ignore the root cause. (Interconnectedness.) 2. Blame the user. (Implicitly, for not enabling two-factor auth.) 3. Suggest a workaround and dismiss any concerns real-life scenarios. (E.g. loosing your wallet and cellphone in an emergency. Emergencies like that happen more often that you'd think.) 4. Feel smug.
They would still have been able to compromise his iCloud account and thus destroy the data stored on his computers.
Unfortunately, I think that in this particular case, having two-factor auth on GMail wouldn't have helped. His account was compromised by having a password recovery email sent to his iCloud address. Presumably, password recovery bypasses two-factor auth.
In this attack and the earlier CloudFlare attack, the attacker took advantage of inappropriate recovery email settings. While it's reasonable for consumers to enter recovery emails, I think that professionals should avoid enabling them. When a @gmail.com sends recovery mail to @me.com (or vice-versa), the attack surface is greatly increased.
Secondly, the Wired article made this claim: "Because I didn’t have Google’s two-factor authentication turned on, when Phobia entered my Gmail address, he could view the alternate e-mail I had set up for account recovery. Google partially obscures that information, starring out many characters, but there were enough characters available, m••••[email protected]."
I don't know for sure whether that's true or not. But assume it is true. If two-factor authentication had been enabled, then the hackers would have had a much harder time guessing Mat's email address for iCloud and whether he had a @me.com email address at all.
The problem may be that "me.com" is so short that Google might display the full domain name. If that's the case, Google should fix it.
Gmail was not really needed to guess the name at @me.com.
Moreover, in his case, it seems he would be better off not having the secondary e-mail address for recovery at Google. It turned out to be anti-security measure.
I disagree. I think most iCloud users (%80 of iOS users by Apple's count) have @me addresses when they upgraded to iOS 5 or Lion. I can use both my @gmail.com and my @me.com in App Store to purchase, or to login to icloud.com.
I've found this to be true - to a certain extent. I had two factor authentication turned on and found it to be a nightmare in OSX Mail. Failures to retrieve mail, asking for my password constantly, etc. I was resetting the application passwords every two days. I tried to research a fix, but in the end it became less of a hassle just to turn it off and have my email work 100% of the time.
It's probably a bug in Mail.app in Lion, but I can't say my experiences with two factor auth have been positive.
Thats what they're for.
Some of the common misperceptions I see:
Myth: But what if my cell phone doesn't have SMS/signal?
Reality: You can install a standalone program called Google Authenticator, so your cell phone doesn't need a signal.
Myth: Okay, but what about if my cell phone runs out of power (added: or my phone is stolen)?
Reality: You can print out a small piece of paper with 10 one-time rescue codes and put that in your wallet.
Myth: Don't I have to fiddle with an extra PIN every time I log in?
Reality: You can tell Google to trust your computer for 30 days and maybe even longer.
Myth: I heard two-factor authentication doesn't work with POP and IMAP?
Reality: You can still use two-factor authentication even with POP and IMAP. You create a special "application-specific password" that your mail client can use instead of your regular password. You can revoke application-specific passwords at any time.
Myth: Okay, but what if I want to verify how secure Google Authenticator is?
Reality: Google Authenticator is open-source: http://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/
Hmm. Maybe I should throw this up on my blog too.