I'm very sorry to admit it but I'm too lazy to read the entire discussion in this thread. Could you please tell me, a mere mortal, at which point the humanity should start worrying about the security of asymmetric encryption in the brave new world of quantum computing?
Which to be clear is quite a bit faster than expected in 2020, but still within the realm of plausible stuff.
The authors argue (e.g. in the first comment here https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=8310#comments) that by their definition, Google still only has a fraction of one logical qubit. Their logical error rate is of order 1e-3, whereas this paper considers a logical qubit to have error of order 1e-18. Google's breakthrough here is to show that the logical error rate can be reduced exponentially as they make the system larger, but there is still a lot of scaling work to do to reach 1e-18.
So according to this paper, we are still on roughly the same track that they laid out, and therefore might expect to break RSA between 2040 and 2060. Note that there are likely a lot of interesting things one can do before breaking RSA, which is among the hardest quantum algorithms to run.
The error correcting code used in this work also has a nice intuitive explanation. Imagine a 2D grid of bits, visualized as pixels that can be black or white. Now imagine drawing a bunch of lines of black pixels, and enforcing that lines can only end on the top or bottom boundary (loops are allowed). If there is an even number of lines connecting the top to the bottom, we call that logical 0, and if there is an odd number of lines, we call that logical 1. This again has the property that as you add more bits, the probability of changing between logical 1 and 0 gets exponentially smaller, because the lines connecting top to bottom get longer (just like in the repetiton code).
This code also has the nice property that if you measure the value of a small patch of (qu)bits, there's no way to tell what the logical state is. This is important for quantum error correction, because measurement destroys quantum information. So the fact that local measurements don't reveal the logical state means that the logical state is protected. This isn't true for the repetition code, where measuring a single bit tells you the logical state.
Use a key exchange that offers perfect forward secrecy (e.g. diffie Hellman) and you don’t need to worry about your RSA private key eventually being discovered.
Unless they break ECDHE, it doesn’t matter if RSA gets popped.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman_key_exc...
The point is that you can build stuff on top of RSA today even if you expect it to be broken eventually if RSA is only for identity verification.
[1] https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/33069/why-is-ec...
There are several choices with scaling RSA too, you can push the primes which slows generation time considerably. Or the more reasonable approach is to settle on a prime size but use multiple of them (MP-RSA). The second approach scales indefinitely. Though it would only serve a purpose if you are determined to hedge against the accepted PQC algorithms (Kyber/MLKEM, McEliece) being broken at some point.
The Intel 4004, in 1971, had only 2,250 transistors.
A handful of qubits today might become a billion sooner than you think.
All perfect forward secrecy means is that you delete your own ephemeral private keys, the public keys stay in the record. And a quantum computer will recover the deleted private keys.
Also, none of the currently accepted post-quantum cryptographic algorithms offer a Diffie-Hellman construction. They use KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism).
This.
People seems to think that because something is end to end encrypted it is secure. They don't seem to grasp that the traffic and communication that is possibly dumped/recorded now in encrypted form could be used against them decades later.
https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/61596
But ... AES is believed to be quantum-safe-ish, so with perfect forwards secrecy this exact threat can be quite well managed.
The currently best known quantum attack on AES requires a serial computation of "half of key length" (Grover's algorithm ... so if they key is 128 bit long then it requires 2^64 sequential steps)
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskNetsec/comments/15i0nzp/aes256_i...
https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/why...
Ah, okay for iMessage, something called PQ3[1], hm, it uses Kyber. And it's also a hybrid scheme, combining ECC. And a lot of peer review.
And there's also some formal verification for Signal's PQXDH [2].
Oh, wow, not bad. Thanks!
Now let's hope a good reliable sane implementation emerges so others can also try this scheme. (And I'm very curious of the added complexity/maintenance burden and computational costs. Though I guess this mostly runs on the end users' devices, right?)
[1] https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/ [2] https://github.com/Inria-Prosecco/pqxdh-analysis
So despite this significant progress, it's probably a still a while until RSA is put out of the job. That being said, quantum computers would be able to retroactively break any public keys that were stored, so there's a case to be made for switching to quantum-resistant cryptography (like lattice-based cryptography) sooner rather than later.