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Re:Willow, Our Quantum Chip by pas on Tuesday December 10, 2024 @06:42AM (#42375957)
Well. Yes, but currently there are no well tested (ie. recommended by the ITsec community) post-quantum cryptosystems as far as I understand.

https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/61596

But ... AES is believed to be quantum-safe-ish, so with perfect forwards secrecy this exact threat can be quite well managed.

The currently best known quantum attack on AES requires a serial computation of "half of key length" (Grover's algorithm ... so if they key is 128 bit long then it requires 2^64 sequential steps)

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskNetsec/comments/15i0nzp/aes256_i...

Re:Willow, Our Quantum Chip by _tk_ on Tuesday December 10, 2024 @07:53AM (#42376374)
Google uses NTRU-HRSS internally, which seems reasonable.

https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/why...

Re:Willow, Our Quantum Chip by makeworld on Tuesday December 10, 2024 @09:04AM (#42376921)
Signal and Apple both use post-quantum.
Re:Willow, Our Quantum Chip by pas on Tuesday December 10, 2024 @03:08PM (#42380887)
I read about Signal's double-trouble tactics, but I haven't heard about Apple's.

Ah, okay for iMessage, something called PQ3[1], hm, it uses Kyber. And it's also a hybrid scheme, combining ECC. And a lot of peer review.

And there's also some formal verification for Signal's PQXDH [2].

Oh, wow, not bad. Thanks!

Now let's hope a good reliable sane implementation emerges so others can also try this scheme. (And I'm very curious of the added complexity/maintenance burden and computational costs. Though I guess this mostly runs on the end users' devices, right?)

[1] https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/ [2] https://github.com/Inria-Prosecco/pqxdh-analysis