Unless they break ECDHE, it doesn’t matter if RSA gets popped.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman_key_exc...
The point is that you can build stuff on top of RSA today even if you expect it to be broken eventually if RSA is only for identity verification.
[1] https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/33069/why-is-ec...
There are several choices with scaling RSA too, you can push the primes which slows generation time considerably. Or the more reasonable approach is to settle on a prime size but use multiple of them (MP-RSA). The second approach scales indefinitely. Though it would only serve a purpose if you are determined to hedge against the accepted PQC algorithms (Kyber/MLKEM, McEliece) being broken at some point.
The Intel 4004, in 1971, had only 2,250 transistors.
A handful of qubits today might become a billion sooner than you think.
All perfect forward secrecy means is that you delete your own ephemeral private keys, the public keys stay in the record. And a quantum computer will recover the deleted private keys.
Also, none of the currently accepted post-quantum cryptographic algorithms offer a Diffie-Hellman construction. They use KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism).
Use a key exchange that offers perfect forward secrecy (e.g. diffie Hellman) and you don’t need to worry about your RSA private key eventually being discovered.