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Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by triyambakam on Thursday October 10, 2024 @02:57PM (#41802138)
Hmm, I wish the author had reviewed Proton. I think it's kind of seen as a meme here? But I heavily rely on it and generally the Proton ecosystem is getting better and better from a UX perspective
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by canadiantim on Thursday October 10, 2024 @03:47PM (#41802760)
I think Proton is more viewed as a honeypot
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by ziddoap on Thursday October 10, 2024 @04:32PM (#41803275)
I have not seen this take before, do you have any pointers to someone making this claim?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by rettichschnidi on Thursday October 10, 2024 @05:24PM (#41803739)
Founders with US affiliation/physicist creating crypto products [1], faulty claims how the relevant Swiss law (BÜPF) applies to them [2], doing crypto in JavaScript on the client side, etc. To me, this smells like Crypto AG [3][4].

[1] https://proton.me/about/team

[2] https://steigerlegal.ch/2019/07/27/protonmail-transparenzber...

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rubicon

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by devman0 on Thursday October 10, 2024 @07:56PM (#41804779)
How else would you do client side crypto for a website if not with JavaScript, isn't that kind of the point of how Proton does E2EE?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by stavros on Thursday October 10, 2024 @09:51PM (#41805348)
Crypto for websites is completely broken (because the server can serve you whatever it wants), so doing crypto for websites at all is suspicious.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by iknowstuff on Thursday October 10, 2024 @10:06PM (#41805406)
I guess they have this for local email decryption: https://proton.me/mail/bridge

idk if they have anything like that for their other products like calendar or file storage

Presumably if you stick to mobile apps you won't be using JavaScript served by their server? Unless they're just html wrappers

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by stavros on Thursday October 10, 2024 @10:09PM (#41805418)
Yeah, apps are generally OK, unless they're webviews, as you say.

The bridge looks good, though it seems really shady that it's not open source. I'd expect it to definitely be open.

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by bsx on Friday October 11, 2024 @08:17AM (#41808827)
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by ranger_danger on Friday October 11, 2024 @10:34AM (#41809828)
It's not "broken", please don't spread FUD. It's a whole lot more transparent than doing it on the server side. Client code can be inspected and publicly audited, and many times you can save/cache it so that it doesn't change. Also opens up the possibility for third party standalone apps that don't change often.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by akimbostrawman on Tuesday October 15, 2024 @09:19AM (#41848285)
this can be mitigated by using a browser addon to calculate and verify the web js content is matching the hash in a public code repo. That is how CTemplar Mail does it.

I'm disappointed they haven't implemented something like this.

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by ranger_danger on Friday October 11, 2024 @10:35AM (#41809831)
WASM? I have seen it used a lot for this.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by andrewinardeer on Thursday October 10, 2024 @05:32PM (#41803796)
Is the suggestion that founders who have US affiliation are automatically in bed with three letter agencies?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by justinclift on Thursday October 10, 2024 @07:58PM (#41804794)
If they're physically located in the US, they have no way to stop (legal) coercion by the TLAs yeah?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by willis936 on Saturday October 12, 2024 @05:19AM (#41817752)
How is this different than 90% of other VPN providers out there? The claim shouldn't be "Proton is a honeypot" but that "US VPNs are a honeypot".
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by bartbutler on Friday October 18, 2024 @09:50AM (#41879468)
We aren't physically located in the US.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by justinclift on Tuesday October 22, 2024 @12:41AM (#41911254)
Who's the "we" in this context? :)
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by nl on Thursday October 10, 2024 @10:43PM (#41805533)
Doing crypto on the client side in JS is absolutely the correct way to do this if you want E2EE with a web client. You need to be careful about supply chain attacks etc.

> To me, this smells like Crypto AG

It's easy to throw around unsubstantiated, impossible to disprove theories.

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by protonprivacy on Wednesday October 16, 2024 @05:32PM (#41864054)
We are not affiliated with Crypto AG. Our encryption occurs client-side, our cryptographic code is open source, and our tech can and has been independently verified.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by thephyber on Thursday October 10, 2024 @05:15PM (#41803667)
From my reading, the “ProtonMail is a honey trap” meme seems to be a popular rumor. Seems like there might be some smoke, but I haven’t seen any fire.

Interesting breakdown[1] of one of the claims that E2E encryption on ProtonMail is broken.

I’m assuming that Proton storage is a product from the same team as ProtonMail.

[1] https://lemmygrad.ml/post/4177

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by kaanyalova on Saturday October 12, 2024 @04:27AM (#41817469)
The link on that post is down. The domain seems to be bought out. Did you not even check the post before posting it?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by yieldcrv on Thursday October 10, 2024 @09:38PM (#41805293)
In account creation, requiring a phone number for “spam prevention” on Tor

There was some deanonymizing like that, phone or credit card

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by ranger_danger on Friday October 11, 2024 @10:38AM (#41809859)
KYC for a business is the smart legal move IMO whether it's technically required or not. Yes Proton is required to cooperate with law enforcement and government requests. Mullvad has been raided and Tutanota servers have been seized before too. Nobody is going to jail for you.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by gertop on Saturday October 12, 2024 @03:41AM (#41817204)
Knowing as little as legally possible about your customer is the actually smart move if your entire selling point is privacy.

Mail providers aren't bound to specific KYC regulation, proton could simply collect... Nothing. But they still do, why? The only legitimate reason they've given is to prevent spam. Fair enough, spammers using them will impact all users. But then why not impose a captcha when sending emails until you provide/validate your phone number? Possibly laziness, possibly complacency, possibly because it's a honeypot.

When it comes to mullvad I'm not sure what you're trying to say? That Proton collecting personally identifiable information will prevent a raid/downtime? Feels like wishful thinking. Or are you suggesting that mullvad gave personal info to the police? Because they didn't. They couldn't. BECAUSE THEY DON'T FORCE YOU TO PROVIDE ANY.

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by ranger_danger on Saturday October 12, 2024 @11:54AM (#41820012)
> Knowing as little as legally possible about your customer is the actually smart move if your entire selling point is privacy.

Yes I agree, but Proton also provides paid services and it is often the law that you must retain certain records in cases of audits, fraud etc., so there is some necessary KYC in that sense, but perhaps you're right in that they could keep less information, possibly at the cost of increased spam and decreased reputation though, so I understand the struggle.

> But then why not impose a captcha when sending emails

I suppose you could, but perhaps they weighed that possibility against it turning people off to using the service entirely? Not sure.

> When it comes to mullvad I'm not sure what you're trying to say

I was not trying to imply any of those things, just pointing out that companies still have to answer to law enforcement sometimes, that they are not immune from the laws of their country... because I have seen that some people who are staunch privacy enthusiasts seem to think companies have the luxury or practical ability (without detriment to their business) to simply not know their customer at all, and I don't think that is often the case. There is also a balance between simplicity and privacy. If you want anonymous payments that's fine, but crypto isn't as easy to use as a credit card. But if you handle credit cards, you must keep some data by law usually. Things like that.

And some people might just want to sell your info to advertisers or data brokers, there's always that.

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by akimbostrawman on Tuesday October 15, 2024 @09:14AM (#41848244)
it is possible to get google captchas as verification on some nodes however it is rare and was easier in the past.

I'm disappointed that they haven't used there own captchas but maybe they will in the future.

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by bartbutler on Friday October 18, 2024 @09:51AM (#41879470)
We (Proton) have had our own CAPTCHA for a year or more now.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by triyambakam on Thursday October 10, 2024 @05:47PM (#41803928)
So what's the alternative?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by opengears on Friday October 11, 2024 @12:22AM (#41806096)
Selfhosting
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by triyambakam on Friday October 11, 2024 @03:35AM (#41807192)
Hmm, yeah that's true
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by dartos on Friday October 11, 2024 @06:45AM (#41808277)
If that 3+ TB attack CF just mitigated starts aiming at the entire ipv4 range (probably more spread out and cyclical), self hosting could die :(

At least anything on UDP

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by MarcusE1W on Saturday October 12, 2024 @06:52AM (#41818183)
Actually I don't think self-hosting is a viable solution for many people. Most server hosts are not security experts. IT security is really hard due to the many possible attack vectors you have to be knowledgeable about. In this article they assume that an attacker has compromised a server and I don't see how a layman can keep a server safe if experts want to compromise it in the long term if you just follow the reccomend maintenance. One day you will slip up.

You might get a security related update late, did not hear about the last breach and are not aware how that relates to you, all sorts of scenarios. The only way to make it much more difficult to be compromised is if you don't connect your self-hosted cloud solution to the internet. But then it's not a really a cloud solution anymore.

And that's before you have to consider that not everyone has the knowledge, time, interest to self host.

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by create-username on Friday October 11, 2024 @01:53AM (#41806595)
The alternative is to store Cryptomator vaults on any cloud. I’m looking forward for reading that proton drive allows cyberduck compatibility to manage Cryptomator vaults
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by traceroute66 on Friday October 11, 2024 @06:06AM (#41808037)
> I think Proton is more viewed as a honeypot

Honestly, this FUD goes round more often than the seasons.

As with most FUD, I'm still waiting for someone to prove it.

And no, I don't buy the "smells like crypto AG" FUD, because you could use that sort of FUD for any of the US-cloud providers ....

For example, when AWS says "trust us" in relation to their KMS or HSM services, can you, really ... eh eh eh .... how do you know KMS or HSM isn't just a software proxy that pretends to be what it is ? :)

The fact is that if you are going to use someone else's servers to do something for you. Whether that someone is Proton or AWS or anyone else. You are, by definition, forced to abstract away your trust boundaries.

Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by 3np on Friday October 11, 2024 @06:28AM (#41808162)
Which would make it all the more interesting to look at.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ... by willis936 on Saturday October 12, 2024 @05:24AM (#41817771)
I want to consider Proton, but they cap out their maximum storage very low with no option to increase. They're not really competing in this space because no one needs backup of only a few GB of data.

https://proton.me/support/increase-storage-space/