Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by devman0 on Thursday October 10, 2024 @07:56PM
(#41804779)
How else would you do client side crypto for a website if not with JavaScript, isn't that kind of the point of how Proton does E2EE?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by stavros on Thursday October 10, 2024 @09:51PM
(#41805348)
Crypto for websites is completely broken (because the server can serve you whatever it wants), so doing crypto for websites at all is suspicious.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by iknowstuff on Thursday October 10, 2024 @10:06PM
(#41805406)
I guess they have this for local email decryption: https://proton.me/mail/bridge
idk if they have anything like that for their other products like calendar or file storage
Presumably if you stick to mobile apps you won't be using JavaScript served by their server? Unless they're just html wrappers
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by stavros on Thursday October 10, 2024 @10:09PM
(#41805418)
Yeah, apps are generally OK, unless they're webviews, as you say.
The bridge looks good, though it seems really shady that it's not open source. I'd expect it to definitely be open.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by ranger_danger on Friday October 11, 2024 @10:34AM
(#41809828)
It's not "broken", please don't spread FUD. It's a whole lot more transparent than doing it on the server side. Client code can be inspected and publicly audited, and many times you can save/cache it so that it doesn't change. Also opens up the possibility for third party standalone apps that don't change often.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by akimbostrawman on Tuesday October 15, 2024 @09:19AM
(#41848285)
this can be mitigated by using a browser addon to calculate and verify the web js content is matching the hash in a public code repo. That is how CTemplar Mail does it.
I'm disappointed they haven't implemented something like this.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by ranger_danger on Friday October 11, 2024 @10:35AM
(#41809831)
WASM? I have seen it used a lot for this.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by andrewinardeer on Thursday October 10, 2024 @05:32PM
(#41803796)
Is the suggestion that founders who have US affiliation are automatically in bed with three letter agencies?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by justinclift on Thursday October 10, 2024 @07:58PM
(#41804794)
If they're physically located in the US, they have no way to stop (legal) coercion by the TLAs yeah?
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by willis936 on Saturday October 12, 2024 @05:19AM
(#41817752)
How is this different than 90% of other VPN providers out there? The claim shouldn't be "Proton is a honeypot" but that "US VPNs are a honeypot".
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by bartbutler on Friday October 18, 2024 @09:50AM
(#41879468)
We aren't physically located in the US.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by justinclift on Tuesday October 22, 2024 @12:41AM
(#41911254)
Who's the "we" in this context? :)
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by nl on Thursday October 10, 2024 @10:43PM
(#41805533)
Doing crypto on the client side in JS is absolutely the correct way to do this if you want E2EE with a web client. You need to be careful about supply chain attacks etc.
> To me, this smells like Crypto AG
It's easy to throw around unsubstantiated, impossible to disprove theories.
Re:End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage in the Wild: A Broken ...
by protonprivacy on Wednesday October 16, 2024 @05:32PM
(#41864054)
We are not affiliated with Crypto AG. Our encryption occurs client-side, our cryptographic code is open source, and our tech can and has been independently verified.
[1] https://proton.me/about/team
[2] https://steigerlegal.ch/2019/07/27/protonmail-transparenzber...
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rubicon