Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by rkagerer on Thursday September 26, 2024 @02:26PM
(#41661562)
ECH - if I understand correctly it's effective for sites hosted on big providers like Cloudflare, AWS, etc, but doesn't add much value when it comes to self-hosted domains or those on a dedicated server, as you'd still see traffic going to whatever IP and be able to infer from that which domain the user's browswer is talking to. I'm hoping someone can explain that I missed something.
And while we're explaining things... ODoH (indirectly mentioned in the article via the Encrypted DNS link) comes with a big bold warning it's based on the fundamental premise that the proxy and the target servers do not collude. When both are operated by the same company, how can you know they aren't colluding? Is there some mechanic in the protocol to help protect users from colluding servers?
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by ekr____ on Thursday September 26, 2024 @02:50PM
(#41661803)
Yes, that's correct about ECH. In general, there's no real way to conceal your browsing behavior if you are connecting to an IP address that isn't shared. So either you use ECH to something like Cloudflare or you connect to some proxy/VPN/etc. so that the local network can't see the final IP address.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by jeroenhd on Thursday September 26, 2024 @02:36PM
(#41661658)
> When both are operated by the same company, how can you know they aren't colluding?
You don't. At best the client can check domain names and IP addresses, but that's hardly a guarantee.
To solve that problem, you can combine multiple parties. For example, you can use https://odoh1.surfdomeinen.nl/proxy as a proxy (operated by SURF [1]) to use the Cloudflare servers for lookup.
I think for ODoH to work well, we need a variety of companies hosting forwarding services. That could be ISPs, Google/Microsoft/etc. or some kind of non-profit.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by dietr1ch on Thursday September 26, 2024 @07:06PM
(#41664520)
I don't know the implementation details, but it should be doable in a way that degrades back into encrypted DNS where at least you get rid of a MitM.
Someone else already mentioned that making sure that the 2 servers have different owners may help, but if people are after you it's probably not enough.
I'm thinking that maybe I'd like to be able to avoid mentioning the server I'm interested on, and simply send a hash of it (you can cut a prefix such that a bunch of matches are found, but not too many)
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by apitman on Friday September 27, 2024 @12:33AM
(#41666276)
> ECH - if I understand correctly it's effective for sites hosted on big providers like Cloudflare, AWS, etc, but doesn't add much value when it comes to self-hosted domains or those on a dedicated server
Yeah, and unfortunately it increases the moat such companies have. They can offer a privacy screen that smaller orgs just can't match.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by vetinari on Thursday September 26, 2024 @04:15PM
(#41662791)
I think you meant North Korea, not South.
It means nothing. Countries always ask nicely first for a domain to be blocked for IPs from their countries. Companies like Cloudflare or Akamai can either honor the request, or find their IP range blocked (yes, including all the other serviced domains). They usually take the first option.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by lifthrasiir on Thursday September 26, 2024 @08:13PM
(#41664970)
There are many more countries enforcing some limitations on the internet, and ECH will just turn passive DPI into active court orders, I believe. At least explictness is better.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by nicce on Thursday September 26, 2024 @05:15PM
(#41663476)
It is about moving the trust.
> This means that whenever a user visits a website on Cloudflare that has ECH enabled, no one except for the user, Cloudflare, and the website owner will be able to determine which website was visited.
So you must use entity which controls the DNS and this entity makes the request further for actual website. Feels like just worse VPN.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by winkelmann on Thursday September 26, 2024 @08:34PM
(#41665090)
> It is about moving the trust.
Trust isn't being moved, though. Cloudflare could, by design, always see what website you were accessing. The difference is with ECH, there is one less party (someone listening in on your internet traffic) that can see which hostname you're accessing.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by nicce on Friday September 27, 2024 @02:15AM
(#41666848)
I was more like comparing to VPN. My argument was poor. But on high level many do not use VPNs and they have very negative impact for service UX anyway these days, so not a big point.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by Rushsick on Thursday September 26, 2024 @03:40PM
(#41662372)
The idea is to make ECH too large of a target to make blocking it practical. If you block ECH you end up blocking access to a large portion of the internet in that region. It's why some major browsers have chosen to not gracefully fallback to non-ECH handshakes upon connection failure.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by orthoxerox on Thursday September 26, 2024 @04:20PM
(#41662855)
Greetings, residents of Arstotzka! To access Arstotzkan government websites, please install this Ministry of Digits TLS root certificate on all your devices. Also, all new phones sold in Arstotzka must have the certificate preinstalled, starting from 2025.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by leloctai on Thursday September 26, 2024 @09:55PM
(#41665526)
Freedom of information is an existential threat to authoritarian states. There is no amount of money they're not willing to give up if it mean they stay in power.
That's said, it will not come to that. They'll just mandate spyware installation.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by leloctai on Thursday September 26, 2024 @10:03PM
(#41665566)
Many such countries already block traffic with ECH entirely. There's no technical solutions to a polical problem.
I remember when you can just change your DNS provider to bypass censorship. Nowadays, browsers and OS provide safe DNS by default, and thus censors had mostly switched to DPI based method. As this cat and mouse game continue, inevitably these governments will mandate spyware on every machine.
These privacy enhancements invented by westerner only work for western citizens threat model.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by ameliaquining on Thursday September 26, 2024 @03:15PM
(#41662092)
Right now, basically yes. No other major public clouds seem to support ECH yet, and ECH basically only works in public clouds; it can't hide your IP address, so it only provides privacy if you share your IP address with lots of other tenants.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by daveau on Thursday September 26, 2024 @02:31PM
(#41661617)
re: ECH
let the cat and mice game between deep packet inspection (DPI) vendors and the rest of the encrypted internet continue. it’ll be amusing to see what they come up with (inaccurate guessing game ai/ml “statistical analysis” is about all they’ve got left, especially against the large umbrella that is cloudflare).
game on, grab your popcorn, it will be fun to watch.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by jeroenhd on Thursday September 26, 2024 @02:58PM
(#41661895)
There's a relatively simple and pain-free solution to legitimate DPI: blocking all requests that don't go through a proxy. Browsers will ignore some certificate restrictions if they detect manually installed TLS root certificates to make corporate networks work.
This approach won't work on apps like Facebook or Instagram, but I don't think there's a legitimate reason to permit-but-snoop on that sort of traffic anyway.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by candiddevmike on Thursday September 26, 2024 @03:34PM
(#41662289)
Passive DPI/web filtering is pretty much done at this point. There's no way to tell what domain you're connecting to with ECH without doing a MITM and breaking the PKI chain or adding private CAs everywhere.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by nialse on Thursday September 26, 2024 @03:37PM
(#41662331)
Let me just stress that the effect of Zstandard on individual end-user latency is a rounding error. No user will ever go: “That was a quick loading web site. Must be Zstandard!”. The effect is solely Cloudflare having to spend x% less bandwidth to deliver the content, saving on their network and server resources.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by hammyhavoc on Thursday September 26, 2024 @05:06PM
(#41663401)
If it saves them money, great. That also means resources saved, and that also means it's better for the planet, thus better for humanity. I'm failing to see the disadvantage.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by terrelln on Thursday September 26, 2024 @04:43PM
(#41663140)
The latest Zstandard exposes several parameters which are useful for reducing time to first byte latency in web compression. They make Zstandard cut the compressed data into smaller blocks, e.g. 4 KB, with the goal to fit a compressed block within a small number of packets, so the browswer can start to decompress without waiting for a full 128 KB block to be sent.
These parameters are described in the v1.5.6 release notes [0]. ZSTD_c_targetCBlockSize is the most notable, but ZSTD_c_maxBlockSize can also be used for a lower CPU cost but larger compressed size.
Are you using these features at Cloudflare? If you need any help using these, or have any questions, please open an issue on Zstandard's GitHub!
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by sltkr on Thursday September 26, 2024 @06:51PM
(#41664398)
Network layer blocking is almost never in the interest of the end user. It's typically used to block users from accessing sites they want to visit, like The Pirate Bay, or recently Russian Times and Sputnik News.
End users who want to protect themselves can easily install blacklists on their end. All major browsers support something like Google Safe Browsing out of the box, and these blacklists are more likely to be kept up-to-date than those of the average ISP.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by idle_zealot on Thursday September 26, 2024 @06:11PM
(#41664056)
Either it's easy to block sites or it isn't. There's no world in which it's easier for you to block scam sites than it is for others to block vital resources and information.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by Animats on Thursday September 26, 2024 @06:20PM
(#41664136)
"This means that whenever a user visits a website on Cloudflare that has ECH enabled, no one except for the user, Cloudflare, and the website owner will be able to determine which website was visited. Cloudflare is a big proponent of privacy for everyone and is excited about the prospects of bringing this technology to life.'
This isn't privacy. This is centralized snooping.
It's like Google's approach to third party cookies. Nobody other than Google can have tracking information.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by Shakahs on Thursday September 26, 2024 @07:11PM
(#41664545)
So now the government needs to compel a corporation to hand over some data,
because they are no longer able to read it straight off the wire like they could before.
That sounds like a significant improvement to privacy.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by naivety on Thursday September 26, 2024 @10:10PM
(#41665608)
People trafficking drugs into Australia were using a secure, encrypted messaging service developed by a private third party provider.
They eventually found out that the third party provider was in fact the Australian Federal Police, reading all their messages in clear and in real time.
The government only needs to compel a corporation if that corporation has an adversarial relationship with them.
We have tried the centralized model pushed by Cloudflare before, it was called the Minitel.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by apitman on Friday September 27, 2024 @01:21AM
(#41666543)
The internet is moving towards a place where it might not be possible to self-host anything important without getting DDoS'd. Companies like Cloudflare provide a solution to this problem, but that also creates a crutch that means no effort is expended to solve the problem at the root, which means the day may come when you don't have any option left other than Cloudflare.
I think these are important issues and worth talking about.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by Shakahs on Friday September 27, 2024 @04:18AM
(#41667642)
Those issues are absolutely worth discussing, in a reasonable way.
Cloudflare isn't the bad actor perpetuating these DDoS attacks, and they aren't forcing website operators to use their services either.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by apitman on Friday September 27, 2024 @11:25AM
(#41671629)
They don't need to be a bad actor. They just need to be big enough and follow their incentives.
Companies aren't binary good or bad. They go through a lifecycle. Today's young and scrappy startup fighting for the people and the CEO making house calls is tomorrow's big tech with AI chat support.
It's worth noting where a company is in its lifecycle, and what the world is likely to look like if it continues to grow.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by sedatk on Thursday September 26, 2024 @07:38PM
(#41664734)
DPI systems in Turkey weren't even checking QUIC packets when I was there, let alone ECH. But, browsers usually start with TCP first to negotiate QUIC support, which prevented bypass of web blocks. If you could force your browser to establish connection directly using QUIC, you could bypass all the blocks. That was last year though. Not sure about the current situation.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by dizhn on Saturday September 28, 2024 @02:58PM
(#41682263)
They usually won't bother with blocking if the site owner just hosts the site under a different domain name. It could be like news.ycombinator1923.com or something. wink
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by lifthrasiir on Thursday September 26, 2024 @08:31PM
(#41665060)
The benchmark for Zstandard against Brotli seems to miss a key information---the compression levels used for both algorithms, because both the compression ratio and compression time will depend on them. In fact this had been my long suspicion about introducing Zstandard to the web standard, because lower compression levels for Brotli are not that slow and it was never publicly mentioned whether improving lower Brotli levels deemed infeasible or not. Given Zstandard Content-Encoding was initially proposed by Meta, I'm not even sure they have at least tried.
Given we now have two strictly better algorithms than gzip, I also wonder about a hybrid scheme that starts with Zstandard but switches to Brotli when the compression time is no longer significant for given request. We might even be able to cheaply convert the existing Zstandard stream into Brotli with some restrictions, as they are really LZSS behind the scene?
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by terrelln on Thursday September 26, 2024 @09:17PM
(#41665337)
Meta drove the Zstandard content encoding, but Google drove the adoption of Zstandard in Chrome.
The faster Brotli levels could probably be made to match Zstandard’s compression speed. But we’ve invested a lot in optimizing these levels, so it would likely take significant investment to match. Google is also contributing to improving the speed of Zstandard compression.
A cheaper conversion from Zstandard to Brotli is possible, but I wouldn’t really expect an improvement to compressed size. The encoding scheme impacts how efficient a LZ coding is, so for Brotli to beat Zstandard, it would likely want a different LZ than Zstandard uses. The same applies for a conversion from Brotli to Zstandard.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by lifthrasiir on Thursday September 26, 2024 @09:48PM
(#41665484)
The conversion is meant to avoid the expensive backreference optimization when it has been already done once by Zstandard, because you can't prepend a Zstandard bitstream with a Brotli bitstream without turning one to another. But well, I think such hybrid scheme is hard to make when the latency is at stake.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by lifthrasiir on Thursday September 26, 2024 @09:56PM
(#41665528)
I don't think so? It's only seekable with an additional index [1], just like most other compression schemes. Having an explicit standard for indices is definitely a plus though.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by lifthrasiir on Friday September 27, 2024 @04:11AM
(#41667608)
Uh, I'm confused why you expect most compression schemes to be necessarily seekable after all.
I assume the seeking implies a significantly faster way to skip the first N bytes of the decompressed output without the actual decompression. "Significant" is here defined as a time complexity strictly less than linear time in the size of compressed or decompressed data in that skip, so for the RLE sequence like `10a90b`, seeking to the 50th byte should be able to avoid processing `10a` at all; reading `10a` but not actually emitting 10 copies of `a` doesn't really count.
Virtually every compression algorithm has two main parts, modelling and coding. Modelling either transforms the input into a more compressible form, or estimates how much is particular portion of the input likely. Those results are then coded into one or more sets of symbols with different probabilities, resulting in a compressed bit sequence. Both parts can be made as complex as needed and will likely to destroy any relation between the input and output byte. Many algorithms including Zstandard do come with some framing scheme to aid with data verification, but such framing is generally not enough for actual seeking unless each frame declares both the uncompressed and compressed size and can be independently decompressed from each other. That's what the Zstandard's seekable format actually does: both sizes for every frame. (Zstandard frames are already defined to be independent.)
There do exist some compression schemes that retain the seekability by design. Texture compression is a good example; a massively parallel nature of GPUs means that a fixed-rate scheme can be much more efficient than a variable-rate and thus inherently sequential scheme. There are also some hybrids that use two interconnected algorithms for CPU and GPU respectively. But such algorithms are not a norm.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by uSoldering on Thursday September 26, 2024 @09:23PM
(#41665368)
What is the overlap of people who are reading a blogpost about Cloudflare standards and people who need a metaphor to understand what compression is? You have 7 paragraphs of highly technical information then just in case, you need to explain how compression works? Just tell your reader you think they're a moron and save yourself the keystrokes.
Re:New standards for a faster and more private Internet
by rajnathani on Friday September 27, 2024 @01:09AM
(#41666466)
> Zstandard’s branchless design is a crucial innovation that enhances CPU efficiency
Given how branchless algorithms are helping optimize not just network transport (compression) and even OS system libs (no citation for this one, but I’ve heard), that I really wish colleges begin teaching this along with DS/Algo course material.
And while we're explaining things... ODoH (indirectly mentioned in the article via the Encrypted DNS link) comes with a big bold warning it's based on the fundamental premise that the proxy and the target servers do not collude. When both are operated by the same company, how can you know they aren't colluding? Is there some mechanic in the protocol to help protect users from colluding servers?
You don't. At best the client can check domain names and IP addresses, but that's hardly a guarantee.
To solve that problem, you can combine multiple parties. For example, you can use https://odoh1.surfdomeinen.nl/proxy as a proxy (operated by SURF [1]) to use the Cloudflare servers for lookup.
I think for ODoH to work well, we need a variety of companies hosting forwarding services. That could be ISPs, Google/Microsoft/etc. or some kind of non-profit.
[1]: https://www.surf.nl/en
Or Apple[1,2].
[1] Oblivious DNS over HTTPS, https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc9230.txt
[2] About iCloud Private Relay, https://support.apple.com/en-us/102602
I'm thinking that maybe I'd like to be able to avoid mentioning the server I'm interested on, and simply send a hash of it (you can cut a prefix such that a bunch of matches are found, but not too many)
Yeah, and unfortunately it increases the moat such companies have. They can offer a privacy screen that smaller orgs just can't match.
ECH seems directly opposed to Chinese governments control of the web.
It means nothing. Countries always ask nicely first for a domain to be blocked for IPs from their countries. Companies like Cloudflare or Akamai can either honor the request, or find their IP range blocked (yes, including all the other serviced domains). They usually take the first option.
South Korea is infamous for their internet censorship.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_South_K...
> Zstandard
I get "faster" but how does it make the internet "more private". The word "private" only shows up exactly once on that page, in the title.
The summary at the top made it look like the whole article was about compression.
> This means that whenever a user visits a website on Cloudflare that has ECH enabled, no one except for the user, Cloudflare, and the website owner will be able to determine which website was visited.
So you must use entity which controls the DNS and this entity makes the request further for actual website. Feels like just worse VPN.
Trust isn't being moved, though. Cloudflare could, by design, always see what website you were accessing. The difference is with ECH, there is one less party (someone listening in on your internet traffic) that can see which hostname you're accessing.
However, the word "privacy" shows up 10 times in the article.
Idk about Iran, but Russia and China just block eSNI, QUIC and whatever their DPI firewalls can't really handle on the fly.
This alongside people smuggling in starlink is making censorship useless.
And starlink can be traced. It’s only time before some people start getting arrested.
Iran does not.
That's said, it will not come to that. They'll just mandate spyware installation.
I remember when you can just change your DNS provider to bypass censorship. Nowadays, browsers and OS provide safe DNS by default, and thus censors had mostly switched to DPI based method. As this cat and mouse game continue, inevitably these governments will mandate spyware on every machine.
These privacy enhancements invented by westerner only work for western citizens threat model.
let the cat and mice game between deep packet inspection (DPI) vendors and the rest of the encrypted internet continue. it’ll be amusing to see what they come up with (inaccurate guessing game ai/ml “statistical analysis” is about all they’ve got left, especially against the large umbrella that is cloudflare).
game on, grab your popcorn, it will be fun to watch.
This approach won't work on apps like Facebook or Instagram, but I don't think there's a legitimate reason to permit-but-snoop on that sort of traffic anyway.
These parameters are described in the v1.5.6 release notes [0]. ZSTD_c_targetCBlockSize is the most notable, but ZSTD_c_maxBlockSize can also be used for a lower CPU cost but larger compressed size.
Are you using these features at Cloudflare? If you need any help using these, or have any questions, please open an issue on Zstandard's GitHub!
[0] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/releases/tag/v1.5.6
ECH makes it hard to block known scam sites at the network layer, for example.
End users who want to protect themselves can easily install blacklists on their end. All major browsers support something like Google Safe Browsing out of the box, and these blacklists are more likely to be kept up-to-date than those of the average ISP.
This isn't privacy. This is centralized snooping.
It's like Google's approach to third party cookies. Nobody other than Google can have tracking information.
It will be when everyone adopts ECH. It's a fantastic start.
The CDN can't give you content you're asking for without knowing which content you're asking for.
This improvement prevents your ISP and the government from reading your packets to get that same information.
I'm all for being wary of large-scale consolidation, but I feel like these lazy gripes aren't assessing the pros and cons dispassionately.
Maybe some PIR protocol can also eventually change this (if the users and Cloudflare don't mind the computational and network overhead!).
They eventually found out that the third party provider was in fact the Australian Federal Police, reading all their messages in clear and in real time.
The government only needs to compel a corporation if that corporation has an adversarial relationship with them.
We have tried the centralized model pushed by Cloudflare before, it was called the Minitel.
I think these are important issues and worth talking about.
Companies aren't binary good or bad. They go through a lifecycle. Today's young and scrappy startup fighting for the people and the CEO making house calls is tomorrow's big tech with AI chat support.
It's worth noting where a company is in its lifecycle, and what the world is likely to look like if it continues to grow.
How do we know that? Who else benefits from most of them?
CF blocks Tor; you can't get past the captcha.
I use the elite hacking tool know as FIRE FOX and I get CF gatekept all the time.
Edit: just look at how many sites you're locked out of if you don't have JS enabled or run an uncommon configuration.
Given we now have two strictly better algorithms than gzip, I also wonder about a hybrid scheme that starts with Zstandard but switches to Brotli when the compression time is no longer significant for given request. We might even be able to cheaply convert the existing Zstandard stream into Brotli with some restrictions, as they are really LZSS behind the scene?
The faster Brotli levels could probably be made to match Zstandard’s compression speed. But we’ve invested a lot in optimizing these levels, so it would likely take significant investment to match. Google is also contributing to improving the speed of Zstandard compression.
A cheaper conversion from Zstandard to Brotli is possible, but I wouldn’t really expect an improvement to compressed size. The encoding scheme impacts how efficient a LZ coding is, so for Brotli to beat Zstandard, it would likely want a different LZ than Zstandard uses. The same applies for a conversion from Brotli to Zstandard.
[1] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/seekable_f...
Source?
I assume the seeking implies a significantly faster way to skip the first N bytes of the decompressed output without the actual decompression. "Significant" is here defined as a time complexity strictly less than linear time in the size of compressed or decompressed data in that skip, so for the RLE sequence like `10a90b`, seeking to the 50th byte should be able to avoid processing `10a` at all; reading `10a` but not actually emitting 10 copies of `a` doesn't really count.
Virtually every compression algorithm has two main parts, modelling and coding. Modelling either transforms the input into a more compressible form, or estimates how much is particular portion of the input likely. Those results are then coded into one or more sets of symbols with different probabilities, resulting in a compressed bit sequence. Both parts can be made as complex as needed and will likely to destroy any relation between the input and output byte. Many algorithms including Zstandard do come with some framing scheme to aid with data verification, but such framing is generally not enough for actual seeking unless each frame declares both the uncompressed and compressed size and can be independently decompressed from each other. That's what the Zstandard's seekable format actually does: both sizes for every frame. (Zstandard frames are already defined to be independent.)
There do exist some compression schemes that retain the seekability by design. Texture compression is a good example; a massively parallel nature of GPUs means that a fixed-rate scheme can be much more efficient than a variable-rate and thus inherently sequential scheme. There are also some hybrids that use two interconnected algorithms for CPU and GPU respectively. But such algorithms are not a norm.
Wtf, you were the one who brought that up.
They do not have anybody else's best interests at heart and are actively centralizing that which was explicitly intended to not be centralized.
Given how branchless algorithms are helping optimize not just network transport (compression) and even OS system libs (no citation for this one, but I’ve heard), that I really wish colleges begin teaching this along with DS/Algo course material.
Data Structures & Algorithms is also sometimes abbreviated as DSA