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Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by amelius on Sunday August 25, 2024 @12:06AM (#41344290)
I think the main problem is that most organizations put security at the end of the budget list.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by tpmoney on Sunday August 25, 2024 @12:37AM (#41344424)
Even if they put it near the top, it's still going to be reduced in effectiveness by the actual needs and goals of the organization. Any company that has a VPN and remote employees is objectively and inherently weaker from a cyber security standpoint than an otherwise equally equipped company with no external access to the network. But they do that because remote employee access means they can do their actual business better. Any company that uses networked computers in objectively and inherently weaker from a cyber security standpoint than one which requires physically moving data from one machine to another by way of personal handoffs between employees at the same physical location, but they do that because it means they can do their actual business better.

It does not matter if cyber security is at the top or the bottom of your budget list, if the choice is ever "better cyber security" or "do more business", cyber security is always going to lose that battle. You will never convince a company to use E2E encrypted email for all communications with all customers and vendors, no matter how high on the budget list cyber security is, because doing so would actively hinder the day to day operations of the business.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by TheColorYellow on Sunday August 25, 2024 @01:45AM (#41344719)
I don't think this is relevant. Even on-prem "air gapped" networks get breached. I would say it happens on as frequent a basis as any other network tbh. Microsoft hacks get headlines because Microsoft is a public company; there are lots of undisclosed breaches happening out there.

Security vulnerabilities come from the same place they always have. Where IO happens, where transactions happen, and where an operating system does a lot of work. How attackers get to these points, what happens when they do, and then how the system reacts when a malicious event occurs are the factors that matter.

In today's world of complex technologies, I have yet to meet a single organization that is invulnerable to these threats. I've seen a lot of organizations limit damage, patch vulnerabilities, and generally manage their risk profile effectively - but losses are a part of the business.

IMO, the only thing that will really make a difference is when we have technologies that are sufficient enough to male the user more resilient. Only then can we have a truly safer web.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by lifeisstillgood on Sunday August 25, 2024 @04:50AM (#41345665)
I’m sorry but I really really really want some citations here - a network that has VPNs, LANs at multiple locations is as vulnerable as a single location that uses air-gapped computers passing say usb sticks around to share say git repos.

I am not sure I would enjoy working at the second place but I would really hope we weren’t an easy target

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by t-3 on Sunday August 25, 2024 @05:35AM (#41345911)
It's been shown many times that people will pick up random USB devices from anywhere and plug them into any computer without thinking. Airgapping just stops the automated scans and stuff that was already being stopped. Defence is reactive, so the momentum and advantage is always on the attacker side, and stopping the lazy ones doesn't do anything to stop the real threats.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by cutemonster on Sunday August 25, 2024 @08:21AM (#41346793)
People die in car crashes although they have seat belts, it's been shown many times, so seat belts doesn't do anything to stop the real danger.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by t-3 on Sunday August 25, 2024 @09:12AM (#41347054)
The costs of seatbelts are already built in to the car. The cost of airgapping is not. The sheer inconvenience and limiting of the potential employee pool would put it far out of budget for anyone but governments or very large corporations doing very sensitive work, and even in those cases it would be on a site-by-site basis, not org-wide.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by cutemonster on Monday August 26, 2024 @05:54AM (#41355553)
> The cost of ... far out of budget ...

Yes maybe, but now you changed the topic and started talking about money and how expensive things are. Have a nice day anyway

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by chalst on Sunday August 25, 2024 @05:13AM (#41345790)
Viruses that infect USB devices can compromise systems based on air gaps.

Cf. eg., https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/air_gaps.html and https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/05/ramsey_malwar...

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by Wowfunhappy on Sunday August 25, 2024 @06:15AM (#41346128)
> I would say it happens on as frequent a basis as any other network tbh.

...really?

I find this extremely hard to believe on its face. Sure an attacker can infect a system via a USB drive, but they need to get physically close to the victim (at least at one point in time). That both dramatically decreases the number of possible attackers and increases their personal risk.

It also becomes far more difficult for an attacker to exfiltrate any data.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by TeMPOraL on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:11AM (#41346391)
Exfil may be tricky if the system is actually airgapped - I take GP's use of scare quotes to mean that most systems are "airgapped" by means of software-enforced security policies, which should correctly be referred to as "not airgapped".

As for the attack method, there's always the good ol' "flash drive found on a parking lot" vector.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by Wowfunhappy on Sunday August 25, 2024 @08:44AM (#41346910)
> As for the attack method, there's always the good ol' "flash drive found on a parking lot" vector.

Right, which requires the attacker to be physically near the parking lot at some point! That decreases the number of possible attackers by several orders of magnitude at least.

> Exfil may be tricky if the system is actually airgapped - I take GP's use of scare quotes to mean that most systems are "airgapped" by means of software-enforced security policies, which should correctly be referred to as "not airgapped".

Ah, that makes more sense! I do think tpmoney was quite clearly talking about truly airgapped systems, however.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by tpmoney on Sunday August 25, 2024 @09:45AM (#41347271)
> Ah, that makes more sense! I do think tpmoney was quite clearly talking about truly airgapped systems, however.

Very much so. My point being that a truly air gapped system is objectively more secure than one that is networked, and yet, a bank or social network company that only operates with truly air gapped systems will be strictly worse off than their competitors in their actual business of banking or social networking. And so since their actual job is not objectively better cyber security, but banking or social networking, then they are inherently at a disadvantage compared to Attackers whose business IS attacking (or at one step removed, selling the resources obtained from attacking). In the name of making their business better, Defenders will chose weaker security, and attackers will chose stronger attacks.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by cutemonster on Sunday August 25, 2024 @08:25AM (#41346816)
Yeah, GP is sort of saying that seat belts are pointless since traffic fatalities can happen anyway
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by hobs on Sunday August 25, 2024 @09:05AM (#41347015)
Citation extremely needed.

I have worked at 20+ companies and the ones that had little to no security got ransomwared at LEAST yearly (with 50m+ in revenues) and the ones that had basic and standard security practices got zero network wide intrusions (at least at lower then say, a nation state level.)

Now, COULD they have been exploited with an 0day? Sure, in theory these networks could be both exploited with the same technology or by a dedicated actor likely without an issue - they're internet connected corporate networks mostly with probably out of date tech; and in practice most attacks corporations need to mitigate are the drive by trash that consumers also face.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by awkward on Sunday August 25, 2024 @09:17AM (#41347082)
If this is true, big if, it’s because air gapping doesn’t happen without a specific threat model in mind. Think of the airplane with red dots.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by tpmoney on Sunday August 25, 2024 @09:38AM (#41347228)
My point is that the vulnerable points, regardless of where they come from, are ultimately there because the purpose of the Defender is not to have perfect cyber security, but to use computers and technology to enable business. Or as you said, "losses are a part of the business"; and that's so because "the business" isn't cyber security.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by exe34 on Sunday August 25, 2024 @01:38AM (#41344682)
the safest computer is turned off, in a Faraday cage, in a vault under a mountain.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by szundi on Sunday August 25, 2024 @08:36AM (#41346864)
Or thrown out from the solar system, antenna facing an other galaxy
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by Archelaos on Sunday August 25, 2024 @06:29AM (#41346202)
The parent wrote that "most organizations put security at the end of the budget list", but he did not write that it should be put at the top of the budget list. Your criticism would only be valid if he had written the latter.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by tpmoney on Sunday August 25, 2024 @11:48AM (#41348170)
The parent wrote that the "main problem" was that they put the security at the end of the budget list. My argument is it doesn't matter where it is on the budget list, it will always be subservient to the actual business of the Defender. That is, my argument is the "main problem" is that perfect cyber security Defense isn't anyone's actual business.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by grogenaut on Sunday August 25, 2024 @12:43AM (#41344448)
Where would you put it. Before feature development, headcount, infrastructure, marketing, sales, management, hr, facilities?
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by 3np on Sunday August 25, 2024 @04:29AM (#41345562)
Compartmentalizing it is an issue in itself.

Replace "security" with "safety" for, IDK, space engineering or nuclear power. Does it still make sense?

Safety and security need to be integral parts of processes. It is not something you can acquire from a vendor or split out as the responsibility of separate team(s) who have to internally battle for resources and interface with the core development through escalation requests...

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by TeMPOraL on Sunday August 25, 2024 @04:53AM (#41345682)
But safety isn't security, and your random SaaS pets.com clone isn't a space shuttle. Safety is more about reliability. Security in space systems is very much bolt-on and split out: the concern of everyone working on a rocket is that it flies and lands safely. Who is or isn't authorized to launch it is a worry of another department.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by archi42 on Tuesday August 27, 2024 @03:27AM (#41365279)
Safety is not really about reliability. Maybe as a means to an end. It's about not killing people and maybe not destroying too much of your facility in case things go south.

Safety systems take over if your chemical reaction overheats the reactor; they prevent your logistics team from moving a train while it's being loaded with dangerous chemicals (real example, the safety system was disabled by the logistics people - ironically the company put those with poor safety record from production to logistics, because they could do no harm there).

You're mixing up safety systems with the property of "doing X is safe by construction" - but most plants inherently are not: e.g. in a small reactor that's manually fed, your employees can just input the wrong recipe by accident; the safety systems should then take care of the mess. Or your junior chemist (who needs an expensive, senior chemist for an established process?) can mess up the improvement to the recipe, resulting in rapid unscheduled disassembly of you poorly maintained reactor, including the building and one of its operators (sadly a real example).

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by HPsquared on Sunday August 25, 2024 @06:04AM (#41346069)
Security is PvP, safety is PvE. Different game, different tactics.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by archi42 on Tuesday August 27, 2024 @03:36AM (#41365325)
See my reply to sibling comment: if you're thinking safety is purely PvE, you're in for a bad time.

Humans are reckless idiots. If circumventing safety systems means they can go home 15 minutes earlier (or if it's the only/simplest easy to get reach some unrealistic high daily goal dictated from higher ups), some of us will happily risk their own health, and that of a whole city, to do so.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by HPsquared on Tuesday August 27, 2024 @05:03AM (#41365668)
Ok, not 100%. Human Factors can be critical in a lot of cases. Similar to security, designers try to eliminate the system's reliance on human actions wherever possible.

Still though, security is fighting against an opponent who searches for weak points and exploits them to the max. "Safety" protects against random natural accidental events (either internal or external in origin). If someone is just trying to get home, they want to get the job done quickly sure, but their intent is not to cause damage, their actions aren't targeted. It's a different risk profile.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by archi42 on Saturday August 31, 2024 @04:07AM (#41407270)
Thanks for agreeing :) safety also protects against preventable human errors.

Maybe my examples are bording on sabotage, eg "sabotage by accident".

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by tpmoney on Sunday August 25, 2024 @09:54AM (#41347330)
> Replace "security" with "safety" for, IDK, space engineering or nuclear power. Does it still make sense?

Here's a question: Why do most safety regulations require the force of law to get companies to enact, but no laws were necessary to get companies to adopt the internet? "Safety" is in a similar boat to security, with the benefit that you usually don't have people actively trying to harm your employees. But Safety often gets tossed out the window when it gets in the way of accomplishing the real goals of the organization. Why is the US military exempt from a number of safety regulations that private companies are beholden to? Because the military believes those regulations will hamper their real mission, which is not keeping individual soldiers safe.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by TeMPOraL on Sunday August 25, 2024 @10:24AM (#41347519)
Indeed. Also, it's even tougher to argue to stop increasing safety at some point, because it usually means arguing for accepting a certain number of lives or limbs lost. And yet we do, and we have to, because like with security, a perfectly safe system is one that does nothing at all.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by bee_rider on Sunday August 25, 2024 @01:46AM (#41344728)
That doesn’t seem like the main problem to me. The original comment seemed more on point; it is for most companies a sideshow that makes no money and only works to enable their main business. That it gets a bad priority in the budget is a result of that underlying problem.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by TeMPOraL on Sunday August 25, 2024 @02:27AM (#41344917)
For good reason - if you prioritize security above everything else, you end up building a rock, as the only system that's perfectly secure is the one that's completely useless and unusable for anything. Adding any feature, any utilitarian aspect to it, means compromising security right there and then. Security is never the goal, it's always an unpleasant cost to pay on the way to the goal.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by edejong on Sunday August 25, 2024 @03:01AM (#41345077)
Security management services balance confidentiality, integrity and availability. Spending more on security means you can have great availability despite the measures on integrity and confidentiality.

Look at any cloud provider. They get it right because they employ the best security management systems.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by kbrkbr on Sunday August 25, 2024 @04:29AM (#41345565)
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by amelius on Sunday August 25, 2024 @10:08AM (#41347416)
> if you prioritize security above everything else, you end up building a rock

Well, I'd prefer incapable people to build secure rocks over them building insecure non-rocks.

Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015) by astrobe_ on Sunday August 25, 2024 @08:00AM (#41346676)
It's an insurance. Nobody likes paying insurance bills. Being on the defense side of cybersecurity means that you are permanently on the back foot, not a pleasant position either. And cherry on the cake, you spend most of your time cleaning up other's mess (CVEs, users being users...).