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Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by Fr0styMatt88 on Saturday July 20, 2024 @09:55PM (#41021776)
The scarier thought I've had -- if a black hat had discovered this crash case, could it have been turned into a widely deployed code execution vulnerability?
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by plorkyeran on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:07PM (#41021835)
Shockingly it turns out that installing a rootkit can have some negative security implications.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by llm_trw on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:34PM (#41021952)
Trying to explain to execs that giving someone root access to your computers means they have root access to your computers is surprisingly difficult.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by tonetegeatinst on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:13PM (#41022092)
I mean kernal level access does provide feature not accessible in userspace. Is it alsooverused when other solutions exist, you bet.

Most people don't need this stuff. Just keeping shit up to date, no not on the nightly build branch, but like installing windows update atleast a day or two after they come out. Or maby regular antivirus scans.

But let's be honest, your kernal drivers are useless if your employees fall for phishing or social engineering. See then its not malware, its an authorized user on the system....just copying data onto a USB drive or a rouge employee taking your customer list to your competition. That fancy pants kernal driver might be really good at stopping sophisticated threats and I'm sure the marketing majors at any company cram products full of buzz words. But remember, you can't fix incompetent or malicious employees unless your taking steps to prevent it.

What's more likely: some foreign government hacking khols? Or a script kiddie social engineers some poor worker pretending to be the support desk?

Not here to shit on this product, it has its place and it obviously does a good job....(heard its expensive but most xrd/edr is)

Seems like we are learning how vulnerable certain things are once again. As a fellow security fellow, I must say that Jia Tan must be so envious that he couldn't have this level of market impact.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by rdtsc on Sunday July 21, 2024 @01:48AM (#41022717)
Start a story for them: "and then, the hackers managed to install a rootkit which runs in kernel mode. The rootkit has sophisticated C2 mechanism with configuration files pretending to be drivers suffixed with .sys extensions. And then, they used that to prevent hospitals and 911 systems around the world from working, resulting in delayed emergency responses, injuries, possibly deaths".

After they cuss the hackers under their breath exclaiming something like: "they should be locked up in jail for the rest of their lives!...", tell them that's exactly what happened, but CS were the hackers, and maybe they should reconsider mandating installing that crap everywhere.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by phire on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:25PM (#41021912)
No.

To trigger the crash, you need to write a bad file into C:\Windows\System32\drivers\CrowdStrike\

You need Administrator permissions to write a file there, which means you already have code execution permissions, and don't need an exploit.

The only people who can trigger it over network are CrowdStrike themselves... Or a malicious entity inside their system who controls both their update signing keys, and the update endpoint.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by cyrnel on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:35PM (#41021962)
Anyone know if the updates use outbound HTTPS requests? If so, those companies that have crappy TLS terminating outbound proxies are looking juicy. And if they aren't pinning certs or using CAA, I'm sure a $5 wrench[1] could convince one of the lesser certificate authorities to sign a cert for whatever domain they're using.

[1]: https://xkcd.com/538/

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by phire on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:41PM (#41021988)
The update files are almost certainly signed.

Even if the HTTPS channel is compromised with a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker shouldn't be able to craft a valid update, unless they also compromised CrowdStrke's keys.

However, the fact that this update apparently managed to bypass any internal testing or staging release channels makes me question how good CrowdStrike's procedures are about securing those update keys.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by cyrnel on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:06PM (#41022068)
Depends when/how the signature is checked. I could imagine a signature being embedded in the file itself, or the file could be partially parsed before the signature is checked.

It's wild to me that it's so normal to install software like this on critical infrastructure, but questions about how they do code signing is a closely guarded/obfuscated secret.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by jmb99 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @12:23AM (#41022353)
Kind of a side talent, but I’m currently (begrudgingly) working on a project with a Fortune 20 company that involves a complicated mess of PKI management, custom (read: non-standard) certificates, a variety of management/logging/debugging keys, and (critically) code signing. It’s taken me months of pulling teeth just to get details about the hierarchy and how the PKI is supposed to work from my own coworkers in a different department (who are in charge of the project), let alone from the client. I still have absolutely 0 idea how they perform code signing, how it’s validated, or how I can test that the non-standard certificates can validate this black-hole-box code signing process. So yeah, companies really don’t like sharing details about code signing.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by phire on Sunday July 21, 2024 @12:45AM (#41022442)
Sure, it's certainly possible.

Though, I prefer to give people benefit of doubt for this type of thing. IMO, the level of incompetence to parse a binary file before checking the signature is significantly higher (or at least different) than simply pushing out a bad update (even if the latter produces a much more spectacular result).

Besides, we don't need to speculate. We have the driver. We have the signature files [1]. Because of the publicity, I bet thousands of people are throwing it into Binary RE tools right now, and if they are doing something as stupid as parsing a binary file before checking it's signature (or not checking a signature at all), I'm sure we will hear about it.

We can't see how it was signed because that's happening on Cloudstrike's infrastructure, but checking the signature verification code is trivial.

[1] Both in this zip file: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OVIWLDMN9xzYv8L391V1ob2ghp8...

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by emmelaich on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:18PM (#41022113)
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by emmelaich on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:17PM (#41022110)
My speculation is the bit of code/data that was broken, is added after the build and testing precisely to avoid the $5 wrench attack.

That is, the data is signed and they don't want to use the real signing key during testing / in the continuous build because then it is too exposed.

So it's added after as something that "could not break". But it of course did.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by phire on Sunday July 21, 2024 @01:21AM (#41022586)
I can think of a bunch of different answers:

This wasn't a code update, just a configuration update. Maybe they don't put config update though QA at all, assuming they are safe.

It's possible that QA is different enough from production (for example debug builds, or signature checking disabled) that it didn't detect this bug.

Might be an ordering issue, and that they tested applying update A then update B, but pushed out update B first.

The fact that it instantly went out to all channels is interesting. Maybe they tested it for the beta channel it was meant for (and it worked, because that version of the driver knew how to cope with that config) but then accidentally pushed it out to all channels, and the older versions had no idea what to do wiht it.

Or maybe they though they were only sending it to their QA systems but pushed the wrong button and sent it out everywhere.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by emmelaich on Sunday July 21, 2024 @04:42AM (#41023495)
> This wasn't a code update, just a configuration update

Configuration is data, data is code.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by gruez on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:44PM (#41022001)
that's assuming they don't do cert pinning. Moreover despite all the evil things you can supposedly do with a $5 wrench, I'm not aware of any documented cases of this sort of attack happening. The closest we've seen are misissuances seemingly caused by buggy code.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by Animats on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:47PM (#41022012)
How does it validate the updates, exactly?

Microsoft supposedly has source IP addresses known by their update clients, so that DNS spoofing won't work.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by FreakLegion on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:18PM (#41022112)
Microsoft signs its updates. There's no restriction on where you can get them from.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by ffhhj on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:36PM (#41022185)
Microsoft has previously leaked their keys.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by FreakLegion on Sunday July 21, 2024 @12:57AM (#41022482)
Not that I recall.

Microsoft has leaked keys that weren't used for code signing. I've been on the receiving end of this actually, when someone from the Microsoft Active Protections Program accidentally sent me the program's email private key.

Microsoft has been tricked into signing bad code themselves, just like Apple, Google, and everyone else who does centralized review and signing.

Microsoft has had certificates forged, basically, through MD5 collisions. Trail of Bits did a good write-up of this years ago.

But I can't think of a case of Microsoft losing control of a code signing key. What are you referring to?

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by Randor on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:53PM (#41022248)
As a former member of the Windows Update software engineering team, I can say this is absolutely false. The updates are signed.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by Animats on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:25AM (#41022898)
I know they are signed. But is that enough?

Attackers today may be willing to spend a few million dollars to access those keys.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by jackjeff on Sunday July 21, 2024 @04:26AM (#41023439)
If you get have privileged escalation vulnerability there are worse things you can do. Just making the system unbootable by destroying the boot sector/EFI partition and overwriting system files. No more rebooting in safe mode and no more deleting a single file to fix the boot.

This would probably be classified as a terrorist attack and frankly it’s just a matter of time until we get one some day. A small dedicated team could pull it off. It’s just so happens that the people with the skills currently either opt for cyber criminality (crypto lockers and such), work for a state actor (think Stuxnet) or play defense in a cyber security firm.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by naveen99 on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:13PM (#41021862)
The hard part is the deploying. Yes if you can get control of the crowdstrike deployment machinery, you can do whatever you want on hundreds of millions of machines. but you don’t need any vulnerabilities in the crowdstrike deployed software for that only the deploying servers.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by tranceylc on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:30PM (#41021936)
Call me crazy but that is a real worry for me, and has been for a while. How long until we see some large corporate software have their deployment process hijacked, and have it affect a ton of computers that auto-update?
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by alsodumb on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:35PM (#41021963)
You mean like the SolarWinds hack that happened a lil while ago?

https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/SolarWinds-hack-ex...

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by btown on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:40PM (#41021984)
One of the most dangerous versions of this IMO is someone who compromises a NPM/Pypi package that's widely used as a dependency. If you can make it so that the original developer doesn't know you've compromised their accounts (spear-phished SIM swap + email compromise while the target is traveling, for instance, or simply compromising the developer themselves), you don't need every downstream user to manually update - you just need enough projects that aren't properly configured with lockfiles, and you've got code execution on a huge number of servers.

I'm hopeful that the fallout from Crowdstrike will be a larger emphasis on software BOM risk - when your systems regularly phone home for updates, you're at the mercy of the weakest link in that chain, and that applies to CI/CD and end user devices alike.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by IncreasePosts on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:19PM (#41022114)
It makes me wonder how many core software libraries to modern infrastructure could be compromised by merely threatening a single person.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by jmb99 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @12:27AM (#41022367)
As always, a relevant xkcd[1]. I would not be surprised if the answer to “how many machines can be compromised in 24 hours by threatening one person” was less than 8 figures. If you can find the right person, probably 9+.

[1] https://xkcd.com/2347/

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by leni536 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @04:47AM (#41023513)
Just compromise one popular vim plugin and you have dev access to half of the industry.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by spydum on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:34PM (#41021953)
I mean, isn't that roughly the solarwinds story? There is no real shortage of supply chain incidents in the last few years. The reality is we are all mostly okay with that tradeoff.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by jen20 on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:35PM (#41021958)
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by inferiorhuman on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:01PM (#41022056)

   if you can get control of the crowdstrike deployment machinery
Or combine a lack of certificate pinning with BGP hijacking.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by MBCook on Saturday July 20, 2024 @09:58PM (#41021792)
I had that same one. If loading a file crashed the kernel module, could it have been exploitable? Or was there a different exploitable bug in there?

Did any nation states/other groups have 0-days on this?

Did this event reveal something known to the public, or did this screw up accidentally protect us from someone finding + exploiting this in the future?

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by Murky3515 on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:19PM (#41021889)
Probably would've been use to mine bitcoin before it was patched