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Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by cyrnel on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:35PM (#41021962)
Anyone know if the updates use outbound HTTPS requests? If so, those companies that have crappy TLS terminating outbound proxies are looking juicy. And if they aren't pinning certs or using CAA, I'm sure a $5 wrench[1] could convince one of the lesser certificate authorities to sign a cert for whatever domain they're using.

[1]: https://xkcd.com/538/

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by phire on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:41PM (#41021988)
The update files are almost certainly signed.

Even if the HTTPS channel is compromised with a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker shouldn't be able to craft a valid update, unless they also compromised CrowdStrke's keys.

However, the fact that this update apparently managed to bypass any internal testing or staging release channels makes me question how good CrowdStrike's procedures are about securing those update keys.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by cyrnel on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:06PM (#41022068)
Depends when/how the signature is checked. I could imagine a signature being embedded in the file itself, or the file could be partially parsed before the signature is checked.

It's wild to me that it's so normal to install software like this on critical infrastructure, but questions about how they do code signing is a closely guarded/obfuscated secret.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by jmb99 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @12:23AM (#41022353)
Kind of a side talent, but I’m currently (begrudgingly) working on a project with a Fortune 20 company that involves a complicated mess of PKI management, custom (read: non-standard) certificates, a variety of management/logging/debugging keys, and (critically) code signing. It’s taken me months of pulling teeth just to get details about the hierarchy and how the PKI is supposed to work from my own coworkers in a different department (who are in charge of the project), let alone from the client. I still have absolutely 0 idea how they perform code signing, how it’s validated, or how I can test that the non-standard certificates can validate this black-hole-box code signing process. So yeah, companies really don’t like sharing details about code signing.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by phire on Sunday July 21, 2024 @12:45AM (#41022442)
Sure, it's certainly possible.

Though, I prefer to give people benefit of doubt for this type of thing. IMO, the level of incompetence to parse a binary file before checking the signature is significantly higher (or at least different) than simply pushing out a bad update (even if the latter produces a much more spectacular result).

Besides, we don't need to speculate. We have the driver. We have the signature files [1]. Because of the publicity, I bet thousands of people are throwing it into Binary RE tools right now, and if they are doing something as stupid as parsing a binary file before checking it's signature (or not checking a signature at all), I'm sure we will hear about it.

We can't see how it was signed because that's happening on Cloudstrike's infrastructure, but checking the signature verification code is trivial.

[1] Both in this zip file: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OVIWLDMN9xzYv8L391V1ob2ghp8...

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by emmelaich on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:18PM (#41022113)
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by emmelaich on Saturday July 20, 2024 @11:17PM (#41022110)
My speculation is the bit of code/data that was broken, is added after the build and testing precisely to avoid the $5 wrench attack.

That is, the data is signed and they don't want to use the real signing key during testing / in the continuous build because then it is too exposed.

So it's added after as something that "could not break". But it of course did.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by phire on Sunday July 21, 2024 @01:21AM (#41022586)
I can think of a bunch of different answers:

This wasn't a code update, just a configuration update. Maybe they don't put config update though QA at all, assuming they are safe.

It's possible that QA is different enough from production (for example debug builds, or signature checking disabled) that it didn't detect this bug.

Might be an ordering issue, and that they tested applying update A then update B, but pushed out update B first.

The fact that it instantly went out to all channels is interesting. Maybe they tested it for the beta channel it was meant for (and it worked, because that version of the driver knew how to cope with that config) but then accidentally pushed it out to all channels, and the older versions had no idea what to do wiht it.

Or maybe they though they were only sending it to their QA systems but pushed the wrong button and sent it out everywhere.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by emmelaich on Sunday July 21, 2024 @04:42AM (#41023495)
> This wasn't a code update, just a configuration update

Configuration is data, data is code.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by gruez on Saturday July 20, 2024 @10:44PM (#41022001)
that's assuming they don't do cert pinning. Moreover despite all the evil things you can supposedly do with a $5 wrench, I'm not aware of any documented cases of this sort of attack happening. The closest we've seen are misissuances seemingly caused by buggy code.