She has a number of variations on this theme, and with each failure she tries something slightly different. Until I catch her and bring her back inside.
The reason I know this is because, before I was aware that it was happening, it succeeded at least twice. (I'm picturing people reading this saying, in Lisa Simpsons's voice, "is my brother dumber than a hamster? Hamster two, Bart zero" - because that's what my inner voice is saying right now).
I did IT work on a farm for a few weeks and was there 3-5 days a week. The cows were far more active than any other animal I saw. They clearly liked each other and had friends and non-friends in the group. They would run and walk dozens and dozens of miles per day and a horse would move 1/4 mile in total over the course of an entire day.
Cows are intelligent, curious, and they have a sense of humor, a desire to play. They have friends, enemies, and .. well, everything, really. They have different capabilities because their brains and bodies are different than ours, but they're every bit as legitimate of a life form as ourselves, and every bit as conscious and self-aware.
To me - as someone who is not a biologist or a professional in this field - this appears to be consciousness. I couldn't imagine anyone trying to argue against that.
It's difficult to establish whether or not an animal is conscious in the way that it's difficult to establish whether another person is conscious. The only evidence we have for consciousness is the fact that we personally experience it ourselves. And because of that, we can't truly know if other's are conscious from a philosophical sense (i.e.—philosophical zombies) but we can posit scientifically that they must be since they share the same brain structure that we do.
Now when we're trying to establish scientifically whether or not an animal is conscious or not, it's more difficult because we don't have the subjective experience of being that animal, and we can't philosophically transfer the phenomenology of the experience our brain creates onto theirs. So, while I think the question "are animals conscious?" is well-bounded, it's not one that is currently answerable due to the currently private nature of consciousness.
> Are animals aware of their surroundings? Yes. Are animals showing the behavioural signs of pain when you hurt them? Yes. Can animals direct attention? Yes. Can animals remember? Yes. Can animals learn? Yes.
Reacting to stimuli is all possible without consciousness—just like crabs react to noxious, painful stimuli without nociceptors. So the phenomena you're describing is not what people are talking about when they're debating consciousness
This knowledge now affects my assumptions about consciousness and whether it’s really knowable.
Because there’s no rigorous scientific definition of what consciousness is, and you can’t even just roughly point to it, just like most quasi-sciences it’s all up for debate.
From my perspective, the only people questioning whether or not non-humans have consciousness are coming from a religious perspective trying to reconcile their cognitive dissonance
The claim that certain individuals lack an inner monologue is a testament to this—I can't imagine what that would be like but that is certainly nothing like my conscious experience is. To me, the lack of an inner monologue sounds very much like the 'dark universe' in which the brain is doing all of the processing and there is no conscious observer to witness the unfolding. I'm sure people without a inner monologue are still conscious.. but—it's interesting to think about how different their experience may be like.
Voila, consciousness without the inner monologue.
I can't see how distracting yourself with something else (thoughts) could make you more conscious.
So I don't know if the fact that your cats are agents that are reacting to stimuli is proof that they're conscious. Again, if we were an outside observer, like an alien, we would have no way to prove humans are conscious. The only reason we believe scientifically that other humans are conscious is because we personally perceive conscious, and since other humans have the same neurological structures that we do, we can posit that they experience the same thing. Philosophically though we can't 'prove' other people are conscious, which gets us back to the philosophical zombie thought experiment.
I understand it sounds simple, but there are so many different systems interplaying to give rise to whatever definition of consciousness you give, it’s really hard to give exact definitions.
Also, you still talk as if this “awareness in the moment” might be a simple dichotomy. I seriously highly doubt this is the case, especially when it comes to stuff like reflexes and instincts.
A stone is "aware in the present moment". Its temperature is an inner state reflecting the environment, short-term. Its composition is an inner state reflecting the environment, long-term.
People often find this line much harder to draw after they have experienced qualia that is radically different from from what they have experienced before. The most common avenues for such an experience are psychedelics or deep meditation, and the experience is often called ego death.
There is much written on people's subjective experiences, but many people would say that they have experienced qualia which was not based on either awareness or the present moment. Of course, the experience still happened within a human brain, which is known to exhibit awareness of the present moment - but the subjective experience can feel as if neither of those concepts matter, or even exist, while still feeling very real.
These experiences often cause people to start thinking a lot more about the distinctions between consciousness, awareness, and qualia. I get that most people use 'awareness' to mean 'experiencing qualia', but I think most people using 'awareness' in that way have not experienced qualia that is bafflingly different from normal human qualia.
We all know what it's like to be conscious (I presume - my theory of mind is intact but may be flawed). It's obviously the quality of being, i.e. experiencing qualia.
And since we as human beings are conscious, it stands to reason that there are probably other living beings (or matter in general) who are not. (Living) matter that doesn't experience the world, basically. No frame of reference. Unless you believe in panpsychism; then everything is conscious and we can ask ourselves what it's like to be a rock.
It's just that the hard problem of consciousness states that we haven't been able to define this "state" in its exact physical, neural correlates, but just because we haven't been able to do that yet, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. It quite literally is the only thing we can know for sure exists, because otherwise no one would be there to ask or hear the question to begin with.
And sure, you can try to break it down into behavior and other properties of a living being, but that is simply side-stepping the hard problem and just ignoring the question of qualia.
Then again, there's something like "aphantasia": some people do not have the capacity to mentally visualize anything, and often aren't even aware of that themselves. I can imagine there's something analogous with the quality of consciousness, i.e. literal "NPCs" who do not experience the world from a frame of reference, but are basically non-sentient, human, autonomous agents. That's just a very dangerous line of thought, so don't take that too seriously :)
I'm not following this line of reasoning. It seems be exactly opposite to panpsychism, which reasons "since I experience qualia, it stands to reason that everything experiences qualia, because I don't know of a state that does not result in qualia". I'm not a confident panpsychist, but that logic seems to make more sense. Unfortunately, it is just as unproveable as the opposite view, just like pretty much everything around qualia.
To be precise, it's the only thing I can know for sure exists. I can't know for sure if anyone else knows it.
The only thing you can be sure of is that you experience some qualia; that you are conscious is an assumption.
Highly recommend it to think critically about the subject, but I think your point is valid, consciousness occurs for many things, and then it doesn't have to many other things. You don't need consciousness to nearly instantly detect that b comes after a sequence of {a,b,a,b,a,?}. You need consciousness to think about _why_ b comes after though. When you go for a swim and then recall the event, you most likely recall it in an objective or third person way mentally - the image or visual in your memory is that third person view.. but that's not actually how you experienced it.
I wonder how much of that applies to animals, and I wonder if we can ever get that answer.
Scientific experiments can detect specific things and specific details (if tested in an appropriate way), but this would be something specific rather than just being called "consciousness", is what I should think.
Well, could you give me the definition of consciousness? No you can’t. So now you’re asking me both to define it and show if animals have it or not.
Are animals aware of their surroundings? Yes. Are animals showing the behavioural signs of pain when you hurt them? Yes. Can animals direct attention? Yes. Can animals remember? Yes. Can animals learn? Yes. Are animals self-aware? Some of them, some only sometimes, some not.
To think of consciousness as a dichotomy instead of a spectrum is baffling to me. As is thinking of consciousness as being a single, indivisible thing.