Apple, on the other hand, has made a pretty serious effort to ensure that no employee can access your data on these AI systems. That’s hugely different! They’re going as far as to severely restrict logging and observability and even building and designing their own chips and operating systems. And ensuring that clients will refuse to talk to non-audited systems.
Yes, we can’t take Apple’s word for it. But I think the third party audits are a huge part of how we trust, and also verify, that this system will be private. I don’t think it’s far to claim that “Apple knows what you’re doing.” That implies that some one, at some level at Apple can at some point access the data sent from your device to this private cloud. That does not seem to be true.
I think another facet of trust here is that a rather big part of Apple’s business model is privacy. They’ve been very successful financially by creating products that generate money in other ways, and it’s very much not necessary or even a sound business idea for them to do something else.
While I think it’s fair to be skeptical about the claims without 3rd party verification, I don’t think it’s fair to say that Apple’s approach isn’t better for your data and privacy than openAI or Google. (Which I think is the broad implication — openAI tracks prompts for its own model training, not to resell, so it’s also “only openAI knows what your doing.”)
Also, what makes you think that Apple's investments on chip design and OS is superior to Google's? Google is known for OpenTitan and other in-house silicon projects. It's also been working in secure enclave tech (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20265625), which has been open-source for years.
You're making unverifiable claims about Apple's actual implementation of the technical systems and policies it is marketing. Apple also sells ads (App Store, but other surfaces as well) and you don't have evidence that your AI data is not being used to target you. Conversely, not all user data is used by Google for ad targeting.
There are multiple verified stories on the lengths Apple goes internally to keep things secret.
I saw a talk years ago about (I think) booting up some bits of the iCloud infrastructure, which needed two different USB keys with different keys to boot up. Then both keys were destroyed so that nobody knows the encryption keys and can't decrypt the contents.
Using deniable, one-time keys etc. are... not that unusual. In fact I'd say I'm more worried about the use of random USB keys there instead of proper KMS system.
(There are similar stories with how doing a cold start can be difficult when you end up with a loop in your access controls, from Google, where a fortunately simulated cold-start showed that they couldn't access necessary KMS physically to bootstrap the system... because access controls depended, after many layers, on the system to be cold-started).
Any piece of technology MAY have a backdoor or secondary function you don't know of and can't find out without breaking said device.
Apple generally engineers their business so that there isn’t an incentive to violate those access controls or principles. Thats not where the money is for them.
Behavior is always shaped by rewards and punishments. Positive reinforcement is always stronger.
All these conversations always end up boiling down to someone thinking they’re being clever for pointing out you have to trust a company at the end of the day when it comes to security and privacy.
Yes. Valid. So if you have to trust someone, doesn’t it make sense for it to be someone who has built protecting privacy into their core value proposition, versus a company that has baked violating your privacy into their value prop?
Apple doesn't care about you, the individual. Your value as a singular customer is worthless. They do care about the whole; a whole that governments can threaten to exclude them from if they don't cooperate with domestic surveillance demands. How far off do you really think American iCloud is from China? If Apple is willing to backdoor one server, what's stopping them from backdooring them all? If they're willing to lie about notification security, what's stopping them from lying about server integrity too?
And worst off, Apple markets security. That's it; you can't go verify their veracity outside the dinky little whitepapers they publish. You can't know for sure if they have privacy violation baked-in to their system because you can't actually verify anything. You simply have to guess, and the best guess you can make gets based off whatever Apple markets as "true" to you. In reality, we can do better with security and should probably expect more from one of the largest consumer technology brands in the world. Simply assuming that they aren't violating user privacy is an absurd thing to gamble your security on.
Which is why it's good for us to demand more from capable companies. Apple looks good when they're scared, and the market wins when they're forced to compete in novel and interesting ways. Success breeds complacency, the rest is distant history.
My dad fits into this category. So worried about being “tracked by the government.” He’s not a dissident. He’s not a journalist. Not a freedom fighter. Just deeply inconveniencing his kids with some of his tech choices.
But if these people were the targets of APTs, all the massive technology lifestyle changes they’ve made to supposedly protect themselves wouldn’t really matter.
Sounds like your dad is the cool dude, and you're the tech-obsessed weirdo. Do you visit him often?
He’s otherwise a good dude. Just makes some tech choices here and there as if he’s a former CIA agent on the run that sort of just make you chuckle and shake your head.
Oh, boy, but this is deeply false. Apple literally provides security researchers models of their devices to verify their security claims on their most important cash cow, the iPhone.
This is just an incredibly bold and verifiably false claim.
Wow.
On top of that, they fail to commit to iOS security on the level of AOSP and don't let researchers create hardened variants or custom patches. With actively-distributed exploits like Pegasus still being used, that's the sort of behavior that turns your userbase into a stationary target. Giving researchers iPhones is insultingly usel
Apple vehemently opposes the concept of anyone securing their iPhone except them. They have a well-documented habit of ignoring vulnerabilities and offering zero compensation for the discovery of zero-days. Apple's ambivalence towards the security research sector is like one of the only things they're known for, among hacker communities. It is "verifiably false" in the sense that Apple spends quite a lot of money marketing the opposite of what they actually do in reality (not that you should be surprised by that).
American companies are subject to US law, full stop. Global technology companies have to balance interests to operate globally. China requires a local partner to operate services in the PRC, thus Apple and Microsoft (and others) operate with a business partner in that market.
From a business perspective, there's little or no incentive for Apple to take measures to collect information on you systematically - they do not monetize it and won't devote resources to its collection. However, not being responsive to government requests, demands, or order for information will result in punitive action. So they comply.
No company cares about you. They don't love or hate you. There's no moral purity - the competitive platform is owned by a company that owns the advertising market and has a long history of extracting every sinew of data to create profiles that allow for maximally efficient ad delivery. Engaging in whataboutism isn't productive.
How do you distinguish between a company who 'has built protecting privacy into their core value proposition' and one who just says they've done so?
What are you going to do if a major privacy scandal comes out with Apple at the center? If you wouldn't jump ship from Apple after a major privacy scandal then why does your input on this matter at all?
Some people feel that is inevitable so it's best to just rip that bandaid off now.
If you're already using a dumb phone and eschewing modern software services, then I'm not really talking to you. Roll on brother/sister, you are living your ideals.
> How do you distinguish between a company who 'has built protecting privacy into their core value proposition' and one who just says they've done so?
The business incentives. Apple's brand and market valuation to some extent depends on being the secure and privacy oriented company you and your family can trust. While Google's valuation and profit depends almost entirely on exploiting as much of your personal data as they possibly can get away with. The business models speaks for themselves.
Does this guarantee privacy and security? Does Apple have a perfect track record here? No of course not, but again if these are my two smartphone choices it seems fairly clear to me.
If you really perceive this as a binary choice, I have no idea how you could conclude that iOS is more secure than the Android Open Source Project.
...of course, it's not just a choice between a Google-spyware phone or an Apple-spyware phone. Many people like to reduce it to that so they can rationalize whichever company they pick, but in reality you have many choices including no smartphone at all. On Android's side, the Open Source images have enabled rigorous cross-referencing in OS capability, as well as forks that reduce the already-limited attack surface. Apple has a long track-record of letting zero-days fester in their inbox and failing to communicate promptly to security researchers, even for actively-exploited vulnerabilities.
It's not a "false equivalency" to highlight how Google, Apple and Microsoft all fold over like wet paper when the intelligence agencies come around. It's not a coincidence, either; all of those companies are enrolled in the NSA's domestic warrantless surveillance program.
Oh come on man. This is why these conversations often aren’t even worth having.
But, hey, at least the NSA won’t get ya.
I wonder how all those people did it in the 90s and 00s and before the age of smartphones.
Reality is based in a context.
Or are we going to go to even more “get off my lawn” kind of places and talk about how ancient man survived quite fine without the internet?
Like to eschew smartphones and just use basic feature phones and to interact in real physical settings and not digital ones.
There's a growing and warranted push back to pervasive and addictive digital technology.
This stuff is all designed so that even an employee with physical access to the machine would find it very difficult to get data. It's encrypted at rest by customer keys, stored in enclaves in volatile RAM. If you detached the computer or disk, you'd lose access. You'd have to perform an attack by somehow injecting code into the running system. But Shielded VMs/GKE instances makes that very hard.
I am not a Google employee anymore but this common tactic of just throwing out "oh, their business model contains ad model ergo, they will sell anything and everything, and violate contracts they sign to steal private data from your private cloud" is a bridge too far.
[1]: https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2024/10114/
If I were king of Apple and I truly valued user privacy, I would be careful not to tie any revenue streams to products that entail the progressive violation of user privacy.
Every teams meeting we have is now transcribed by AI, and while it’s something we want, it’s also a lot of data in the hands of a company where we don’t fully know what happens with it. Maybe they keep it safe and only really share it with the NSA or whichever American sneaky agency listens in on our traffic. Which isn’t particularly tin-foil-hat. We’ve semi-recently had a spy scandal where it somewhat unrelated (this wasn’t the scandal) was revealed that our own government basically lets the US snoop on every internet exit node our country has. It is what it is when you’re basically a form of vassal state to the Us. Anyway, with the increased AI monitoring tools build directly into Microsoft products, we’re now handing over more data than ever.
To get the point, we’re currently seeing some debate on whether Chromebooks and Google education/workspaces should be allowed in schools. Which is a good debate. Or at least it would be if the alternative wasn’t Microsoft… Because does it really matter if it’s Google or Microsoft that invades your privacy?
Apple is increasingly joining this trend. Only recently it was revealed that new Apple devices have some sort of radio build into them, even though it’s not on their tech sheets. Or in other words, Apple has now joined the trend of devices that can form their own internet by being near other Apple devices. Similar to how Samsung and most car manufacturers have operated for years now.
And again if sort of leads to… does it really matter if it’s Google or Apple that intrudes on your privacy? To some degree it does, of course, I’d personally rather have Microsoft or Apple spy on me, but I would frankly prefer if no one spied on me.
Build your system so that it can't be decrypted, don't log anything etc. Mullvad has been doing this with VPNs and law enforcement has tested it - there's nothing for them to get.
Same has been proven with Apple not allowing FBI to open an iPhone, because it'd set a precedent. Future iPhone versions were made so that it's literally impossible for even Apple to open a locked iPhone.
There's no reason why they wouldn't go to same lengths on their private cloud compute. It's the one thing they can do that Google can't.
Now you can't debug anything.
> Mullvad has been doing this with VPNs
Mullvad do not need to store any data at all. Infact any data that they store is a risk. Minimising the data stored minimises their risk. The only thing they need to store is keys.
Look, if you want to ask an AI service if this photo has a dog in, thats simple and requires no state other than the photo. If you want to ask it does it have my dog in, thats a whole 'nother kettle of fish. How do you communicate the descriptors that describe your dog? how do you generate them? on device? that'll drain your battery in a very short order.
> Apple not allowing FBI to open an iPhone, because it'd set a precedent
Because they didn't follow process.
> Future iPhone versions were made so that it's literally impossible for even Apple to open a locked iPhone.
They don't need to, just hack the icloud backup. plus its not impossible, its just difficult. If you own the key authority then its less hard.
Right, but I have no reason to think that this isn't a marketing ploy either, just another story. There is simply no way that Apple is as big as it is, without providing whatever data the government requires. Corporations and governments are not your friend.
No government order short of targeting a specific backdoored update to a specific person will allow them to give data they can't access.
And if you're doing something that can make a TLA force Apple to create a targeted iOS update just for you, it's not something regular people can or should worry about.
Apple keeps normal people safe from mass surveillance, being protected from CIA/NSA required going Full Snowden and it's not a technological problem, you need to change the way you live.
> The scandal broke in early June 2013, external when the Guardian newspaper reported that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting the telephone records of tens of millions of Americans.
> The paper published the secret court order directing telecommunications company Verizon to hand over all its telephone data to the NSA on an "ongoing daily basis".
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964
You seem to think that 10 years, under cover of secret orders, that this is NOT going on now. Not Apple!
People's lovely trusting natures in corporations and government never ceases to amaze me.
I'm failing to see the what would be the challenge here. Apple can technically do that. The government can force them to do that.
I thought the outcome of that case was that no precedent was set, since the iPhone was unlocked before the FBI could test their argument in court.
> Future iPhone versions were made so that it's literally impossible for even Apple to open a locked iPhone.
Firmware signed by apple is what runs to verify your biometrics and decide whether or not to unlock the device. At any point apple could sign firmware with a backdoor for this processor which lets them unlock any phone. How did they prevent this in future iPhone versions?
> theshrike79 18 hours ago | parent | context | flag | on: Private Cloud Compute: A new frontier for AI priva...
The best protection against "secret orders" is to use mathematics.
Build your system so that it can't be decrypted, don't log anything etc. Mullvad has been doing this with VPNs and law enforcement has tested it - there's nothing for them to get.
Same has been proven with Apple not allowing FBI to open an iPhone, because it'd set a precedent. Future iPhone versions were made so that it's literally impossible for even Apple to open a locked iPhone.
> There's no reason why they wouldn't go to same lengths on their private cloud compute. It's the one thing they can do that Google can't.
They did go to the same length, they have the ability to see your data whenever they choose to since they own the signing keys.
I don't think this is already the case, and I think the article is an example of safeguards being put into place (in this particular scenario) to prevent it.
Under the system described in the linked paper, your scenario is not possible. In fact, the whole thing looks to be designed to prevent exactly that scenario.
Where do you see the weakness? How could a secret order result in undetectable data capture?
In case anyone was uncertain about whether to trust what we are told - we heard that the US government was taping millions of phone records from the Snowden revelations.
So, we are told there are secrets, and we are told that there are mechanisms in place to prevent this information from being made public.
You are also free to believe that the revelations are no longer relevant... I'd like to hear the reason.
IMO - the reverse is the case - in that you need to show why Apple have now become trustworthy. Why would Apple not be subject to secret judgements?
I know there is a lot of marketing spin about Apple's privacy - but do you really think that they would actually confront the government system, in a way that isn't some further publicity stunt? Can one confront the government and retain a license to operate, do you think? Is it not probable that the reality is that Apple have huge support from the government?
Perhaps this kind of idea is hard to understand - that one can make a big noise about privacy, and how one is doing this or that to prevent access, and all the while ensuring that access is provided to authorised parties. Corporations can say this sort of thing with a straight face - its not a privacy issue to private information - its a (secret) legal issue!
Sorry, but secret courts and secret judgements, along with existing disclosure that millions were being spied upon, means one needs to expect the worst.
But I'm not sure where that leaves you. Is it just a nihilistic "no security matters, it's all a show" viewpoint?
You wouldn't expect a repeat abuser to stop abusing just because of 'time' or a marketing campaign. And yet this is the case here. People keep looking to their tormentors for solutions.
Not expecting healing from those also inflicting the trauma, ie changing one's expectations, seems like a minimum effort/engagement in my view, but it's somehow inconceivable.
No name employees at Google or Facebook can't access customer data either. Their business model of ads doesn't mean that random employees there can look at what you do.
Designing their own chips and operating systems gives them more places to hide, not less.
But I agree, third party audit.
I'm trying to understand if this is really possible. I know they claim so but is there any info on how this would prevent Apple from executing different code to what is presented for audit?
And at least after my experiences with T2 chip, I consider Apple devices to be always owned by Apple first...
So the question is: could the hash be falsified? That’s why they’re publishing the source code to firmware and bootloader, so researchers can audit the secure boot foundations.
I am sure there is some way that a completely malevolent Apple could design a weakness into this system so they could spend a fortune on the trappings while still being able to access user information they could never use without exposing the lie and being crushed under class actions and regulatory assault.
But I reject the idea that that remote possibility means the whole system offers no benefit users should consider in purchasing decisions.
Matt Green's posts about it so am sure it's been thought out - but hard to understand how it doesn't just depend on employees doing the right thing, when if you could, you would need all the rigmarole.
If a third party wants that data, whether the third party is an online criminal, government law enforcement or a "business partner", this idea that Apple's "business model" will somehow negate the downsides of "cloud computing", online advertising and internet privacy is futile. Moreover, it is a myth. Apple is spending more and more on ad services, we can see this in its SEC filings. Before he died, Steve Jobs was named on an Apple patent application for showing ads during boot. The company uses "privacy" as a marketing tactic. There is no evidence of an ideological or actual effort to avoid the so-called "tech" company "business model". Apple follows what these companies do. It considers them competitors. Apple collects a motherload of user data and metadata. A company that was serious about privacy would not do this. It's a cop out, not a trade off.
To truly avoid the risks of cloud computing, online advertising and associated privacy issues, choosing Apple instead of Google is a half-baked effort. Anyone who was serious about it would choose neither.
Of course, do what is necessary, trust whomever; no one is faulting anyone for making practical choices, but let's not pretend choosing Apple and trusting it solves these problems introduced by so-called "tech" company competitors. Apple pursues online advertising, cloud computing and data collection. All at the expense of privacy. With billions in cash on hand, it is one of the wealthiest companies on Earth, does it really need to do that.
In the good old days, we could call Apple a hardware company. The boundaries were clear. Those days are long gone. Connect an Apple computer to a network and watch what goes over the wire wth zero user input, destined for servers controlled by the mothership. There is nothing "private" about that design.
Yeah. I feel like the conversation needs some guard rails like, "Within the realm of big tech, which has discovered that one of its most profitable models is to make you the product, Apple is really quite privacy friendly!"
That sounds completely fair, in my judgement.
> Google obviously tracks everything you do for ads, recommendations, AI, you name it. They don’t even hide it, it’s a core part of their business model.
This wasn't the experience I saw. Google is intentional about which data from which products go into their ads models (which are separate from their other user modeling), and you can see things like which data of yours is used in ads personalization on https://myadcenter.google.com/personalizationoff or in the "Why this ad" option on ads.
> and it’s very much not necessary or even a sound business idea for them to do something else
I agree that Apple plays into privacy with their advertising and product positioning. I think assuming all future products will be privacy-respecting because of this is over-trusting. There is _a lot_ of money in advertising / personal data
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/apple-advertisin...
It also exempts itself from normal tracking opt-outs in iOS. It has _another_ set of settings you need to opt out off to disable _their_ advertising tracking.
I will trust them because the alternatives I see are scattered and unfocused.
Specifically, open-source and self-hostable. Open source doesn't save you if people can't run their own servers, because you never know whether what's in the public repo is the exact same thing that's running on the cloud servers.
What runs on the servers isn't actually very important. Why? Becuase even if you could somehow know with 100% certainty that what a server runs is the same code you can see, any provider is still subject to all kinds of court orders.
What matters is the client code. If you can audit the client code (or better yet, build your own compatible client based on API specs) then you know for sure what the server side sees. If everything is encrypted locally with keys only you control, it doesn't matter what runs on the server.
Other than obvious "open source software isn't perfectly secure" attack scenarios, this would require a non-targeted hardware attack, where the entire infrastructure would need to misinterpret the software or misrepresent the chain of custody.
I believe this is one of the protections Apple is attempting to implement here.
Their device says it's been attested. Has it? Who knows? They control the hardware, so can just make the server attest whatever they want, even if it's not true. It'd be trivial to just use a fake hash for the system volume data. You didn't build the attestation chip. You will never find out.
Happy to be proven wrong here, but at first glance the whole idea seems like a sham. This is security theater. It does nothing.
The big issue with Apple is that their attestation infrastructure is wholly private to them, you can't self-host (Android is a bit similar in that application using Google's attestation system have the same limitation, but you can in theory setup your own).
Under the assumption that Apple is telling the truth about what the server hardware is doing, this could protect against unauthorized modifications to the server software by third parties.
If however, we assume Apple itself is untrustworthy (such as, because the US government secretly ordered them to run a different system image with their spyware installed) then this will not help you at all to detect that.
> It’d be trivial to just use a fake hash
You have to go deeper to support this. Apple is publishing source code to firmware and bootloader, and the software above that is available to researchers.
The volume hash is computed way up in the stack, subject to the chain of trust from these components.
Are you suggesting that Apple will actually use totally different firmware and bootloaders, just to be able to run different system images that report fake hashes, and do so perfectly so differences between actual execution environment and attested environment cannot be detected, all while none of the executives, architects, developers, or operators involved in the sham ever leaks? And the nefarious use of the data is never noticed?
At some point this crosses over into “maybe I’m just a software simulation and the entire world and everyone in it are just constructs” territory.
It's also not as complicated as you make it sound here. Because Apple controls the hardware, and thus also the data passing into attestation, they can freely attest whatever they want - no need to truly run the whole stack.
But operationally it is incredibly complicated to deliver and operate this kind of false attestation at massive scale.
If apple holds the signing keys for the servers, can they not change the code at any time?
Or if someone compels them to
If you trust math you can prove the software is what they say it is.
Yes it is work to do this, but this is a big step forward.
It does not tell you how it got that key. A compromised server would send you the key all the same.
You still have to trust in the security infrastructure. Trust that Apple is running the hardware it says it is, Trust that apple is running the software it says it is.
Security audits help build that trust, but it is not and never will be proof. A three-letter-agency of choice can still walk in and demand they change things without telling anyone. (And while that particular risk is irrelevant to most users, various countries are still opposed to the US having that power over such critical user data.)
To quote:
verifiable transparency, goes one step further and does away with the hypothetical: security researchers must be able to verify the security and privacy guarantees of Private Cloud Compute, and they must be able to verify that the software that’s running in the PCC production environment is the same as the software they inspected when verifying the guarantees.
So how does this work?
> The PCC client on the user’s device then encrypts this request directly to the public keys of the PCC nodes that it has first confirmed are valid and cryptographically certified. This provides end-to-end encryption from the user’s device to the validated PCC nodes, ensuring the request cannot be accessed in transit by anything outside those highly protected PCC nodes
> Next, we must protect the integrity of the PCC node and prevent any tampering with the keys used by PCC to decrypt user requests. The system uses Secure Boot and Code Signing for an enforceable guarantee that only authorized and cryptographically measured code is executable on the node. All code that can run on the node must be part of a trust cache that has been signed by Apple, approved for that specific PCC node, and loaded by the Secure Enclave such that it cannot be changed or amended at runtime.
But why can't a 3-letter agency bypass this?
> We designed Private Cloud Compute to ensure that privileged access doesn’t allow anyone to bypass our stateless computation guarantees.
> We consider allowing security researchers to verify the end-to-end security and privacy guarantees of Private Cloud Compute to be a critical requirement for ongoing public trust in the system.... When we launch Private Cloud Compute, we’ll take the extraordinary step of making software images of every production build of PCC publicly available for security research. This promise, too, is an enforceable guarantee: user devices will be willing to send data only to PCC nodes that can cryptographically attest to running publicly listed software.
So your data will not be sent to node that are not cryptographically attested by third parties.
These are pretty strong guarantees, and really make it difficult for Apple to bypass.
It's like end-to-end encryption using the Signal protocol: relatively easy to verify it is doing what is claimed, and extraordinarily hard to bypass.
Specifically:
> The only thing the math tells you is that the server software gave you a correct key.
No, this is secure attestation. See for example https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06wi/final... which explains it quite well.
The weakness of attestation is that you don't know what the root of trust is. But Apple strengthens this by their public inspection and public transparency logs, as well as the target diffusion technique which forces an attack to be very widespread to target a single user.
These aren't simple things for a 3LA to work around.
> These are pretty strong guarantees, and really make it difficult for Apple to bypass.
These guarantees rely entirely on trust in the hardware but it's not your hardware.
This exactly the problem that "trusted computing" is designed to solve.
I'd encourage you to read for example the AWS Nitro Enclave outline here: https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/confidential-computing....
Nitro enclaves are similar in that they are designed to stop AWS operators from having access to the compute, even though it isn't owned by you.
Still, this is notably more secure than your typical cloud compute, where you have to just trust the cloud provider when they pinky swear that they won’t peek.
How does the client verify that the code running on the PCC is the code that has been audited publicly, and not a modified version logging your data or using it for other purposes(signed by apple).
Actually it is. Read their docs on what they do linked below.
…wait, haven’t there been MULTIPLE cases of open-source projects getting hacked in the last couple of years?
https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto
And to be fair, this doesn't apply only to this case. Even the data you have stored locally, Apple could access it if they wanted, they sure have power to do it if they so wish or were ordered by the government. They might have done it already and just didn't told anyone for obvious reasons. So, I would argue the best you could say is that it's private in the sense that only Apples knows/can know what you are doing rather than a larger number of entities .
Which, you could argue it's a win when the alternatives will leak your data to many more parts... But still far away from being this unbreakable cryptography that it's portrayed it to be.