There are plenty of people and teams who just want a button to push to run their build. That's not so hard. Give them a CI/CD system and they'll use it.
The problem becomes the people who want to use weird, wildly divergent build processes made of fifteen shell scripts strung together and downloading arbitrary content from random remote servers because they enjoyed engineering it. They'll insist on having a blank slate of a cloud tenancy because no build system can meet their needs. The CI/CD team does not take this case seriously and will never meaningfully support it. Security is in no way staffed to build out a major extension of the CI/CD service.
Perhaps it's the data team, who has decided they would like to datamine large quantities of private information at their leisure, in contravention of privacy policies and contractual language. So they'll jump through hoops and contortions and share passwords every which way in order to do the thing they want. They will deliberately set out to disable monitoring systems because they resent the implications. At no point will they pause to consider if any of this is a good idea.
It's not just about making it easy to be secure. It's also about being able to find and stop people being insecure. One of the important things a security policy - and security organization - does is set boundaries for what activity is and isn't permitted. Crossing those boundaries needs to be watched closely... and yes, punished.
What the actual **. That's a very hefty GDPR violation and you should be fired for doing that.
> simply to be productive
If you are using private and sensitive data, that should be pretty much out of the question. You develop with a dummy database only, which doesn't matter if leaked. And after having finished testing, move to the actual data.
But those damned deadlines ...
It doesn't matter if any of this is true. What matters is they believe it and it leaves them feeling empowered enough to invest.
Today, give that person an AWS account and they can absolutely build cloud-based data solutions by clicking around and following SO posts. Add ChatGPT to guide them and the sky is the limit…on how much data they can expose.
They inherently desire to work with the company’s Crown Jewels of data. They want unfettered access to, and want to give other people access to, an entire data warehouse of some of our company’s most sensitive customer information. And when it comes to securing it properly, they often do not have the same engineering capabilities as software teams.
Anything that tries to get them to understand the risks they are taking or the sensitivity of the data, much less de-risk their workflows, is treated as an obstacle to be routed around. Often, the best I can hope for is a token effort at negotiation where their goal will be to avoid any and all changes on their part. After which I will have to monitor them carefully, because from experience the odds of them backsliding within a week are uncomfortably high.
Nothing about this is conducive to producing a healthy environment. When people's idea of "easy" is they can download the company's most sensitive data to their laptop to load into Jupyter, any amount of security controls will come as an imposition.
Given that many data engineers have a data science, data analytics, BI, or software engineering background, I'm curious if you've noticed any trends in their approach to data security?
Snark aside, there's usually a reflexive assumption that more data is always better and that anything that gets in the way of more data is bad. Anything that limits how data is analyzed is bad. Anything that limits or restricts their choice of tooling or where they use it is rejected.
Data scientists and engineers are people who are, often, working with a company's crown jewels. They are trusted with data representing the private lives of hundreds of millions of people assembled in a data warehouse. I want them to have a care. To treat this with due gravitas. All too often, all they seem to see is a neat data set to feed into R on their Macbook.
Yes, such workflows are something to be routed around.
The rest - a VPN to a virtual desktop - is entirely reasonable.
Security measures in operational workflows are only a little bit about what the end user - you - sees. Generally they're really about delivering something less obviously visible to the user but very valuable to the business, investors, and regulators.
https://www.nist.gov/itl/smallbusinesscyber
https://www.nist.gov/itl/smallbusinesscyber/nist-cybersecuri...
Data engineering teams need at least part of their team to be designated software or systems engineers that are experts in stuff like how to create a robust cloud environment. This is not only beneficial for security, but also for cost optimization, performance, operations, etc! It drives me crazy when I see a data engineer or marketing team told they have to fend for themselves when trying to figure out how to build a cloud environment.
In practice, the answer is to hire a consultancy. There are fractional CISO services out there. It's very likely that a startup without significant security experience in-house does not have the expertise to make good use of any guidance they can find. Every scenario is too specific, every personality dynamic too unique, and every new technology question too novel for there to be easy pre-fab answers that a non-security-practioner can find, understand, and apply in a correct and consistent manner.
In my organization, the problem is the security people, not the marketing people. They're simply not responsive.
Someone on a non-IT team will send a message to someone in IT Security asking a question, checking to see if a procedure is correct, or if it's OK to so something, and the IT person simply won't get back to them in an acceptable timeframe.
I'm not talking about minutes. I'm talking days. I've seen my coworkers' IT Security tickets go unanswered for more than a week.
Yes, securing your big fancy data warehouse is very important. But guess what — hackers don't knock on the front door anymore. They're going through the small cracks that you allow to form when you don't realize that your job is securing the entire organization, not just your silo.
This is why the rest of the company is going around security to get things done. Because if the money doesn't keep flowing, everyone loses their jobs.
Honestly, 1 week sounds totally reasonable to me. If you’re at the point where you need an answer immediately or it’s going to delay your timelines, then you didn’t plan your timelines very well, or you waited too long to engage your security team. You have to keep in mind that while you might be laser-focused on your app and think it’s the highest priority, your security team is likely dealing with hundreds of apps, each of which all claim to be the highest priority. Triaging has to happen, and it doesn’t always go in your favor. It really sucks for everyone involved, but I don’t see a good fix for it.
The sweet spot is empowering teams to make most security decisions on their own so the capacity of security people can be spent more wisely and development teams don’t have to wait for an answer except for in very rare cases, but the pessimist in me thinks we’re already too far behind on this and technology (and the opportunity for new security dangers to arise) moves too fast for us to ever catch up.
Basically, there is always an assigned person on call to oversee the use of any "crown jewel" data?
This way the internal users can continue to move fast, but maybe break way fewer things?
You can’t rely on that as a fix though, because it’s inherently reactive, when what you really want is proactive protections. By the time you get paged about a breach, it’s already too late.
1) Marketing person wants to play with sensitive data
2) Prior to anything happening, security-aware person is notified
3) Same day, security-aware person deploys the data where the marketing person wanted it, with proper safeguards, hands-off access
edit: I believe you addressed what I am getting at in your recent comment here... https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39995747
However in my experience in a big org, #1 happens frequently enough where it basically would be needed at all times, and would need a security person (or entire team) dedicated solely to that purpose. And sadly in my experience, companies are not willing to spend the money, or able to hire enough security people, to have that level of a dedicated security concierge for every team that needs it.
I may be grasping at straws here. It just feels ridiculous that my national security is being risked by these obviously super-dumb moves made by trillion dollar corporations.
The problem isn't just knowledge. The problem is getting people to use that knowledge to push back on bad ideas.
From my external POV, it feels like for all its faults, Google/Alphabet took the time to create BeyondCorp, and does not have the same record of infosec errors that Microsoft seems to regularly display in recent times.
Is that correct? If so, in your opinion, what is the difference? They both print money...
Is this just a difference in "corporate culture?"
Disclaimer: I grew up in Kirkland/Redmond, have a bias that is favorable towards MS, and would love to understand what the heck is happening.
This has been my experience. We had someone set a secure instance following all the policies and such. Then they moved to another org in the company and I started getting email violations going to the VP every few weeks because they didn't do some sort of attestation. The problem was only the user could do it and the automation had no guidance on how resolve the issue or stop the alerts. This went on for months before it was resolved.
A mistake is one thing, but negligence is another.
Beyond that, whoever allows customer data to be freely accessed and used in cases like this should also be fired.
Start culling those who are doing the job poorly to start making space for others who may be able to do it properly.
How about starting to cull top level managers who constantly put pressure on people, don't hire competent security people but reward quick results that create future problems?
Sure, the top managers is at fault, but individuals are also responsible for their actions.
Why would there be an environment or incentives where this could be a valid strategy?
Things that limit civil liability like mandatory arbitration clauses have made this worse.
Lmao I love how suggesting that developers make take responsibility for their work is met with such hostility here. Nice job removing my comments, you jokes of "developers".
There's truth to what you say, but you're blaming the wrong crowd. Security people are rarely (if ever) the same people that are creating the tools and the security features of the tools you're using. In most cases, I'm powerless as a security engineer to "make security easy to use", the only thing I could do in that regard would be to loosen our security requirements and make our systems less secure, which isn't what you want either.
IMO the problem is more that when developing products, security (and ease of security) is still not seen as that important of a feature (if its even seen as a feature at all and not an annoying cost that the product managers have to deal with). In our application security group, we actually do have requirements that any new product being built must have certain security features that make it easier to secure things, but those requirements are often some of the very first things that the product development teams try to justify delaying or ignoring.
In the app I just released, we take security very seriously. I have spent days on just the login screen, tuning it, so that it lubricates the sign on experience.
In fact, that's what I'm doing, right now. Some of our users have been getting confused with Sign In With Apple, so I'm looking at ways to make it even smoother.
To engineers, especially ones that use CLIs a lot, "UI" is simply "silly chrome for lusers."
However, the other 90% of users think that it is very important.
I have been looking at the signups for a while, and wondering why the SiA signups have been going unused (or the person tries again, with a non-SiA signup).
It was because of a "UX thing."
It's really, really important to take the "UX thing" seriously. It can make or break products. The OXO line of kitchen gadgets got huge, because the designer's wife was disabled, and he designed tools to make her life easier, which also made everyone else's life easier.
It's just that it only makes sense to me as a security thing if Sign in with Apple is specifically more secure than other methods of sign in.
I usually like 3rd party logins, don't need passwords, but there's potential for them to be multi-edged sword. Depending on the implementation.
The workflow is a bit different from the standard login ID/password entry. You use a "Sign In With Apple" button that the OS provides, and that has its own on-device (and cloud) credential generation.
I was not optimizing for the button. There's no need for a user ID, if you are using SiA, so I should not have presented that field to users. Also, some credentials are only available at generation time, and have to be maintained by the app (securely, in the keychain).
That behavior can get reflected in the UI, and may be confusing to folks.
SiA is the only SSO solution we use. I won't use anyone else's code for that stuff, and we keep all user data inside the app. We also don't collect very much.
Because in 99% of cases the code will never be able to cause harm to a human being and there is zero risk for loss of life.
The comparison you are making is kind of ridiculous. To work on the software that works on an airplane then you’ll be vetted appropriately but to work on random CRUD app you don’t really all that much.
It has to be secure and functional otherwise people will use office365 or google docs or dropbox.
And now I wonder about AI tools. There are no self hosted solutions yet so what will the leaks look like ?
Depends on your definition of “easiest.” It will become the easiest path to conduct business activities by throwing roadblocks into the insecure path. It will not be the “easiest” to use.
It’s the equivalent of lowering all the speed limits on every road to 10mph “out of an abundance of caution” instead of doing the hard work of determining the appropriate limits.
I see coworkers storing their entire password (1 week expiration) in notepad in the meantime.
I was going to store the password in a portable Keepass, but I got blocked from accessing a software download website and was scorned by the proxy block page.
Frankly, I think the cyberArk method is effing foolish and having regular 2fa integrated into a product's login makes a lot more sense.
There’s nothing inherently wrong with this tbh, from a practical (not policy) security standpoint.
If I have code execution on your box and can access your notepad, I can also simply monitor the clipboard for when you copy the creds from cyberark.
Secure, accessible password storage shouldn't be a burden.
Secure data handling can't ever be the easiest path. The easiest path is to have all data available all the time to everyone with zero access controls. Adding any kind of security to that is going to reduce the ease, even by a tiny amount.
Security needs to be pragmatic, people have a job to do and a business to run. Security teams should never forget they are there to enable the business.
But at the same time, the company needs to have a culture that recognizes data security is important. If that is not present, there's nothing the security team can do.
Someone inside a company sets up an Azure/AWS instance, to do sandboxing, and doesn't secure it.
Many of these giant data breaches, are because some Marketing person, set up an AWS instance, dumped their entire user DB into it, and did a bunch of data mining.
I think that most cloud providers are now defaulting to locked-down, but I the issue seems to be, that folks are still going outside their org, to do this.
I suspect that having some kind of secure internal cloud setup would be helpful.
However, and this is a biggie: It needs to be easy to use. So many times, security has so many roadblocks, that folks work around it, simply to be productive.
In my opinion, security needs to be the easiest path. If it is not, then that is the fault of the Security folks; not the end user. I worked for a company that had such terrible security policy, that it basically completely stopped all productivity.
Having a policy is worthless, if it is too difficult to follow.