Because they don't own an Apple device or have iMessage, which is the entire point of this discussion?
Last time I checked, Apple still used security questions any hacker can get answers to on Facebook. I'm not all that confident about Apple's approach to account security.
Apple has the ability to control security issues on Android: they can release an Android app, like every other E2EE messenger out there.
Apple chooses not to, and it's their choice, of course. It doesn't care about the privacy of it's non-users, and it doesn't care about the privacy of its users when they communicate with non-users. From what I can tell, it only cares if you stay within the Apple bubble.
Apple is doing it optionally because they're trying to balance two opposing forces here: helping its users access a locked account, and giving users tightly locked accounts.
Check again.
I recently reset a forgotten iTunes password. This required:
- An email verification
- An SMS verification
- A verification code sent to another device on the account
- A ten-day wait
- Another second device verification
The days of answering personal trivia questions to reset passwords are long gone.
> Last time I checked, Apple still used security questions any hacker can get answers to on Facebook.
Apple's default for a number of years has been to use trusted devices IIRC. Their kb article on resetting a forgotten Apple ID password even suggests that it's better to wait until you're back with a trusted device than to immediately try to reset without one, suggesting that the process is somewhat intensive and perhaps subject to human review? I just kicked it off online and the first question _is_ to confirm an obfuscated cell phone number, but I can't imagine that after that it's mother's maiden name dreck?
> Apple has the ability to control security issues on Android: they can release an Android app, like every other E2EE messenger out there.
Which would thus expose them to security weaknesses of a device and OS they do not control, and potentially expose iPhone and iOS customers to increased risk should an Android iMessage user's phone have malware, or screen scraping, or keylogging, etc.
> Apple chooses not to, and it's their choice, of course. It doesn't care about the privacy of it's non-users, and it doesn't care about the privacy of its users when they communicate with non-users. From what I can tell, it only cares if you stay within the Apple bubble.
Nail on the head, but I do think that folks overstate the simplicity with which Apple could provide a comparably secure iMessage experience on Android.
I'm surprised I haven't seen this mentioned more. They could even make a green (or whatever colour they wish) iMessage bubble to denote that it is not from an Apple device. Seems like it solves all the problems people present with E2EE/iMessage with Android interop. On the issue of spam, which I feel is just grasping at straws, You could allow blocking unknown non-Apple iMessages by default. Unless I am mistaken, this really only leaves the walled-garden as the thing that stops Apple from implementing something like this.
In fact, you could even only allow Android iMessage conversations that include at least one genuine Apple device. This combats the argument that they shouldn't have to give resources away to Android users for free. This would be added-value to their own customers by providing more streamlined messaging with their Android contacts. Such as situations where group chats are forced to swap to MMS for a single Android user, sending pictures/video to a friend, etc.
Sure, if this car is super safe it may be better if both you and the other driver both had it. But it is clearly better to have airbags, even if the other car is less safe than it could be if it was from the first-party brand.
It is one thing to not try to mitigate security issues outside their control and another thing to remove possible security because you don't control it entirely.
Of course, this is a hard problem. I'm not saying Apple is bad at security, many good messaging platforms run into these kinds of problems. But the way you fix these problems (and the way Apple in fact did fix the bugs above) was through patching their own software, not by trying to control what attackers can send.
If security researches can send a malicious payload attack that compromises iMessage, the solution is not to make sure they can't send that payload (which would be impossible to guarantee anyway), the solution is to patch iMessage to no longer be vulnerable to that payload attack.
One hopes that the only thing preventing your iMessage client from being compromised is not whether or not the attacker has a spare $1,000 lying around.
The actual solution is to make the client/server not be vulnerable to malicious payloads that would cause a buffer overflow. Whether you do that by patching bugs individually or switching to a memory safe language, or whatever strategy is used -- "don't send our messaging platform bad data" isn't a security fix.