And I seem to recall a recent vulnerability where people were able to bypass the display manager login on some graphical desktop Linux distro.
I just don't feel comfortable shifting the threat to this part of the OS, because desktop Linux has not had the extensive testing required yet. It reminds me of when I was in school and you could bypass NT4 or Windows 98 logins by mashing the Enter key or doing weird user input combinations. Basically manually fuzzing.
If TPM only adds convenience then I'd prefer to continue entering my LUKS password, and my login password, separately.
Isn't this the entire point of full disk encryption? You mention cost, but what is even the benefit of encryption that's unlocked by just booting?
So, data on a stolen laptop which has an unprotected TPM (no PIN to boot) can be considered compromised.
If a laptop is stolen the thief can wait sufficiently long for some vulnerability to be discovered somewhere in the stack. With LUKS only the LUKS encryption has to be good and full disk encryption protects the data.
Ideally, your login screen is secure and allows no bypasses into a shell or similar, so you cannot really access any files on the hard drive.
And if you modify some system files or boot another operating system to get around this, you are required to know the disk encryption password to get to them.
This gives you the benefit of system integrity verification at time of boot, but also requiring your input to release the keys (and meaning you can't get to the system lock screen without the PIN).
In my opinion all the TPM achieves in this case is ensuring you lose your data if the machine dies (or if some OS update fucks up and doesn't properly ensure the TPM acknowledges the new version as valid).
That said it does help against the so called evil maid attacks, given that it would lock itself out if anyone modifies the OS, so if that's part of your threat model then it is useful, I guess.
Because there are different kinds of keyboards out there, with different layouts, so if you switch keyboard you could find yourself unable to input the password. Imagine typing a "non-English" letter in the password and then switching to a US layout keyboard without that letter. Sure, a rare scenario, but with hundreds of millions of users you will hit it.
(for win home users: regedit?)
It doesn't "shift" it, it's not the same password. It doesn't work the way it does on a mac, where your user password unlocks the drive so you don't have to enter it again to unlock your user session.
Assuming you don't have autologon turned on, without this scheme, you'd have to enter two passwords: LUKS first during boot, then your user password in the XDM. With this scheme, you skip the first password.
But yeah, if you don't enable any other protection, like TPM+PIN, your PC will boot on its own all the way to the login manager. So if you don't trust your login manager, that's an issue.
What's a good alternative for Linux?
[1]: Acronis TrueImage, but there are others.
Filesystems without snapshots can't be disk cloned that easily, but tools like Timeshift will try to replicate snapshot behaviour using hardlinks, so I assume backups of Timeshift snapshots should also suffice.
Timeshift can be configured in various ways, including making daily snapshots. I mostly use it for periodic snapshots and snapshots taken before the package manager runs (as a poor man's System Restore alternative).
I don't think Timeshift supports automatically sending snapshots just yet. For that, you'd need to set up a cronjob or systemd timer.
If you have a BTRFS volume on a server that exists purely to receive backups and separate the subvolumes sufficiently (i.e. using specific subvolumes for the different backed up devices), I don't think send/receive should be a problem.
I wouldn't back up to the root partition of a running system, I think a dedicated data volume makes a lot more sense design-wise.
Annoyingly, this is a random 16 byte value that's translated into a numeric string that only Ubuntus's cryptsetup wrapper seems to use. You need to convert it into an actual key if you want to re-enroll your TPM or add a key file/passphrase to another slot.
If you don't back up the recovery key, your data is lost.
For the curious, to avoid "most" QWERTZ/AZERTY differences among Latin layouts:
cbdefghijklnrtuv
I am not a huge fan of relying on this, I cannot recall numer of times where I had to recover my files from live USB or by plugging my drive into another PC - both of which will get difficult to do when my true password sits in TPM on the (potentially bricked) motherboard. But I guess that if it can be used in addition to regular password (e.g. use regular password when TPM is missing, use PIN if it works) then it's fine