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Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by crote on Monday May 08, 2023 @03:24AM (#35858999)
Neat, but that also means their value as MFA is undermined.

It's no longer "something you have" when it can freely be copied, including by a casual passerby or a virus. You're basically reducing it to a password stored in a file called "MY PASSWORDS" on your desktop.

Great for user friendliness, terrible for security. So now when you use Passkeys we'll need to add another 2FA instance to properly secure your account...

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by growse on Monday May 08, 2023 @03:31AM (#35859036)
If MYPASSWORDS.txt is encrypted and can only be decrypted with a key stored in some sort of HSM, then it is still MFA.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by Dalewyn on Monday May 08, 2023 @03:34AM (#35859048)
So what you're saying is it's not encrypted, not secured, and should not be trusted?

Seriously, how many key leaks and other compromises do we have to witness before we do away with the notion they're secure and trustworthy?

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by stavros on Monday May 08, 2023 @04:06AM (#35859190)
There is no notion that "something is secure". It literally doesn't exist. There is a notion that something is secure under a specific threat model, and there are many threat models for which keys are secure and passwords are not.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by charcircuit on Monday May 08, 2023 @03:34AM (#35859045)
The point is if you can export the key from the HSM then it no longer requires that HSM as the exported key and MYPASSWORDS.txt can be bundled together. Knowing the contents of that bundle is a single factor of authentication.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by growse on Monday May 08, 2023 @08:50AM (#35860997)
Yes, but this is tautological.

"If I can clone a physical key, or create a copy, then it's not a good physical key" isn't particularly insightful.

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by booi on Monday May 08, 2023 @03:32AM (#35859037)
So you’re saying.. I should rename that file on my desktop?
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by nemoniac on Monday May 08, 2023 @03:52AM (#35859126)
So an ssh private key is not "something you have" either then?

It's certainly not something you know nor something you are. Where does it fit into the MFA scheme of things?

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by nsheridan on Monday May 08, 2023 @05:13AM (#35859622)
An SSH private key isn't "something you have" - it's not a physical object, you can make copies of it.

To me it falls into "something you know". You might not be able to type it from memory into a file but in practical terms it's no different to a password, it just usually happens to reside on disk.

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by mstolpm on Monday May 08, 2023 @05:42AM (#35859773)
A physical key to your front door is a physical object and something you own - but you can still make copies of it. Someone else can even make a copy from a photo of the key. Google authenticator was (until recently) the only app I know that made it very hard to copy the OAuth secret to another device, lots of other OAuth apps made it a feature to sync/backup your keys.

I can't think of a lot of security factors (besides perhaps biometrics) where copying is really impossible. Its just not economic.

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by growse on Monday May 08, 2023 @08:52AM (#35861014)
Very little is "impossible". The point of developing a good second factor is to have a design that makes it economically infeasible to copy. Like a good HSM.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by charcircuit on Monday May 08, 2023 @12:24PM (#35863487)
A physical key is something you know too if it can be copied. It's just now the thing you know is the bitting of the key.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by saltcured on Monday May 08, 2023 @02:47PM (#35865513)
This seems like a pretty significant semantic shift from what multi-factor originally meant. I think the real problem here is that the original idea of factors came from an environment where a person is being authorized for physical access to a controlled facility and the factors are being checked by a trusted deputy of the relying party. The different factors really mean something when you are being checked at a facility gate.

What you "know" is held in your mind and up to your will whether to divulge or not. You might not have a choice if put under duress.

What you "have" is possessed on your person and you may choose to present it but you may be forced to reveal it in a search. You may have had a choice as to which possessions to carry with you to the facility or which to hide and disavow.

What you "are" are passively observable characteristics of yourself that the facility may choose to measure and which may be difficult for an imposter to replicate. You would probably be unable to withhold these characteristics.

Once we water this down into a remote access to a website, these factors become vague analogies. In the end, the website is only able to observe information from the local user agent. How much can the website deputize end-user equipment and trust it to make any of these distinctions on its behalf?

What you know and what you have start to blur together as different grades of information. There may be no real way for the website to distinguish whether it came from your mind or from some storage or communication device in your possession.

What you are and what you have start to blur together as well. There may be no way for the website to distinguish how you protected your possessions (i.e. via biometrics or PIN), or whether you involved other parties who helped with this.

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by vasco on Monday May 08, 2023 @05:35AM (#35859742)
It is something you have, the machine where the file is. It's only something you know if the only way for me to steal it from you is to threaten you to say it. If I can just yank your open laptop from your lap in a cafe, it's something you have.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by charcircuit on Monday May 08, 2023 @12:27PM (#35863536)
If you are able to copy it off the laptop it becomes something you know. One important property about something you have is that you the owner of the account have that thing in your possession then no one can hack you. If someone is able to copy it then that invariant is not true.

Writing your password on a piece of paper doesn't turn that password into something you have.

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by vasco on Monday May 08, 2023 @12:33PM (#35863634)
It literally does. Now whoever _has_ that piece of paper can get to your account. A physical piece of paper with a password written on it is no different from a physical key. Unless you're going to say that if you memorise the indentations on your house key then your key is "something you know" too.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by charcircuit on Monday May 08, 2023 @08:31PM (#35868809)
If the attacker screenshots the note they can login to your account without HAVING that note. Yes, a house key is something you know.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by creshal on Monday May 08, 2023 @07:24AM (#35860375)
It's usually considered something you know, since it's used as password replacement (first factor). You can create schemes where it could be considered a second factor (used together with a password, mandatory smartcard/fob storage, etc.), but that's not the regular case.

At the same time, it's easy to turn password+TOTP into a single factor by storing both in the same password manager… the theoretical MFA definitions are not the most practical.

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by Phemist on Monday May 08, 2023 @07:59AM (#35860610)
I wrote a 1-page article for this in a small obscure, local-language magazine. The title of which was, translated in English (OMG, I should have also published in English) - Re-factor the factors.

I think the 3-factor authentication (3FA) model of "know, have and are" is up for a revision. Knowing that all models are wrong, I hope my suggestion as at least useful. These were really rough thoughts, and I was hoping to spark some discussion of it, but unfortunately that never happened.

Anyway, I think the 3FA model has several problems.

1) there is no clear category for recent "ambient" auth factors that are getting very popular, like if one logs into a website on a browser and its fingerprint is unknown, that a "step-up" authentication is required.

2) Authentication is proving that you are who you say you are (you prove an identityclaim), a factor called "are" make the cognitive shortcut of equating the inherence factor to the identity proof very very tempting (and I think many people in the field have fallen for it, given the prevalence of biometrics as sole authentication.

3) Behavioural biometrics like keystroke dynamics do not neatly fall into one of the three categories (it is a little bit of knowledge, it is a little bit of "inherence")

I also take major offense to the statement that follows from it, that I AM my fingerprint, or I AM my Iris. NO, I can _prove_ who I am by presenting my fingerprint or iris.

To fix this, in the article I suggested moving to a 2-dimensional model of authentication (2DA), that is reminiscent of but not quite the same as the 3FA model.

The two dimensions were:

Dimension 1: Knowledge vs Possession. A factor is somewhere on this dimension, and my thought was which is which could be tested by the colloquial language use of "know". I can always say I have a password, I have a way of using my phone, but additionally I "know" my password, and I "know" my way of using my phone (even if implicitly). On the otherhand, I have a smartcard, but I do not know it, nor do I know my fingerprint.

The SSH private key would in my opinion fall in the "have" part of this dimension.

Dimension 2: Transferability. The degree to which the factor is transferable to someone else, to which ownership of the factor can be "bestowed" on someone else. Smartcards are highly transferable, as are passwords, however fingerprints generally are not expected to be transferable, neither are the way I use my phone nor from what browser and what location I log-in.

Naturally, 4 relatively distinct quadrants in this space arise, which I tried to label indepently with a single word:

possession, high transferability: carry

possesion, low transferability: show

knowledge, high transfer: tell

knowledge, low transfer: do.

So, the catchy phrase for the 2DA model would be, things that you "carry, show, tell and do".

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by crote on Thursday May 11, 2023 @11:45AM (#35903852)
Correct, unless you store it solely in a HSM like a Yubikey.

One of the critical parts of "something you have" is that it is something only you have. If you can copy it, there is no longer a guarantee that you are the sole person possessing it.

This is also why Google Authenticator did not allow export for a very long time. If you want multiple TOTP tokens, you should enroll them separately, so that it is at all times possible to determine which exact token is being used to authenticate and revoke them individually if required.

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by stavros on Monday May 08, 2023 @04:10AM (#35859209)
I don't think it's mandatory, I think you'll be able to get a device that doesn't export, if that's what you want.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by arghwhat on Monday May 08, 2023 @04:16AM (#35859243)
Despite being an improvement, passkeys were never MFA. They substitute a single factor - your password - with one stored and managed in a safer way.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by jonathanstrange on Monday May 08, 2023 @04:36AM (#35859377)
My memory is definitely safer than my phone in terms of passphrase storage. So is a physical notebook.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by rekoil on Monday May 08, 2023 @05:28AM (#35859706)
Yours may be, but that isn't true for the majority (dare I say >95%) of users. The problem is that people tend to simplify when forced to remember things, or re-use. A Passkey, even handled in the manner described in this post, is better for most people.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by dpatterbee on Monday May 08, 2023 @05:58AM (#35859868)
That seems like hubris, the human is always the weakest link in the security chain.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by asimpletune on Monday May 08, 2023 @07:01AM (#35860233)
Actually, I'm not even sure your memory is safer. You would have to remember hundreds if not thousands of passwords, including remembering which domain they belong to, as well as to be able to generate unique ones for every new domain you encounter for the rest of your life.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by contravariant on Monday May 08, 2023 @07:06AM (#35860261)
Could luck performing a public key handshake from memory though.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by thedougd on Monday May 08, 2023 @07:09AM (#35860280)
If you were using webauthn as a second factor, I believe the passkey changes implemented by Apple and others means your device bound webauthn keys are now synchronized to their cloud services.

That hurts and my enterprise had to halt their rollout of webauthn for MFA while we figure it out.

Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by crote on Thursday May 11, 2023 @11:41AM (#35903792)
The problem is that U2F/FIDO2/Webauthn was 100% used as a second-factor. Passkeys are pretty much just a variant of Webauthn, so you are now replacing token+password with solely a token.
Re:Passkeys will be importable, exportable, cross-device, an... by TacticalCoder on Monday May 08, 2023 @05:38AM (#35859753)
> It's no longer "something you have" when it can freely be copied, including by a casual passerby or a virus

Yup it's very sad. It's better, for regular people, compared to passwords but it's a complete step backwards compared to actual physical secrets stored behind an HSM (like inside an actual physical FIDO2 device).

It is pure insanity that FIDO2/webauthn was, at last, getting somewhere and that we had something secure gaining traction and that the standard has been embraced and extended by the likes of Microsoft (and Apple and Google) to then greatly lower its security.

While still pretending it's all still FIDO2/webauthn.

And as I understand it it's really bad because companies using passkeys shall be able to force their users to use the less secure form of passkeys by actually refusing passkeys from those offering passkeys where the secret never leaves physical hardware.

For a start it is pretty obvious that the less secure Google/Apple/Microsoft "password stored in a file on your desktop" (and backed in the (i)Cloud: what a concept for security keys!) you mention shall be accepted everywhere. While it's highly likely that at some point, "because convenience", they'll cut off passkeys vendors offering actually secure devices.

And it's likely we'll have at the same time "security experts" explaining it's a godsend security-wise.

> So now when you use Passkeys we'll need to add another 2FA instance to properly secure your account...

As long as it's actually possible to do so.

I fear that at some point it's going to be passkeys are the only auth option and by the way we accept "software passkeys backupable to the cloud" only.

It's just sad.

When you think that the original implementation of FIDO allowed users to detect if their security key had been cloned, thanks to the counter... But since then Google (and others) removed that check (so it's already impossible to detect if your key has been cloned)...

This all makes me think there's more to it than "just" Apple/Microsoft/Google. I think it's highly likely some three-letter agency was involved in the "enhancement" of the standard.