So, the solution here seems to be not just creating backup devices (using the same account) but diversify the platforms as well like use a mix of android, yubikey, ios and any other supported platforms.
Doubt many people would have the time and resources to do it correctly.
If your threat model includes “the manufacturer of the device I use to authenticate myself is actively working against me”, you are already completely lost.
As a trivial example, it seems very likely that providers will implement one or more forms of backdoor to ensure that LEO can access your cloud resources.
1. Google can lock you out, but it’s ok because 1% of users have a workaround,
2. You will lose access, but it’s ok because you won’t if you didn’t use this product,
3. Google can log in as you, but it’s ok because we should trust them not to, and
4. We’ve got no recourse, but it’s ok because we were probably helpless anyway?
Companies may get away with this for other products, but the bar is way higher for security products. There are real solutions, or at least ameliorations, and it’d be unsafe to use the product without ensuring they’re there.
With this announcement, you can log into a Google account with a Passkey. That Passkey could be generated by anything implementing the spec – an iPhone, a browser, a home-grown Python script, whatever you want.
Google can still lock you out of your Google account whether you use a Passkey or not. If you use your Google account to sign in to other sites, Google can also therefore still prevent you from logging into those other sites, as they have been able to do before (I don't know if they do this as a matter of policy, but they theoretically can).
Passkeys do not change this.
The only potential place that Passkeys might change things is if you use a Passkey generated by a Google technology, like Android or Chrome. You could use those Passkeys for logging into anything, not just Google accounts. As these are tied to a device, I don't believe the Google account on that device affects them in any way. Google can't lock you out of your Android phone, and can't prevent you using Chrome, so can't prevent you using Passkeys in either of those systems.
I am extremely security savvy and have no friggin idea what you guys are on about. “Passkey?”
Is that the word you guys decided to make up to replace, for some reason, “security key,” which people already knew? I have several of those, along with various TOTP storage apps, and zero desire to learn whatever new crap Google is trying to swindle us with. You guys can pound sand with this passkey crap, I’m glad I moved everything off Google years ago.
(I'm also having trouble squaring "extremely security savvy" with the question whether a security key is a passkey... but OK.)
I'm hoping Passkeys do indeed take off as they provide better security for pretty much everyone, and if they do your service providers will most likely adopt them.
1. They can lock you out of your google account and services you authenticate using login with google, but no more or less than they can lock you out without passkey authentication.
2. You may lose access as per #1, but no differently than if you lost access to your google account having used MFA or whatever other method to log in. It's completely orthogonal.
3. This is just wrong. The passkey is a cert which is used to sign something and send them the signature they can verify with the public part of the cert. They can't login as you. If you don't trust them not to backdoor the passkey itself during generation you can use a passkey generated by someone else.
4. You never had any recourse. This doesn't change that at all either way. It's a login methodology.
Passkeys are stored in the iCloud Keychain which is end-to-end encrypted with 256-bit AES. Passkeys cannot be read by Apple anywhere but on your own device.
Unless you control/audit the whole stack (and forbid updates), you have to trust somebody.
https://web.stanford.edu/class/cs208e/cgi-bin/main.cgi/stati...
iCloud Keychain is e2ee.
1. no, it's a cryptographic key stored on your device. but also yes, because if you're using a passkey on a device you sign into using your google account, google can lock you out of that account and potentially that device. if that device is your only way of logging into a service, you'd be locked out of the service in the same way that losing or destroying the device would lock you out of the service. but authorizing multiple passkeys and adding backup authentication methods is encouraged, so for practical purposes the answer is no.
2. you should understand that passkeys are issued by your device or browser. so if you don't want to trust google, you can use a passkey issued by safari or iPhone instead of Chrome or Android. if you're using an apple-issued passkey to sign into some other service that isn't your google account, google has literally no involvement anywhere in that chain.
3. not according to the spec. the passkey is a certificate that gets stored on your device. your device shares a signature (not the certificate) with the service you're signing into to prove you have access to the certificate. but they're issuing you the cert through their proprietary software. if you don't trust google to not snag a copy of the passkey when they generate it for you, you should use passkeys generated by an issuer that you do trust. (in apple's implementations, passkeys are synced through iCloud, so the answer there is yes - apple does have your passkeys and could sign in to services as you if they wanted. google is not doing that.)
4. you'd have to read the ToS for yourself to figure out what you could sue google for. but the more relevant thing than legal recourse is that this scheme doesn't really give google any power they don't already have, and in many ways distributes power out to third-parties so you have to trust google less. apple's passkey implementation is leading google's. others will follow. this is about allowing you to use an open standard to authenticate with your google account.