I have asked all of my team to change their passwords. We use LastPass via our parent company and will be switching off LastPass soon for our team. LastPass never would've been my choice, it was made before I joined.
But assume you're breached, change it all now, and ideally you're not going to stay with LastPass. Their communication sucks, which is just icing on the cake in this entire situation.
That reads like you're resetting credentials and then putting the new credentials back in LastPass, and then possibly maybe moving away from LastPass at some point in the future.
Given how little LastPass has disclosed, and the negligence we already know about, we should not only assume we're breached, but we should also assume LastPass is still storing critical data in cleartext, they don't have a "zero knowledge architecture", and their systems are still vulnerable to intrusion and exfiltration.
If you get lost and stuff seems too hard, if your replacement product lets you sort by age then just sort by oldest and hit 5 today. Hit 5 more tomorrow. Keep chipping at it. At this point you might as well change one every single day.
https://www.pcworld.com/article/430756/nifty-new-lastpass-da...
This is an old article, no idea if the feature still exists or not.
Based on your understanding, does my master password length sufficiently mitigate the low-iterations, or is decryption a realistic possibility?
But it's probably easier to just change your passwords anyway. At this point I wouldn't be suprised if the story gets even worse somehow.
Luckily I had already switched over to Bitwarden, but I still had around 250 accounts to go through, although about 40 entries ended up being duplicates, defunct sites/products, or so old that the accounts were already deleted due to inactivity.
If you haven't started rotating all of your credentials already, this news should definitely get you started on it!
Thanks, LastPass!
> Our investigation to date has determined that a threat actor exfiltrated encrypted backups from a third-party cloud storage service related to the following products: Central, Pro, join.me, Hamachi, and RemotelyAnywhere.
Even without the breach, handing this data to a third party, containing as it does sensitive, unencrypted user information (such as the list of sites you have credentials stored for) without taking appropriate precautions was unacceptable.
Yes they have. They had a breach, and lied about it. You can't trust anything about them now. Assume a total breach and move on.
What if you closed your account 5 years ago, did they still have backups?
means that some auditor, met with someone that does not know anything, and checked boxes in a form.
Worst case: it’s entirely possible they don’t know.
For example, it's clear backups were stolen, but they won't say how old the backups were, or what their retention policy is. So even if you changed your password to a stronger one, with more rotations, it may be that the attacker got hold of very old backups with weaker security. I've asked their support team for information about time windows of backups stolen, if they have a retention policy and whether it was adhered to, but they won't share that information. Instead we are left with a blog post that is more than a month old, no recent updates, and questions remaining unanswered. I'm a paying 'enterprise' customer, and they are meant to be ISO270001 compliant, so a retention policy should be a pretty simple thing to share.