Everyone is reporting this as a failure of Ranked Choice Voting, but it's actually a failure of Instant Runoff Voting. There are other, better, more reliable Ranked Choice alternatives, and any serious expert in voting systems would tell you that IRV has as many weird failures as FPTP.
http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ is a good overview of different methods.
With FPTP, every voter casts one vote for one candidate, and the candidate with the most votes wins. Simple.
If you need a website with diagrams to explain the abstruse differences between different voting mechanisms, I think you've already failed. This stuff is certainly of academic interest but the average voter cannot handle it.
At best, you're made RCV/IRV with extra steps. Because still you give your guy 5 stars, but now there's people you do not want at all. They're 0s. Then there are people you're ok with, but would rather have your guy win. They're 1s. That way, if the runoff is between one of your 0s and one of your 1s, you're making sure a 0 doesn't win. Which is exactly RCV/IRV where you've ranked them 1, 2, and 3.
Past that, candidates towards the bottom of the ballot are going to get shafted. There is incredible decision fatigue in having to rank everyone 0 - 5 stars. After a while, you will either give up or just start picking more arbitrarily.
RCV/IRV is fine. Condorcet is fine. Star voting is just bad.
I'd argue that every single word in this small claim is wrong.
Scoring isn't equivalent to ranking unless the conditions are that you cannot score two candidates the same and that you must fill in every possible score vale (i.e. rank). Neither of these conditions are true for any cardinal system. You can score candidates the same and you can score candidates with variable distances (e.g. 5,3,2,1. Note there is no 4). This has different embedding properties. You actually can express more information in cardinal this way.
Second, run-off voting is much more complicated. Cardinal systems are determined by argmax of a reduce-sum. Which is trivially parallelizable and only requires a singular election. Run-offs require multi-elections. Even in simple cases like this one, there were 2 elections (and that's with 3 candidates!). This doesn't scale well either.
Star voting outperforms IRV on both 100% honest and 100% strategic election strategies.
Decision fatigue is easier for Star than for IRV—just rate everyone you don't care about as a 2, whereas for IRV, if you want to distinguish between "8 people I don't know" and "person I hate", you have to decide on a ranking order for the 8 people.
UKIP getting 13% of the vote in a general election, showing a large amount of support, but not winning a single seat is, in my opinion, a travesty (and I vehemently disagree with their platform and what they stand for). It left 13% of the electorate feeling that their views were not represented in any way whatsoever .
If only 13% of voters support UKIP, UKIP would not win elections no matter what kind of voting system you have: ranked choice, instant runoff, etc.
On the other hand, with proportional representation, if a party gets 13% of the vote it would end up with 13% of the seats in Parliament. That's a different type of system, though, and it is hard to reconcile with a per-constituency election system.
One way to reconcile it is with different legislative bodies. Exchange the house of lords for a proportional body, and keep the commons local to constituencies.
FWIW I also disagree with the suggestion that people can't handle it. Plenty of countries use ranked or proportional voting systems and their citizens understand how to use them just fine. They may not be able to perfectly optimise their preferences, but then they can't do it in FPTP either (and it's provably impossible to do so in every case whatever the voting system).
I don't know if I have ever seen any movement to push back against "wrong" vernacular succeed. Consider the more recent "coronavirus" which is equivalent to COVID-19 in the vernacular, even though it's really just a family of viruses and COVID-19 is an illness caused by a particular coronavirus instance (SARS CoV-2).
From https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-democrats-win-in-a...
> 40 percent of voters had chosen Peltola as their first choice, 31 percent had chosen Palin and 29 percent had chosen Republican businessman Nick Begich III. Under the rules of ranked choice voting, Begich — as the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes — was then eliminated, and his votes were redistributed to whomever his voters ranked second.
> Unsurprisingly, most of Begich’s votes (50 percent) went to his fellow Republican, Palin. But an impressive 29 percent went to Peltola, and 21 percent were “exhausted,” meaning there was no second-choice pick, and the votes were essentially thrown out. That combination was enough for Peltola to win. While Palin gained more votes from the redistribution than Peltola did, Peltola was starting from a higher total, and receiving 29 percent of Begich’s votes was enough to keep her ahead of Palin. In the end, Peltola received 51 percent of the votes counted in the final round, while Palin received 49 percent.
Sounds fair to me. Some of Begich’s voters expressed a “Begich or nobody” preference. Many Begich voters expressed a “Peltola over Palin” preference. It’s not clear to me why pairwise preferences are meaningful, they don’t encode nuances like the above. Though maybe that’s a feature and not a bug?
I’m aware this gets pretty technical with Arrow’s theorem, maybe there isn’t an ELI5.
This short video gives an example that’s easy to understand:
https://youtu.be/Xekj6gycFpU?list=PLz0n_SjOttTcmP-7y4beuYv49...
I can see how ex post, one could say "if I had ranked my choice lower, they would have done better", but it's not clear to me that this property actually informs any real-world voting strategy ex ante.
Basically, this seems like a somewhat academic property that most voters probably wouldn't care about, so it's not clear that a lack of monotonicity would actually impede IRV from popular acceptance.
Even leading up to this election, I saw some mainstream coverage of the fact that the election would come down to who finished 3rd. i.e. if Palin got eliminated in the first round, most of her votes would’ve gone to Begich and he probably would’ve won. Doesn’t speak well for RCV that it can come down to such a slim margin, but I still think RCV > FPTP for the third party reason above.
As you allude to, RCV is fine when the minor parties essentially have no chance at winning. They get knocked out in the early rounds and then don't matter. In cases where two candidates have similar vote shares, the result is fairly chaotic.
IRV, on the other hand, does not encourage candidates to drop out, allowing the voters to express their views more clearly.
Almost all Palin voters would have preferred Begich to Peltola, so they could have gotten a better result by lying about their preferences and strategically voting for Begich as their first choice. Expressing their views honestly resulted in a worse outcome than if they had expressed their views dishonestly.
Among voting nerds this failure mode is referred to as "favorite betrayal" -- https://electowiki.org/wiki/Favorite_betrayal_criterion
That's literally the opposite of what it does. Palin should have dropped out, or her voters should have dishonestly ranked her second, so that the win would have gone to a Republican instead of a Democrat. IRV did not prevent Palin from acting as a spoiler and did not make it safe for voters to honestly rank the candidates.
(Palin beats Begich in a one-winner Republican primary, given that she had more of the votes cast for the two R candidates which is ~= the votes cast in a primary with only Republican voters, then loses to Peltola in the general by 51.4 to 48.6.)
It might be that non-transferable votes as a result of preference failures would change this a bit, of course.
Now I'm not sure if Alaska was semi-closed, but that's not moving the needle as hard as you want it to. Because if you're already registered for a party, you cannot vote in the other party's primary. Only unregistered voters may, and only in one.
And typically, independent voters don't do that. As reflected in the low vote totals in the various primaries in previous elections.
The two-tier primary/general election system produces more extreme-position winners, exactly by this mechanism.
And consider another common outcome - shift the odds very slightly here and the Palin-esque candidate wins the primary, and the general, even though the eliminated primary candidate (Begich in this case) would have been more acceptable to the electorate at large.
Observation: contingent preference is a valid concept; the "problem" for Condorcet is that it is reductionist.
Among other things this means that it is not a given that you can compare percentages as shown.
Now... how to vote for our voting system of preference?!
I think Condorcet kind of fails here because people are voting "not Palin" more than they are voting for anyone with their second choice.
If there were primaries, Palin beats Begich, not by much, but she does. In which case, the general is Palin and Peltola. Palin is a particularly odious candidate to Democrats. Very few Democrats are going to vote for her. So Peltola will win any general election that's just them two.
So Republicans are split among Begich > Peltola > Palin; Palin > Begich > Peltola; and possibly some degree of others. Probably some degree of Begich > Palin > Peltola as well.
Democrats are mostly going to be Peltola > Begich > Palin. Because while they would prefer Peltola, they absolutely do not want Palin.
Independents are going to independent.
So I think that's what we're seeing. Condorcet is showing us results for elections we would never actually see. Palin against just Begich in an election where Democrats can vote just doesn't happen.
To address your point about why IRV is seen as more consensus based than FPTP is because FPTP doesn't care about 50%+1. If Alaska was FPTP, then Peltola still wins the election here, because she had the highest vote tally in the initial round. But then she wins with only about 40% of the vote. With IRV, you don't stop until someone gets to 50%+1.
I think the biggest problem with Condorcet is simply math. Already, Condorcet is very "set-theory" based. And once you hit an edge case, you all of a sudden get dropped into a whole world of combinatorics.
Another issue is that the expectation is that your down ranked choice can't cause your first rank choice to lose. But that's what happens in Condorcet. The people who voted Peltola > Begich > Palin are the ones causing Begich to win even though they prefer Peltola.
Every voting method is imperfect when things are split near the middle. And hilariously enough, they're all perfectly fine when most people want something in particular.
One of the classic results in political science is Duverger's Law, sometimes formulated as 'under first past the post the number of effective parties tends towards two', but 'tends towards' is doing an awful lot of work. One could unkindly suggest that, like a lot of political science results, it works better in the US than in the rest of the world. And I say that as a political scientist...
With the current US political climate, a third party would likely win a lot of the time if we were simply doing pair preferences like you laid out, because people are essentially voting by party for the lesser evil in most elections these days.
Odd example here. That election wasn't FPTP, it just happened to work out that way. Overall people don't think FPTP is consensus because you have to vote pragmatically for people you don't necessarily like. Therefore the winner is not the consensus "favorite" choice of everyone who voted.
Pairwise Preferences
88222 Begich > Peltola
79574 Peltola > Begich
Begich wins with 52.5% against Peltola
101530 Begich > Palin
63681 Palin > Begich
Begich wins with 61.4% against Palin
91418 Peltola > Palin
86271 Palin > Peltola
Peltola wins with 51.4% against Palin
Edit to include all of the failures here. I am copying this from a comment on r/endfptp, analysis is not mine (link below):
Condorcet Failure: Begich beats Peltola by 52.5% and Palin by 61.4%.
Favorite Betrayal Failure: If 2913 Palin voters that preferred Begich to Peltola betrayed Palin by strategically ranking Begich 1st he would of won instead of Peltola.
Monotonicity Failure: If Peltola were able to gain the support of 5825 Palin voters, she would of lost to Begich.
Participation Failure: If 5825 Palin voters that preferred Begich to Peltola had forgotten to vote, Begich would of won.
Consistency Failure: If 5828 Palin>Begich voters, 2915 Begich voters, and 2914 Peltola>Begich voters were removed from the election, Begich would have won and if you counted just those removed votes, Begich also would of won
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/x9oupk/2022_alaska...