It was a controversy created by a poorly written Apple press release that unveiled two distinct features, and subsequently ginned up by an even worse EFF blog post.
CSAM scanning was all about iCloud, just like every other vendor, and the benefit was a roadmap to E2E storage.
The more confusing thing was the explicit content notifications for parents for their minor children in family plans.
So instead, just like everyone else, you almost certainly have CSAM scanning happening in iCloud directly. All of your content is just a subpoena away. Thanks EFF.
So this is a big red line. If you want to upload to iCloud, ok, scanning there is a fair game and you can always not upload to iCloud. But your device should be your device, respecting your privacy.
As a parent, I may want to opt into a service on my managed, family device so I know my child’s fellow 9th grader girlfriend is sending pictures that may be a crime to possess, or vice versa. That is exactly what Apple did.
Like I said, you’re conflating two things that are not the same, because you’ve been fed a steady diet of bad information stemming from Apples unusually poor communications and the EFFs inaccurate blog post.
Google scans your content for potential CSAM based on AI.
One can imagine the false positive rate for the Google approach is likely higher.
Google scans files on their devices, using their resources (storage, compute power).
It is you who decided to upload files to Google's cloud.
However, it is difficult to use your own device if you don't have privacy there.
The whole point of the Apple system was to enable end to end encryption so Apple couldn’t view your data on their servers. The only way they could get access is when a threshold of CSAM likely files were met. e.g the keys are sharded.
With the Apple approach you have considerably more privacy.
Modern SoCs have security domains that are invisible to the main CPUs. Apple can run just about anything it wants on the security coprocessor and users will be none the wiser.
The American DOJ, FBI etc do not want end-to-end encryption and use ‘think of the children’ as an excuse. This gives Apple the plausible pushback to say ‘We have thought of the children…’
It goes to show that Apple isn't afraid to undermine their own experience to implement adversarial software services. Combined with the way they "respect" the privacy of Chinese citizens, I don't think Apple actually cares about our privacy. It would seem that instead they're testing the waters for more radical changes[0], like using on-device machine learning to detect suicidal users or terrorists. And who's going to object when that happens, right?
[0] Source: the past century of US political discourse.
The more bothersome thing (to me) is client-side scanning. Apple is setting a precedent that allows any first-party manufacturer to work against the user's interests as long as there's a large enough common enemy. It should go without saying, but that's a horrible idea!
If Google were doing the same thing on their Pixel phones, I'd be slamming them equally as hard. It's simply depressing to watch a company claim they know best, while proceeding to use your phone to run their regulatory compliance code.
(Even if you took a picture to send to your doctor through an encrypted app, it just has to end up in the photo library to be cloud synced, unless you remember to hand delete it.)
The practical difference is nil. The fact of the matter is, either way, if you don't upload you won't be scanned, if you do upload you will be. End result is the same regardless of whether you use OneDrive, Box, Dropbox or Google Drive (who all implement CSAM scanning)
If Apple wants to run that code, they're welcome to do it on their own servers; they pay for the hardware, they decide what software it runs. I shouldn't have to waste my storage space on their NeuralHash model though. I shouldn't waste my CPU cycles on their regulatory compliance. Arguing anything else is paramount to saying that Apple owned your phone from the start, and if that's the case, then antitrust legislation can't come soon enough.
your compute and phone resources are already used for analytics and other things that you didn't explicitly tell the phone to do.
you also greatly overestimate how much CPU it takes to compare a hash, lol
fact of the matter is, you're only scanned when you're using apple services.
I didn't know LineageOS sent analytics, it never showed up on Netguard. Curious!
If you think this is a dumb thing to argue about, then by all means; don't argue about it! If you're satisfied with your iPhone and convinced that Apple can do no wrong, then certainly don't let me get in your way. We're talking about the largest company in the world, though, and if you're unwilling to offer them a little criticism for objectively degrading the iPhone experience, then I don't see the point in discussing this.
> you also greatly overestimate how much CPU it takes to compare a hash, lol
Do I? If it's not such a big hassle, then Apple can just run it on their own servers. They own your iCloud decryption keys anyways, it shouldn't be too big of a deal.
> Do I? If it's not such a big hassle, then Apple can just run it on their own servers. They own your iCloud decryption keys anyways, it shouldn't be too big of a deal.
Privacy is better preserved doing it on device compared to on their servers.
anyway, nothing more to discuss here.
2. It only allows single file actions, no sync/offline cache/etc. Most apps don't meaningfully work well with this - there is no "sync these ten comics to this device at all times"
Most apps still only use their local file sandbox.
You mean like Google’s recent CSAM controversy? At least Apple never proposed using ML to find new CSAM and report you to the police with a single violation…