If you're going to do it, you want to be in the pro market, you want to be selling the body, you want an extensive first-party library and, ideally, minimal competition from external third-parties (Sigma, Tamron, etc) selling into your system.
Kodak had none of that, their only DSLR experience was building "digital conversions" of Nikon bodies (using nikon lenses) and they would have been starting from scratch.
Fuji also got really lucky that Japan fucking loves cameras, especially film cameras. Fuji has NEVER given a shit about the world outside japan, other than selling freighter-loads of color negative film (disposable cameras are still extremely popular in the developing world), they give zero shits about marketing their cameras or instant film or anything else outside the Japanese market. Their camera gear (35mm, MF, and LF) has always been top-notch and it just has zero market penetration in the US because they never bothered to market it. It's also routine to have fuji stuff (Astia, FP-100C45, FP-100C, etc) discontinued with like a week of notice to japan, and zero notice to the rest of the world, they have extremely poor organizational communication because they only give a shit about japan. But they never had to, because Japan has had a love affair with photography for 70 years now.
When you look at cameras like the Fuji X-series... those are cameras designed for the Japanese domestic market, cause they still love rangefinders. So is the Pentax Q series... americans don't get it, shitty p+s sensor, why would I buy it? you're not meant to, it's a cute little camera for japanese housewives, they just let us buy it too... sometimes.
Fuji (although later getting into the X series), did pretty much what Kodak eventually did--mostly applying emulsion and chemical expertise in addition to legacy pro film business plus commercial printing--but, as you say, much smaller and much more insular.
As I've written about in the past, Kodak gets held up as a classic example of "marketing myopia"--see any Marketing 101 textbook. But, for the reasons you cite, Kodak should just have pivoted harder into digital doesn't really hold up.
I used to be an IT industry analyst and, while they were never a particular focus, I did follow what NEC, Fujitsu, and Hitachi did in the server market. My general observation was that they all had aspirations to be global IT suppliers but, for the most part, they didn't want to make any material investments to make that actually happen.
Someone uses precise complicated chemical manufacturing processes that require a deep understanding of color science to produce the millions of sensors in phones, cars, cameras, doorbells, etc. And it's not Kodak.
Decision makers at kodak should have been able to leverage their considerable resources to gain market share with the new technology that would eventually replace their main product.
All things considered, they did a pretty good job of scaling down and staying alive. But it's a classic example of "My salary depends on not understanding it"