https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_EN-PROD/A_European_trans...
If you mean transfer in a more abstract fiscal sense, not even individual EU states themselves are homogeneous regarding their internal fiscal policies. Some are federal, such as Germany, and some are highly centralised, such as France. Then you have the case of Spain where all 17 autonomous communities (≈pseudofederal states) have a small leeway regarding income tax and must follow the baseline central policy, but two regions in particular—the Basque Country and Navarre—have fully devolved powers regarding taxation due to "fueros", i.e. historical rights.
Almost every economist said in 98 that the euro is a bad idea. And it is for the south of Europe. It's great for the north and Germany especially, but for the south it is and has a killer.
In my opinion, the Euro will ultimately break the current EU.
Luxembourg GDP Per Capita: 114,370
Ireland GDP Per Capita: 83,990
-----
Romania GDP Per Capita: 12,510
Bulgaria GDP Per Capita: 9,850
vs:
New York GDP Per Capita: 93,463
-----
Mississippi GDP Per Capita: 42,411
Yes, NY transfers wealth to Mississippi but the scale of transfer and the relative number of wealthy states vs poor (there's like 5 in the deep south) means the dynamic is completely different. Without significant development in ex-Soviet states I'm not sure how the EU can hold together longterm.
https://tradingeconomics.com/romania/gdp-per-capita
https://tradingeconomics.com/estonia/gdp-per-capita
https://tradingeconomics.com/bulgaria/gdp-per-capita
Rich countries in the north especially Germany put in place policies akin to dumping and were shielded from the effects it should have had on their money by the economic gap with the poorer countries in the south. Southern countries found themselves handicapped by an overvalued currency. Meanwhile politicians in the north refused any form of transfers and keep popularising the idea that southern countries are poorer because they lack discipline.
Currency fluctuations don’t allow for global trade. That’s why after WW2, the Bretton-Woods system was established with fixed exchange rates. After that came to its end, Europe created a new system. Rates were not pegged to gold but to other European currencies (only 2% deviation allowed, 6% for Italy and Britain).
That created a problem for countries that couldn’t keep up with the German economy: Stabilizing the exchange rate was getting very expensive for those countries. Germany started with zero gold reserves after WW2 and now has second place because of this system.
The solution: a common currency. Germany gave up the privilege of getting paid for their strong currency so weak currency countries could stay in the system. A lot of money for an economically integrated Europe. Italy gave up some sovereignty over the money supply and pledged not to spend too much.
Even without the euro, Italy had an “overvalued currency” that held it back because it kept devaluing its currency with no economic growth and, yes, no financial discipline (although, of course, Italians don’t lack discipline). The introduction of the euro relieved Italy of much of the burden.
While I agree that there was a lot of populist rhetoric in the northern countries, pretending that the euro is bad for Italy and good for Germany is also populistic. The reverse is true.
If you mean fixed exchange rates (going back to the 70s) are bad for Italy then one can discuss that. (But there’s a lot of economic literature against that – just imagine California and Kentucky had different and free-floating currencies and how trade would be impaired)
> Currency fluctuations don’t allow for global trade.
I’m glade to learn every country in the world with their own currency can’t participate in global trade. Obviously fluctuation is not an issue for trading.
I’m guessing that by the pegging to each other you are mentioning the ECU and European Exchange Rate Mechanism. Its goal had very little to do with trade. It was mostly an attempt to avoid speculation and large monetary fluctuations which made debt management more costly for countries. It collapsed extremely fast and the southern countries were amongst the first to exit the system for reasons which are very close to why the euro is so poor for them.
> The solution: a common currency. Germany gave up the privilege of getting paid for their strong currency so weak currency countries could stay in the system.
A strong currency is detrimental to a country export. I’m not even addressing the rest of the paragraph as it doesn’t make much sense. Why are singling Italy by the way? The problem is the same for Spain, Portugal, Greece, in some measure Ireland and even somewhat impact France.
You are also completely failing to address the distortion of the German economy which are a large part of the issues especially after Hartz IV. If you take a look at the German wage levels, saving rates and trade balance, you will see that their money should be much stronger than the euro is.
This is why the EU is a stupid idea. When it is the south, they should suffer, when it is Central Europe, everyone should come together and sing kumbaya
I really wish the south acted like the north is acting now when Germany was considered the sick part of Europe in the 90s. We would have avoided so much trouble.
is the cultural problem an important factor? as someone who's also from the south, yes, i think it is. is it the only one (that matters)? no.
the eu (and the euro) works mainly to provide a cheap-access market for the stronger economies to a series of other countries. it's extremely difficult for poorer economies to compete with the stronger ones (due to regulations, size and how those two interplay). it's even more difficult for those economies to provide the same quality of life (i.e. higher salaries, same level of social care, etc.) when they themselves don't have full control of their economy/market.
Anecdotal: My dentist was from Rumenia. I'm sure they need dentists too but he can make more money in the Netherlands.
There are pending issues related to management, but also north-enforced market control (milk cuotas come to mind) that definitely have affected the economy.
That is totally to forgot that Italy has been cost reduction/ austerity since the 90's. Precisely when it's started to do that, its economy stalled.
Spain had its debt going from 30% to 70% after the 2008 crisis.
Even in Germany, parts that lost industries decades ago are still borer that the rest of country. France and Belgium have similar problems and Italy north-south split is even older.
Nobody know how to reverse it or at least succeeded. This is not easy.
The euro just cannot work in the long run. The sooner people up top admit this the better for 300m europeans. But they will never admit defeat.
You can't have positive real rates AND pump up the real estate bubble.
There are two parts to growth - population and actual growth.
The majority of "actual" GDP growth for the last 20 years in the West has been people paying more money (inflation adjusted) for the same land.
Why? Because you could! Interest only went lower.
Positive real yields mean people need to actually work instead of speculate on real estate. Most people would rather just speculate on real estate. It's so much easier.
Unfortunately, it's a zero sum game. The losers are renters.
That said I'm curious how things will develop. Now that U.K. expects up to 18% inflation I wonder if the price-salary-real estate spiral in the metropoles can keep up its momentum.
Negative cash-flow real estate (anywhere with absurd Price-to-Rent ratios) has DESTROYED the S&P 500 (on leverage) for the last 20 years because of abnormally high appreciation (leveraged) due to interest rates perpetually decreasing.
Most R/E is leveraged.
Historically, you did not need positive cash-flow in R/E to make a fortune, and a lot of the fortunes amassed came from negative cash-flow R/E that consistently become more and more negative cash-flowing...
It doesn't really make any sense unless you believe interest rates will perpetually get lower. Anyone who took that trade over the last 20 years did very well.
Much more expensive gas means the German economy goes kaboom, which is exactly what is now happening (afaik Germany recently had the biggest trade deficit in 30 years or something). The EU economy as a whole largely, largely depends on the German economy. The Euro is the currency behind most of that EU economy.
> What does lead to a weaker currency? On the EU side, central bank accommodation in the face of inflation ripping higher. Germany recently logged a 37% YoY annual increase in producer prices:
The producer prices are rising because of the gas prices
> Yet the article does not explain how a "gas crisis" leads to a weaker currency.
It wasn’t clear (at least for me) why gas has such an impact on the economy as a whole because many articles concentrate the debate on the private households heating only.
But currently, most of the gas is used in the industrial sector (chemicals, power supply, food preparation), also for electricity generation and for producing materials such as ammonia, plastics, methanol and hydrogen.
Ergo, you can safely bet both your kidneys that nothing's going to happen.
It's crazy how hard it is to make 1 European country agree on finances these days, all the EU member nations agreeing to seriously tighten is about as likely as the President of the US declaring he is an alien.
Returning several million net-negative economic migrants to their home regions would also be necessary.
"[current geopolitics] leads to price going [up or down]". Even with a survey of big players markets don't always have a simple interpretation
the only real solutions are:
full fiscal union (the EU decides Germany/France/...'s budget, with redistribution)
or collapse of the euro
One thing I find weird (a touchy point?) is that the UK left. Yes, that was a few years ago, but my point is historical EU / Euro pricing is now diminished overall, in its up/down cycle.
COVID threw this asunder, so we did not see true fiscal results from UK leaving. And the UK left over a few years, making the departure less dramatic.
The UK comes in right after Germany:
https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/
and:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_European_Union
Comparing the EU (18T) to the UK (3.4T) shows some impact here, around 20%. If the UK was still in the EU, I'd say the Euro wouldn't have dropped below parity.
Parity is an "OMG!" marker, and can cause cascading changes in perception to the strength of fiscal objects.
the europhiles in the UK attempted the first steps of joining (ERM1), which pegged the pound with the deutschmark
it was forced out when George Soros and friends attacked the peg on Black Wednesday
immediately prior to this the ERM was known an the Eternal Recession Mechanism (which is now exactly what the euro is)
Yet the article does not explain how a "gas crisis" leads to a weaker currency.
What does lead to a weaker currency? On the EU side, central bank accommodation in the face of inflation ripping higher. Germany recently logged a 37% YoY annual increase in producer prices:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-economic-outlook...
And the ECB has done basically nothing about it. Deeply negative real rates and little indication that the ECB has the stomach for any substantive action.
On the US side, there have been sizable interest rate hikes, which will continue at least until the midterm elections get underway. Real rates are still deeply negative.
That difference in rates attracts a lot of capital that might otherwise be parked on the EU side.
The US doesn't need to be a pillar of financial responsibility to attract the world's capital. It just has to be the cleanest dirty shirt in the hamper.