> The same method, which at least has worked previously
it was a common theory prior to WW1 breaking out, then WW1 broke out and falsified it
and now Russia has falsified this theory again
(the threat of the Soviet Union plus nuclear deterrence prevented war in Europe, not the EU)
Who knows how high it can go. Maybe in the early 22nd century someone will argue that economic interdependence before WW3 was nowhere near as they have it then...
It’s a bit unilateral. As long as Russia can save enough money or have other buyers for its gas and oil it can just shut the supply in the middle of winter. Germans can of course refuse to export their products to Russia but people freezing in the middle of winter is a bit more dire than not being able to buy the latest Mercedes.
So, like other sibling comment pointed out, it turned more into dependency than co-dependency.
I could see, in the previous years, maybe the Germans wanted to move way from NATO and integrate with Russia but seeing Russian behavior since the Chechnya war https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Grozny_(1999%E2%80... I wonder if anyone warned the Germans not to get in bed with the Russians. That was 20 years ago.
Or are you suggesting that in 2008 Germany should have supported Georgia in South Ossetia?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Russo-Georgian...
The equivalence is in aversion to separatism. I think if the leaders of Ichkeria would agree to be jailed, the Russian government wouldn’t destroy the city. I am not sure what alternative you propose for a country that wants to ensure its internationally recognized claim to a territory.
> Or are you suggesting that in 2008 Germany should have supported Georgia in South Ossetia? > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Russo-Georgian...
There is a well-recognized contradiction between the principle of sovereignty and self-determination in the international law. What one should do is not clear if you agree with those principles less so if you don’t recognize them. So it is a quite complicated question. So those things almost always devolve to realpolitik.
The Baltic states were gobbled up by the Soviet Union during WWII, and accrued significant Russian minorities during the Cold War, but they are culturally and ethnically distinct from Russia, with their own languages and histories going back centuries (just check out the Grand Duchy of Lithuania).
Especially Tallinn is becoming a hugely interesting city with the mix of centuries old history, some soviet heritage, new and tech.
They still make an interesting thought experiment since they actually were wholly integrated into the Soviet Union. The other examples near EU are Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova which have ended up on completely different paths.
In comparison to the former East Block nations which more were in the Soviet sphere which was a similar but different existence.
What is this, 1910?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Illusion
It was a theory. It was tested. It didn't work, not with Russia, not with the rest of Europe.
The EU was of course promoted primarily to avoid the repetition of the World Wars, and it is indeed succeeding at it within its scope, and has also so far been a great influence outside of it as well.
However, it is a mistake to believe that economic interdependence is the reason for its success, or that interdependence is a disincentive for war. The period from the late 19th century was highly globalised, with much international free trade, and increasingly so up until the 1910s. However, that didn't stop war breaking out between wealthy military powers over nationalistic grudges, and neither would it in the 2020s.
I am not knowledgeable enough to fully understand how the EU has broken the cycle of war between European nations, but it has been something much more profound than economic interdependence. Germany was probably right in not wanting to keep close relations with Russia, especially before 2008/2014, but shot itself in the foot by naïvely assuming that co-dependence—or rather, German dependence—would in any way stop Putin's regime from aggressive expansionism.
Please do clarify. I am intimately familiar with one of those Baltic states, but fail to see what you mean.
So what same method are you talking about?
Because the only method shown to prevent war in Europe is co-dependence. EU is founded on integrating the belligerents of WW2 close enough that it would be unthinkable to happen again.
The same method, which at least has worked previously, was tried with Russia and now 30 years later, or more likely in 2014 with the invasion of Crimea we can conclude that Russia is different in some core way of thinking. Not too different though, looking at how the Baltic states have developed when given the choice and chance.
The alternative scenario, with a Russia still riding on the tail ends of soviet military might in steep decline not even given a chance in the early 2000s seems like a recipe for an even worse outcome than we have today.