I think the simple answer is that before the scale of Hiroshima was really understood, everyone though of it as mostly just a more efficient way to perform the atrocity that they were already doing. On this point check out Wellersteins earlier text on the 67:th anniversary: http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/08/06/hiroshima-at-67-th...
Yes. These nuclear weapons were a more efficient way of obliterating a city through fire: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo_(10_March_194...
It turns out that if you drop thousands of tons of incendiaries on a city made from wood and paper, you can kill a really large number of people at once.
We can re-litigate these questions, but I'm not sure we'll reach any answers. A more salient one is "how can we prevent this from ever happening again?" including "how can we prevent states from launching wars of aggression?"
All sides are probably at least a little wrong here, and ultimately, it probably boils down to a feud between Russia and various aspects of the West going at least back to the Crimean war, if not earlier, and the back and forth animosity that has perpetuated the cycle over that time. Perhaps the question then isn't "how can we prevent launching wars of aggression," but rather "how can we successfully reach an agreement where all sides agree to finally bury the hatchet."
As long as we refuse to consider the longer cycle of revenge and posturing at play we'll likely continue to be confused in the face of it perpetuating itself.
I think you may be underestimating the scope of WWII in the Pacific. The battles to retake islands had often been extremely bloody. The battle for Okinawa for example cost 14k Allied soldiers and 77k Japanese soldiers, and well over 100k civilians. I don't think any other island came close in total numbers, but only because they didn't have high populations.
Any reasonable extrapolation of those invasions to an invasion of mainland Japan would have far more civilian deaths than using both atomic bombs, even if you projected lower casualty rates than there had been in the island campaigns.
A blockade instead of an invasion might have worked, but that too would likely have a very large number of civilian casualties. Blockades work by either making it so bad that the civilians rise up and force a change in policy, or so many civilians die that the government runs out of people to draft into the army. The last to actually personally feel the effects of a blockade are the people in power.
Even after the second bomb there were highly placed military offices who were so determined to continue the war that they attempted a coup to stop the Emperor from surrendering [2].
And even if we accept that "Japan was beaten". What the next move? A naval blockade? Starve Japan into submission?
How many tens of thousands of civilian deaths due to famine would make the leadership break? Would that have been better than tens of thousands of civilian deaths due to nuclear bombs?
Second bomb (Nagasaki) was not authorized in some special way. Air force had two bombs available and planned to drop them a week apart. Due to weather it ended up being 3 days. After Nagasaki Truman ordered them to need explicit approval of the president to drop future bombs (appalled at civilian deaths).
The people who made the decisions back then did not have, could not have that belief. They had been fighting a brutal war for years, and it was just a bomb. A bigger, more powerful bomb that they hoped would help win the war, but without the hindsight that informs your view, it would not at all have been obvious to them that this bomb could end the war all by itself. Because a weapon that could force a surrender merely through a demonstration of its power had never before existed.
The point of view you can't find is simply this: "We have to hit them what everything we have, as hard as possible, as quickly as possible, until they can't fight back anymore, because that's the only thing that's worked so far."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Holocaust
The war needed to end immediately.
In conclusion; no, i dont agree that it was be "perfectly ethical" or even simply ethical, but rather a neccesity born of the lack of efficacy in the firebombing campaing. And yes, a top-down hierarchical militant society like imperial japan of the time would not have surrendered without significant show of power, of imminent destruction, demonstrated. Im personally more convinced that Hirohito only issued the decree to surrender unconditionally due to the fear of imminent destruction of the capital, since a military society would always expect an attack on the command structure.
At the end of the day, they seem to have had more to do with letting the Soviets know the time of day more than anything pertaining to Japan. The whole event is a reminder of why having a figurehead president with all the real decisions made by military leadership is rarely a good way to run the country.
This is a very popular historical revisionist argument which seems to have little if any credible evidence to back it up[0]. It's just something that feels true to people when they consider the evil of the American military industrial complex, can't accept any Western historical narrative at face value, and require a conspiracy behind everything.
But what documentary evidence does exist, as far as I can tell, supports the status quo version of events[1].
[0] https://www.bu.edu/historic/hs/kort.html
[1] https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Event...
Japanese atrocities against civilians in China and Korea were enormous. Japanese treatment of US PoWs was horrendous. Japanese troops continued to fight literally to the last man, just to try and kill as many Americans as they could. I think when fighting an all-out war against an opponent like this, it's hard to self-limit.
Further, the Japanese approach of never surrendering produced some gargantuan casualties. The Battle of Iwo Jima [1] was apparently the turning point in American thinking. After breaking the back of Japanese Imperial Fleet, Americans figured they need to start taking territory, which meant mostly invading islands. Iwo Jima had notable, but not extreme importance. And again, the Japanese would just not surrender. Quoting Wikipedia, of the 21,000 Japanese troops, only 216 were taken prisoner, and these were mostly unconscious or disabled soldiers who could physically not fight. The rest fought tooth, nail and bayonet against each and every American, and died eventually.
Add 6k American soldiers who died in that one battle, and suddenly dropping an extra nuke on a city of 100,000 looks, weirdly, like a life-saving manoeuvre. And Iwo Jima wasn't even that important, or particularly close to Japan proper, you could expect casualties to only get significantly worse. This doesn't even count the wounded, which in a military context doesn't usually mean a bloody nose.
I'll never forget the day a friend told me: "the Japanese were absolutely ruthless. I mean, these guys made the _nazis_ say 'what the hell is wrong with the Japanese?'"
Which led me to read about this man:
Yeah, the civilians and especially the children should've overthrown the government. They were totally asking to get nuked.
Using nukes may have been the least-bad long term option. That doesn't change that it was an atrocity.
If it is the least-bad long term option, that makes it in context the ethical choice. Hence, not an atrocity.
The thing is you have no way to know that in advance. And people may disagree what "least-bad" even means, it's extremely subjective.
I'm gonna disagree that deliberately killing innocent people is ever an ethically correct choice.
This is more or less the trolley problem, so as you say it is entirely subjective. We're just going to have to agree to disagree :)
The first bomb is somewhat understandable, still you could argue that the US might have figured out a way to demonstrate its destructive power to the Japanese without killing over 100,000 mostly innocent people in an instant. Maybe at the trade-off of temporarily risking US soldier lifes and resources of the general public. Still, you can argue the other way and see it as a terrible conclusion to a terrible war.
But the second one? I've seen many docs and historians perspectives on why it was considered necessary, but I can't find the point of view from which it was anything but a total atrocity for which the people who made it happen should be remembered in shame forever. So much of Japan not immediately surrendering after the first bomb dropped was down to the fog of war, to simple and understandable slow speed in government decisionmaking, etc.
Even if you can't be sure that the first bomb would have been enough to have them surrender, just the chance of it should have been enough to pick a different strategy, at the chance of saving a couple of dozen thousand innocent lives.