I mean, if you just pushed a config change and the whole network goes kaput, take a look at the config change before you start suspecting hackers.
This is why some hospitals still use the old pager systems to contact people in the city. One hospital-owned antenna on a battery can coordinate a lot of people. I don’t know what the equivalent to that would be in this case though.
It still works, you know?
Also, pagerduty works over wifi...
I would imagine using it for running a nurse-doc comms would constitute professional use.
Of course I'm sure this does run the line of if this is emergency or not.
(Many hospitals do also have ham radio operators as part of the disaster plans and operate during their drills.)
INAL, contact ARRL for farther questions.
May whatever deity you worship help the instructor teaching atmospheric propagation to some of the staff I’ve worked with in the past.
Yes sure, there's repeaters, and other details to know about, but tx/rx on a single frequency isn't exactly the rocket science that sad hams make it out to be.
even when the internet is down?
They probably did it from home/overseas. Can't check what you did after you dropped the country itself offline.
"In the Rogers network, one IP routing manufacturer uses a design that limits the number of routes that are presented by the Distribution Routers to the core routers. The other IP routing vendor relies on controls at its core routers. The impact of these differences in equipment design and protocols are at the heart of the outage that Rogers experienced."
I read this as: we were halfway through a big project to replace 6509s with new Juniper switches but that takes a few years, so in the meantime we sometimes make configuration changes to each router that have different behaviors.
And the Big Failures are always around this spot in the stack. Things like routing topology control (also top-level DNS configuration, another famous fat-finger lever) are "single points of failure" more or less by definition.
> But, at 4:43 a.m. on July 8, a piece of code was introduced that deleted a routing filter. In telecom networks, packets of data are guided and directed by devices called routers, and filters prevent those routers from becoming overwhelmed, by limiting the number of possible routes that are presented to them.
> Deleting the filter caused all possible routes to the internet to pass through the routers, resulting in several of the devices exceeding their memory and processing capacities. This caused the core network to shut down.
Lesson no 1: Do not design your system to have a single point of failure.