Tether, and "stablecoins" in general are known as the casino chips of Crypto. A way to exchange more volatile crypto for what is supposed to be essentially dollars without creating a taxable event. Assuming crypto is still something people want to trade, that's still a valuable service. Tether isn't supposed to be an investment. It's a money laundering scheme to facilitate the other investments outside of the taxable economy and outside of KYC regulation. Seen from that vantage point, staking pools and "potential upside" is actually not desirable.
I don’t see how tether helps you avoid taxes unless you’re going to lie about your transactions and hope nobody notices.
... for now
We've seen lots of the crypto exchanges fail to make exchanges for hours to days when things get hot
Official stock exchanges have a standard practice of halting trading in stocks when unusual events happen. Sometimes this cools the market and things get back to normal, sometimes the thing has gone to zero when
If Tether crashes to $0.01, I'd be a bit surprised if it didn't stop being convertible for a significant time.
when i'm not lp'ing, i see no reason to switch to usd so long as us-based attestations continue to be solid. the opportunity cost of being in usd on coinbase is missing lucrative nft deals.
If actual money is not involved, for example I trade my X with you for your Y, then it gets quite interesting. In the US there are generally two ways that tax law handles this. I don't know how far along the law is with fitting all the various cryptocurrency things into this.
One way is to treat it for tax purposes as if I sold X at its fair market value and you sold Y at its fair market value, and then I bought Y and you bought X. I'm taxes on my gains from that imputed sale, and take that price as my basis in Y. Similar for you.
The other way to treat it is as a non-realization event, putting off any tax consequences until I actually sell Y or trade it for something that gets handled as an imputed sale. My basis in Y is the same as the basis I had in X.
What determines which of these applies is whether or not the exchange is a "like-kind exchange". If the exchange is a like-kind exchange it gets the "swap basis" approach. If it is not like-kind it gets the "imputed sale" approach.
Sometimes this is clear cut. Suppose I bought an old guitar at garage sale 50 years ago for a couple dollars that is nowadays a valuable vintage guitar worth $100k, and 50 years ago you bought a new comic book that is now worth $100k to collectors.
If we trade, that would be an imputed sale because guitars and comic books are not like-kind.
When things are in the same category it gets much harder, and the case law is full of courts having to go deeply into philosophical questions of what makes things like-kind.
Say we trade paintings. Are all paintings like-kind? Or would a Monet not be like-kind with a Picasso because they are different artists and/or different styles? Is a male horse like kind with a female horse? Is an electric guitar like kind with an acoustic guitar? Is a comic book that is valuable because of the first appearance of a character like-kind with a comic book that is valuable because of who inked it?
In the spirit of US law (since crypto is t precisely classified), if you are a professional trader, you only pay taxes on your overall annual trading profits, not each individual trade. Same as how a a retail store doesn't have gains and losses on every individual item in inventory.
> explaining that virtual currency is treated as property for Federal income tax purposes and providing examples of how longstanding tax principles applicable to transactions involving property apply to virtual currency.[0]
Also, every crypto tax software does exactly what you say is not required. A bit of signal there.
[0] https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/freq...
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc429
If you use one of the various mark-to-market rules, then you may well “only pay taxes on your overall annual trading profits”, but you pay it every year on unrealized gains too. Choose your poison.
There are probably no 100% cash-backed stablecoins.
>Jeremy Allaire @jerallaire 3/ As of 12:00pm EST Friday, May 13, 2022, the USDC reserve consisted of $11.6 billion cash (22.9%), $39.0 billion U.S. Treasuries (77.1%), for a total of $50.6 billion (100%), and there were 50.6 billion USDC in circulation
Par value or market value? If it’s the former the current value is surely less.
If that's not the case, they have as much rope as they have ability to liquidate. IE they can keep buying their own coin to defend the price for as long as they can.
Imo, stablecoins are a good example of everyone knowing the score but systemic risk accrues regardless. Stabkecoins just the worst kind of risk. Low risk/reward on a daily basis. Risk of catastrophic collapse on a bad day. It's the type of risk that gets financial companies/complexes into trouble.
Backing by USD is not required. As you say, anything they can liquidate is good. Doesn't have to be USD. This works best when you are over-capitalised, ie when you have a thick equity cushion, so that when your assets go down in terms of USD, you still have enough balance sheet assets left to cover all your USD obligations.
You are right that trying to be stable makes things more systematically risky. If Tesla stock drops by 20% over night, some people are going to lose money, but the finance system won't collapse. If supposedly stable assets drop by 20%, everything can go wrong.
That's part of why government backed deposit insurance for banks and too-big-to-fail are problems.
I don't think it really matters what the underlying assets are. Once the bank runs, it'll probably run dry. "Equity cushions" don't work. The banks own shares suck as a hedge against a run. Assets do hedge against a run. But, once a run is truly happening... it's unlikely to stop. Eventually reserves run out. Assets, credit, etc. I don't buy the idea of assets "calming" a run. In a collapse, the assets are only good as a currency to literally pay out exiting holders.
That said, it's possible to keep the game going a long time. Decades even, depending on the levels of greed and luck.
Stablecoins are still new. The derivatives death star is still not fully operational.
Suppose you start a company with 1,000 kg of gold. No other assets, no liabilities. Currently, that gold is worth about 60 million USD.
Now you issue 1,000,000 'stable' tokens. Each can be redeemed for one USD. For simplicity, assume that you just give them away.
At current gold prices, your tokens are 60x over-capitalised. If the gold price collapses 90%, your tokens are still 6x over-capitalised. That's what I mean by an equity cushion.
A 'run' is everyone trying to redeem their tokens. If that happens, you just sell one million dollars worth of gold, and pay that obligation. You are not running out of anything here.
In historical practice in eg Scotland, the banks that issued private bank notes there kept an equity cushion of about 30% around. That means for every 70 pounds in liabilities, they had 100 pounds of assets on their balance sheet. (For comparison, in our example of 60x over-capitalisation, that's an equity cushion of 59/60 = ~98%. Or for the 6x over-capitalisation, it's 5/6 = ~83%.)
It's called an equity cushion, because on a balance sheet the excess of assets shows up at equity.
That equity on the books is very different from the banks shares. It's the difference between 'book value' and 'market value'. See https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile... for a table with price-to-book-values (PBV). You can also look up that value for any specific firm online.
> I don't think it really matters what the underlying assets are. Once the bank runs, it'll probably run dry.
That might be true in the most trivial sense: if a bank has plenty of underlying assets, like our example that was 6-60x over-capitalised, there will never be a run. So the 'once the bank runs' condition would never happen.
---
Technical detail: I completely avoided the question of reserves here. Mostly, because it's not actually very interesting. The bank will keep some reserves on hand, so that they can pay out routine redemptions immediately. They would be well advanced to follow the role model of the Scottish banks: their notes came with an 'option clause'.
The 'option clause' says that the bank can either redeem notes right away at par, or they can opt to 'pay' with a super-senior IOU that accumulates a punitive interest rate but that the bank can choose to pay back any time.
That option gives the bank time to liquidate assets, if they ever ran out of reserves. The punitive interest rate re-assures customers that the bank would not abuse that privilege it willy-nilly.
(Of course, that mechanism only helps with illiquidity. It does not protect against insolvency. But that's fine: it's better for the economy when insolvent companies cease operations.)
[0] https://twitter.com/thelastbearsta1/status/14690072004965908...
They are equivalent to a crypto that the market has lost faith in (both are worth nothing).
What I find more believable is the commercial paper is actually from crypto hedge funds and exchanges incorporated in Hong Kong.[0]
[0] - https://protos.com/tether-papers-crypto-stablecoin-usdt-inve...
I believe that these exchanges/crypto funds are borrowing USDT with interest payable in USD and principle payable in USDT. This would incentivise borrowers to buy USDT when the peg breaks to the down side thus keeping USDT pegged to the dollar.
I think it would be more accurate to say that USDT is not backed by anything. The loans are backed by commercial paper but if the borrowers are not fulfilling these debts in USD in reality there is no backing.
I presume the incentives that stop the peg breaking to the down side will only hold as long as the exchanges/crypto funds stay liquid. If there is a sustained mass exodus out of USDT I predict things will get ugly.
In August 2021 The Economist estimated Tether to be leveraged 383-to-1. That's incredibly unstable. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/08/07/why-regulators-...
How does this happen again 15 years later? Is it because we ineffectively dealt with 2008? A result of the repeal of Glass-Steagall? Or have we over regulated banking to the point the miscreants went underground to build things like crypto?
I don't get it. Crashing over and over doesn't seem good for anyone.
The answer on regulation is a mix, then. Some of it has been effective (if only at scaring off potential investor dangers completely), some of it is difficult, some of the response is underwhelming. So far there hasn't been a 2008-scale meltdown because it hasn't been a big enough market to have a domino effect, and I still don't think it is yet, so really now's the time to take preventive measures but it's not too late for that. It is too late to protect all the people who've lost big so far, but that is a much smaller number than those who suffered in 2008. In my opinion the movers and shakers who care about worldwide financial stability are tuning in around the right time and are overwhelmingly accepting that regulation is going to be necessary. I predict the EU and the US will both push some pretty solid efforts soon; EU through explicit regulation, US through maybe some legislation but definitely through better enforcement.
The US is already very much ahead of most countries in regulating but not outright banning crypto. It's closer to banning it than let's say Switzerland. With the way they consider any sale a taxable event if US regulations were better for let's say the retail crypto trader as a whole they would all massively move to US regulated exchanges like Coinbase but that would remove a lot of "natural" circuit breakers like bots or manual arbits.
If you think that sounds a lot like 2008, well, yes it is. Fortunately this time it's not gone even close to under the radar. Remember 2008 was built on a much safer financial product. Like, there were a lot of good mortgages in America, and for a while there was a healthy market for packaging them up in bonds, it just turned very sour when the bad mortgages started making up the bulk of new bonds issued to meet huge demand and more was wrung from the sponge in derivative products at the same time. The idea of a collapse was unheard-of; the market had quietly undergone huge changes with only a dozen or something people worldwide really taking notice. We're in here with a thread every few days on HN talking about the possibility of a 2008. That's a difference.
Some of the discussion of crypto regulation is more about the "prudential" side i.e. talking about some crypto entities as if they're deposit-taking institutions (like retail aka commercial banks). That's quite recent, I think it's what you're referring to by "influx of dollars ... back into government" i.e. getting them on the Federal Reserve system, getting deposit insurance, and having to be so heavily scrutinised any crypto CEO would have a heart attack in the first 20 minutes. In 2008, some commercial banks got too far into mortgage securities, failed and got bailed out. Some commercial banks doing deposits & loans got bailed out, and some even got nationalised. That protection mostly just worked as planned. Given the fact of bailouts, the risk of bailouts had to be readjusted, of course, so the new laws were about what commercial banks couldn't invest in. Lehmann was of course an investment bank. The main message is that the root causes of the crisis were not perpetrated by commercial banks, so all the new regulation around them was about trimming the risk of bad securities turning into systemic meltdowns. That's a relevant thing to worry about today but note that actual banks are pretty well protected and not really allowed to freewheel like some did in 2008. If your normal bank is investing your deposits in crypto, I would be surprised.
People worry about Coinbase because it's seen as a kind of commercial bank but not regulated as one, so it (1) gets to freewheel on investments & capital requirements like no other commercial bank in the country, and (2) has no deposit protection for those who use it. So risky twice over. Frankly I don't think Coinbase could survive with its current business model as a regulated bank, same way Uber wouldn't survive if it were forced to compete without favour & VC dried up, so forcing Coinbase to to be might trigger the very collapse being protected against (by stopping it investing in all the schemes that make it money, killing those schemes and causing knock-on), and look kinda bad. It's a tricky one. Maybe if there's enough securities enforcement against the things that are keeping the party going, the fraudulent portions can gracefully collapse on their own and the government won't have to cop the blame for bringing on the death of a pretty popular industry by prudential regulation.
Isn't it more that the crypto + companies with cult followings + chinese real estate bubbles simply have not yet popped? These assets are big enough to cause a sell-off in other areas. Maybe they haven't dipped low enough yet, or maybe the dips are gradual enough to be absorbed.
People are convinced that since its cryto, it won't be vulnerable to the same old issues that every other traded instrument has had since the south sea bubble/tulip mania.
the 2008 market crash was similar as you pointed out, in that it involved wholesale fraud (using a subset of good mortgages to market worthless ones) that were "validated" by ratings agencies.
Here, there were no real third parties to provide ratings. Just people saying "Look its crypto, you can loose because its backed by real something or other"
Hence they are not regulated.
So even keeping GS (which was limited to big banks and a few similar institutions) wouldn't have made any difference. Not that keeping it would necessarily have been a bad ide...
I don't buy the argument that crypto lives in a vacuum. People valuing that asset are part of the global economy.
The question is, is crypto really as valuable as the crypto exchange markets claim, and do companies assign face value to these assets, or do they account for the amount of risk they deserve?
Value is not a single concept. The value of something to me is different to to you. And for both of us it changes over time. Value cannot really be defined, let alone measured.
So we are stuck with prices. And prices are sort of connected to value. But the connection is very non linear.
We can know the price of crypto (or gold or shares or credit default swaps). But it's value is purely a matter of personal taste...
It didn't stop. Lehmans were thrown under the bus and business continued like there's no tomorrow with more and more financial instruments created and investment bankers putting their clients money in crap positions.
> I don't get it. Crashing over and over doesn't seem good for anyone.
There's money to be made on crashes, too. And if someone got rich before, they can patiently wait. There'll be money to be made before next crash, too. I doubt the pattern bothers them. Have you heared how Buffet assigns blame[1]?
Voila, instant correlation.
If there were a way to have enough transparency that we had smaller crashes more frequently it would probably help to limit the damage to those who can afford to lose it.
The truth is that you can only push a correction so far out. It will happen eventually and the farther out you push it the worse it will be.
It's human nature to create and participate in systems that are untenable over time but are tempting for short-term speculation.
Normally, in advanced economies, we try to use regulation to prevent or limit these events. But crypto explicitly avoids regulation, so of course it's going to pop up there. It's got nothing to do with not cleaning up after 2008.
Cryptocurrency is a new asset class, of course it's going to go through some of the painful learning experiences that traditional finance has. I've been saying since 2013 that we're going to see the exact mistakes of finance repeated with cryptocurrency.
The point I wanted to make is when you regulate too much you may encourage the growth of things that are unregulatable. Gambling and alcohol come to mind. I don't know that that's what happened, hence the question. Phrasing it another way, are we post-WW I (over regulated) or post-WW II (got it right, but you'll never be perfect)?
Very similar to Madoff's derivatives transactions. He was so big, but there little evidence of him transacting his main "strategy" in the market.
Eh, the problems in 2008 were ultimately caused by (many) central banks around the globe letting nominal gdp drop. All loans (and dividends etc) are ultimately paid out of aggregate nominal income; so obviously they are all correlated with nominal gdp: it's basically the same as aggregate nominal income.
Perhaps it's in the form of debt from exchanges. Tether could buy short-term notes from the exchanges paying them in Tether -- maybe at a slight premium to make sure the exchanges go along. The terms would stipulate that Tether could call the loan at any time allowing them to quickly pull Tether off the market as needed to maintain their peg.
How long the dance can go on would depend on the premium they've offered the exchanges and how much free Tether they've minted for themselves.
Obviously, this is all pure speculation.
Because the most liquid trading pairs and futures use USDT. The same companies who borrow USDT from Tether happen to be the same people who run exchanges or act as market makers.
Will it still be true next month or next year?
Seems to me the slow abandonment of Tether has become faster.
This is how you get a 2008-type crash - loans which seem to be unrelated but are tied to a common market.
About 11% of Tether has been cashed out in the last month.
The real problem for Tether is simple. Why would anyone buy Tether at this point? There's zero upside potential, after all. And the competition, USDC and GUSD, looks better backed. So a steady outflow is to be expected. We're going to find out how strong their backing is.
Watch out for heavily promoted Tether-based "staking" schemes designed to prevent cash-out.