For instance, if you are typing $SensitiveMessage, you would be far better off doing that in a firefox 100 textedit box in a browser tab, rather than an xterm, or emacs, or your desktop environments preferred text editor, or anything else.
I currently use "secure keyboard" in xterm but I know that has problems.
It has to make a Herculean effort because it is by far the worst possible app to be typing $SensitiveMessage in.
At least Kate or gedit probably doesn't have a second tab open running a JavaScript subprocess which is presently trying to attack you so it can cryptolocker you or empty your wallet.
So it's only more secure if you think emacs / xterm / your text editor is real likely to be compromised
FF devs are finalizing a utility process overhaul and laying the groundwork for CFI; for years, Chromium has had both with a much more thorough implementation than FF will in the near future. However, the browser space desperately needs competition so I'll take what I can get. Sigh.
I'm not sure what Firefox does, I believe they use the Chromium sandbox, and I'm way out of date on that. It used to do some filesystem setup like hardened chroots, but I would assume that's been supplanted by fs namespacing.
They didn’t isolate all the Firefox processes from X11. Only the content processes are affected, i.e. the processes whose attack surface is rather massive.
But the content processes are still going to deliver their finished work items to the GPU process for rendering. The GPU process retains all the rights it needs, including talking to X11.
You can even run Firefox via Wayland and forward a persistent XWayland session if that's your cup of tea.
If such a user wants to run untrusted programs, he'd use a virtual machine anyway.
So, I think it's very easy to overstate the benefit, and your comment did just that.
Before X11 isolation, it can: (1) get RCE in content process; (2) send events to your GNOME Shell to open a terminal; (3) send keyboard events to the terminal to download the keylogger, start it, and add it to some config file that makes it start automatically on future logins.
After X11 isolation, it will: (1) get RCE in content process; (2) get stopped because it can't send keyboard/mouse events to other applications anymore.
I do concede that our utility functions may differ, if you actually believe it and not just inflating the importance of this issue.
Also I may have a bias in that I disable JavaScript by default, so the probability of such a risk is much lower. I tried to not make that assumption though, in judging the expected loss.
People have literally gotten killed because of this type of attack. Yes, hostile nation-states probably don't care enough about you personally, but there are people for whom this is a life-and-death matter.
The one thing that reduces the impact of this is that it's Firefox on Linux, which is a niche browser on a niche OS, but desktop Linux Firefox is a product that Mozilla officially ships, which means that it's Mozilla's responsibility to protect its users.
I assumed you talked about "those on Linux", not "those on Linux who have non-negligible probability of being targeted by hostile nation-states".
It's often difficult to step back and re-evaluate initial claims, and we sometimes choose to use tactics like zooming in on improbable contexts to justify them. But I think it's healthy to face criticism that may snap us out of it, so I'm writing this comment. But it's late now, so I will not be able to follow up anymore.
P.S. I don't have GNOME installed :)
Since I cannot reply to your other comment, I will respond here. What proportion of Firefox-Linux users do you think are victims of such RCE attacks?
I don't think you actually understand what's going on here.
The untrusted programs in this case would be javascript and other exploitable things that firefox interprets every time you visit a webpage. Unless you run firefox itself under a different UID or inside of a VM you are effected by this, regardless of whether you are running other "untrusted" software or not.
Maybe you are thinking that using X11 as an attack vector requires a "bad" program running in addition to firefox? If so, that is not the case, any program that is running on X11 that can execute commands or read and write files could be used for this purpose. A terminal emulator is a pretty good example of such a program.
They have certainly misunderstood the attack. Claiming this has zero utility is effectively saying sandboxing is useless, which is just plain wrong.
Congratulations to Mozilla for getting this shipped!
In your imaginary world. Real users don't know what a VM is and expect their system to be able to run untrusted programs without exposing all of their data. Which they are able to do on most modern systems.
As I cannot reply to your reply, I will write the response here. By using Wayland, surely the direct benefit of this change to you is zero...
> For Linux users, we removed the connection from content processes to the X11 Server, which stops attackers from exploiting the unsecured X11 protocol.
It's hard to overstate how much of a benefit this is in terms of security for those on Linux. Any application with access to the X11 socket effectively has the keys to the kingdom, because it can hijack other applications, including those running at higher privileges, at will. (There have been halfhearted attempts to address this over the years, but nothing that's been effective or widely adopted.) The only real solution for desktop app security on Linux is to forbid direct access to X11 entirely, and so it's a huge deal that Firefox is now able to do this.
In general, doing this sort of thing is a monumental undertaking for large applications like Firefox. Kudos to my former colleagues for pulling it off.