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Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by pjdesno on Monday May 02, 2022 @12:19PM (#31237172)
When this first came out, I recall reading that the reason the watchdog timer was reset from the timer interrupt was because as they added more software and overloaded the CPU, things got slower and the timer started triggering during normal operation. This caused the engine to hiccup if the vehicle was moving, or stall if you were at a stop. (IIRC reboot takes ~125ms, so no spark during this time)

The watchdog is the last-ditch failsafe, in a safety-critical system, and they basically disabled it because it was inconvenient. In some businesses (aviation?) you could probably be convicted of something for doing that, whether or not it ever hurt anyone.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by elfchief on Monday May 02, 2022 @03:24PM (#31239637)
One thing that I found amusing/interesting/horrifying back when I read about this originally is that you can measure the computer reboot time in feet. IIRC, in the problem vehicles, the reboot time was something like 150 feet @ 60mph.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by hatsunearu on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @02:12AM (#31245250)
Well, good thing is during that reboot time your brakes will likely work to its full potential, you'll have engine braking, your clutch will work, your transmission might work if you have a separate TCM, your steering will work with power steering.

You will just lose power, as though you let off the throttle fully, during this time.

In fact your car turns off fueling when you let off the throttle fully to conserve fuel.

I think the only danger is that if you were going full tilt on a sports car, and the throttle failed close, you will get lift off oversteer probably.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by winrid on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @02:22AM (#31245304)
> "your transmission might work if you have a separate TCM"

This is why well engineered vehicles have a separate computer for everything and not just one little chip.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by civilized on Monday May 02, 2022 @12:42PM (#31237485)
What's infuriating is, think about how much of that software was probably worthless bloat for features no one needs. As many as 89 people may have died so Toyota could claim Bluetooth and MP3s in their latest models.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by 2143 on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:02PM (#31238558)
> What's infuriating is... As many as 89 people may have died so Toyota could claim Bluetooth and MP3s in their latest models.

You don't have to stay infuriated anymore.

The computers for in-car-entertainment is different and decoupled from the one for engine and throttle management.

As for the bloat, my observation (which could be wrong) is that Toyota seems to have comparatively less bloat.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by RC_ITR on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:08PM (#31238640)
>The computers for in-car-entertainment is different and decoupled from the one for engine and throttle management.

Somewhat unrelated to this particular case, but terrifyingly, the network isn't and CAN is one of the least secure BUS's imaginable.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by fmntf on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:28PM (#31238906)
Even cheap cars have a dedicated powertrain/brake/ABS CAN bus. Separate buses are then interconnected via a gateway.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by firephonestival on Monday May 02, 2022 @05:13PM (#31240987)
New cars do, but that has not always been the case. The rapid shift to hard bus separation happened after this incident:

https://www.eetimes.com/hacked-jeep-whom-to-blame/

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by anyfoo on Monday May 02, 2022 @10:07PM (#31243616)
My car (2014) has seven or so different CAN busses, with a gateway in between. Whether that constitutes a different "network" or not can be argued, but at least something that brings the entertainment CAN bus down, be it just by e.g. shorting it, won't (easily) bring down the other busses.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by vodou on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:24PM (#31238855)
>... CAN is one of the least secure BUS's imaginable.

Can you elaborate on this?

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by kayodelycaon on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:35PM (#31239010)
No security or authentication. IIRC, any attached device has full control over the physical layer by design. I don't really see why this is a problem in a car with isolated buses for safety-critical components.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by hatsunearu on Monday May 02, 2022 @07:11PM (#31242345)
Yeah... that's like saying a car has a security risk because someone can go in the wheel well and slash the brake lines...
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by RC_ITR on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @02:25AM (#31245326)
Yeah, that is a security risk

We choose to ignore it because it's rarely exploited, but by that logic, we should just ignore all zero-days.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by leetbulb on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @12:05AM (#31244476)
Many newer vehicles contain systems, OEM and/or after-market, that are permanently connected to the internet via cellular modem. Other systems with insecure RF tech used for various gimmicks. Other systems that communicate with external and potentially malicious devices like chargers. Etc. Most of these systems have enough access to (in)directly destroy or booby trap the car. My car is able to receive ECU(!), firmware, software updates OTA from the manufacturer. These critical systems are just as "closed" or "isolated" as cloud-enabled "CCTV." Scary stuff.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by WalterBright on Monday May 02, 2022 @05:22PM (#31241117)
> The computers for in-car-entertainment is different and decoupled from the one for engine and throttle management.

Learning the lessons from the aviation industry all over again.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by PaulHoule on Monday May 02, 2022 @12:49PM (#31237572)
I'd assume the entertainment is decoupled from any engine control, drivetrain control or drive-by-wire features.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by malfist on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:10PM (#31238657)
Yeah, GP is wrong in assuming bluetooth or MP3 processing had anything to do with this.

The CAN bus is what rules in cars, and infotainment systems are generally isolated and off of it. In some cases infotainment can read the CAN bus for things like pulling speed to display on GPS, but generally cannot place items on the bus

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by chomp on Monday May 02, 2022 @12:57PM (#31237710)
You're correct, this is the ETCS, which is a piece of the electronics in a Toyota. It's responsible for feeding speed, sensor, and drive control inputs in, and figuring out EFI, throttle, timing and stuff like that.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by bhk on Monday May 02, 2022 @11:28PM (#31244197)
Not so, according to NASA and NHTSA. More mundane, physical masters were at fault.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by oofbey on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:11PM (#31238677)
I wonder how much the software engineers at Tesla & similar think about this stuff. I bet not much.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by shepherdjerred on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @12:07AM (#31244496)
Why do you say that? Has Tesla has a similar set of incidents (unrelated to its self driving features)
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by carlmr on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @03:03AM (#31245523)
You're comparing apples and oranges. Compare how many cars Toyota vs Tesla puts on the road. Then divide the number of cases here 89 by that multiplier. You will find that even if Tesla had similar issues, they would in many cases just not be detected.