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Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by kayodelycaon on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:35PM (#31239010)
No security or authentication. IIRC, any attached device has full control over the physical layer by design. I don't really see why this is a problem in a car with isolated buses for safety-critical components.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by hatsunearu on Monday May 02, 2022 @07:11PM (#31242345)
Yeah... that's like saying a car has a security risk because someone can go in the wheel well and slash the brake lines...
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by RC_ITR on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @02:25AM (#31245326)
Yeah, that is a security risk

We choose to ignore it because it's rarely exploited, but by that logic, we should just ignore all zero-days.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by leetbulb on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @12:05AM (#31244476)
Many newer vehicles contain systems, OEM and/or after-market, that are permanently connected to the internet via cellular modem. Other systems with insecure RF tech used for various gimmicks. Other systems that communicate with external and potentially malicious devices like chargers. Etc. Most of these systems have enough access to (in)directly destroy or booby trap the car. My car is able to receive ECU(!), firmware, software updates OTA from the manufacturer. These critical systems are just as "closed" or "isolated" as cloud-enabled "CCTV." Scary stuff.