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Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by 2143 on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:02PM (#31238558)
> What's infuriating is... As many as 89 people may have died so Toyota could claim Bluetooth and MP3s in their latest models.

You don't have to stay infuriated anymore.

The computers for in-car-entertainment is different and decoupled from the one for engine and throttle management.

As for the bloat, my observation (which could be wrong) is that Toyota seems to have comparatively less bloat.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by RC_ITR on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:08PM (#31238640)
>The computers for in-car-entertainment is different and decoupled from the one for engine and throttle management.

Somewhat unrelated to this particular case, but terrifyingly, the network isn't and CAN is one of the least secure BUS's imaginable.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by fmntf on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:28PM (#31238906)
Even cheap cars have a dedicated powertrain/brake/ABS CAN bus. Separate buses are then interconnected via a gateway.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by firephonestival on Monday May 02, 2022 @05:13PM (#31240987)
New cars do, but that has not always been the case. The rapid shift to hard bus separation happened after this incident:

https://www.eetimes.com/hacked-jeep-whom-to-blame/

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by anyfoo on Monday May 02, 2022 @10:07PM (#31243616)
My car (2014) has seven or so different CAN busses, with a gateway in between. Whether that constitutes a different "network" or not can be argued, but at least something that brings the entertainment CAN bus down, be it just by e.g. shorting it, won't (easily) bring down the other busses.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by vodou on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:24PM (#31238855)
>... CAN is one of the least secure BUS's imaginable.

Can you elaborate on this?

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by kayodelycaon on Monday May 02, 2022 @02:35PM (#31239010)
No security or authentication. IIRC, any attached device has full control over the physical layer by design. I don't really see why this is a problem in a car with isolated buses for safety-critical components.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by hatsunearu on Monday May 02, 2022 @07:11PM (#31242345)
Yeah... that's like saying a car has a security risk because someone can go in the wheel well and slash the brake lines...
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by RC_ITR on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @02:25AM (#31245326)
Yeah, that is a security risk

We choose to ignore it because it's rarely exploited, but by that logic, we should just ignore all zero-days.

Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by leetbulb on Tuesday May 03, 2022 @12:05AM (#31244476)
Many newer vehicles contain systems, OEM and/or after-market, that are permanently connected to the internet via cellular modem. Other systems with insecure RF tech used for various gimmicks. Other systems that communicate with external and potentially malicious devices like chargers. Etc. Most of these systems have enough access to (in)directly destroy or booby trap the car. My car is able to receive ECU(!), firmware, software updates OTA from the manufacturer. These critical systems are just as "closed" or "isolated" as cloud-enabled "CCTV." Scary stuff.
Re:A case study of Toyota unintended acceleration and softwa... by WalterBright on Monday May 02, 2022 @05:22PM (#31241117)
> The computers for in-car-entertainment is different and decoupled from the one for engine and throttle management.

Learning the lessons from the aviation industry all over again.