On the second point, I'd say it depends on the level of granularity and detail. Here they're describing general mechanisms and they're not saying that this is all they do, so I think it's a good thing.
In general relying on obscurity for your security is a bad idea, as attackers will often find a way to get that information. That said I wouldn't give attackers a complete schematic of my env. and every protection, no sense in making things easy for them :)
As to your second point, security through obscurity is generally believed to not be worthwhile.
Security only through obscurity - sure.
But obscurity as an additional layer, as part of a defence in depth strategy, still has some value.
It’s rare for any large org to publicly discuss any details of its security design, let alone a bank. Monzo must be supremely confident in their system to go public with this information, or judge that the marketing/recruitment benefit outweighs any potential risk.
What if AWS gets cracked/hacked/compromised?
I know it's not happened yet, but it's not impossible.
* For individual banks and their customers, is it more likely that an AWS-wide exploit will compromise an AWS-hosted bank, or is it more likely that a self-hosting-specific exploit will compromise a self-hosted bank?
* For society, is it better that security efforts are concentrated in on centralised providers like AWS, or is it better that security efforts are distributed, on individual hosting entities?
In reality it's always about tradeoffs: who to delegate to and who to trust.
The difference is that cloud relies on public services, which once compromised (e.g. via social engineering), allow for lateral attacks resulting in much bigger impact (e.g. Lapsus$) across the complete customer base. This makes social engineering much more attractive in cost vs impact. The resulting monoculture in not only the software, but the infrastructure and configuation also increase the impact on technical attacks on specific exploits.
What are the public services that AWS relies on, and how are they different from a bank's server farm, or a bank renting out space in a datacenter?
The same, really, applies to all other concerns.
All of these services are hosted by AWS in a multi-tenant fashion, sharing not only the code, but infrastructure and configuration patterns.
Is not advertising your security architecture "security through obscurity"?
Banking has a fairly predictable usage pattern, but there will be black swan financial events that cause 100-1000x load. On top of that, how else could you serve customers around the globe with reasonable latencies?
These are genuine questions. I’ll admit I’m an engineer whose entire career has been during the cloud era. I don’t see how cloud’s advantages of scaling and worldwide “edge” locations can be replicated by the average bank’s tech team.
I can only speak to the banks I've have the opportunity to work with who stayed on prem or built their own internal cloud infra; what you call waste, they consider a premium/cost of business for security and resilience. I'm sure a lot of folks would've said the same thing about JIT supply chains (that had been squeezed to be as efficient as possible) until they unraveled.
> I don’t see how cloud’s advantages of scaling and worldwide “edge” locations can be replicated by the average bank’s tech team.
As always, "what are your requirements and what are you optimizing for?" Most folks don't need web scale nor edge locations [1] [2], they'll get by just fine with a CDN and some API endpoints [3].
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19576092
[2] https://blog.bradfieldcs.com/you-are-not-google-84912cf44afb
> Most folks don't need web scale nor edge locations [1] [2], they'll get by just fine with a CDN and some API endpoints [3]
Isn’t using a CDN using cloud?
For legacy banks, it will be much harder to move a mainframe based core banking system to the cloud, or migrate from a mainframe system to a new cloud system.
I do believe AWS is likely far more secure than any DIY computing environment but even so, should banking be on cloud infrastructure? I'm not saying I think this is a bad idea but it came to mind when I read this.
Also, is it really a good idea for a bank to be talking openly about its security strategy? Isn't an important part of security not to let on anything that might be used against you? For example if determined hackers know your systems then they can keep an eye out long term for vulnerabilities in those technologies and be ready to strike. Does this sort of thing matter or not?