https://www.mouser.com/ProductDetail/Parker-LORD/3DMGQ7?qs=s...
3DMGQ7 Data sheet: https://www.mouser.com/datasheet/2/1083/3dmgq7_gnssins_ds_0-...
There are physical restrictions on transmitter aerials which make really wide FHSS impossibly difficult. Especially from a satellite. So GPS still transmits on the same standard 5 frequencies, with some special codings.
The antijamming features work a little differently. If you know a random code sequence you can use various digital noise reduction techniques to improve the SNR and help punch a signal through noise.
But if you blanket blast the transmitter frequencies and their associated components with noise, you're still going to have an effective jammer. It will just have a smaller effective range.
A more interesting attack would be jamming the M code and then spoofing the data on the civilian band, which is one hypothesis for what happened to the RQ-170 that Iran soft-ish landed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93U.S._RQ-170_incid...
Not as trivial as jamming detection and countermeasures, so simple that it has found its way into base model commercial components. If you are in the air: use directional antennas - why are you listening to the ground? If you are on the ground: you get an easy 30deg arc pointing to the hostile transmitter... put a building or terrain between it and you.
This is nowhere near as good as the device described in the parent article, but it's good enough for a lot of applications. If you can get a GPS fix every few minutes, it's good enough for many nav applications.
(When we did a DARPA Grand Challenge vehicle in 2005, we had a MEMS gyro with over 10 deg/minute drift. That was too much for the mapping to work properly. We needed < 2 deg/minute for the laser scans to align. Better IMUs were back-ordered due to the Iraq war, and attempting to work around the problem with filters and a magnetic compass were not quite good enough.)
[1] https://www.mouser.com/ProductDetail/Parker-LORD/3DMGQ7