Responding in a separate comment since I either missed the second half, or it was edited in.

>That's neither here, nor there. It's another thing to peak selectively with a warrant of sorts, than to (a) peak automatically in everybody, (b) with a false-positive-prone technique, especially since the mere accusation on a false match can be disastrous for a person, even if they eventually are proven innocent...

I do not believe that iCloud CSAM server side matching ever required a warrant, and I'm not sure where you've gotten this idea. It quite literally is (a) peak automatically in everybody.

Regarding (b), with this way - thanks to them publishing details on it - there's more transparency than if it was done server side.

>especially since the mere accusation on a false match can be disastrous for a person

As noted elsewhere in this very thread, this can happen whether client or server side. It's not unique in any way, shape or form to what Apple is doing here.

I'm incredibly amused by the number of supposedly deeply technical and informed people on this site who seem to be unaware of CSAM scanning and its existing use on cloud services.

>What exactly do you think is the same as before?

The same checking when you synced things to iCloud. As has been repeated over and over again, this check happens for iCloud Photos. It's not running arbitrarily.

Your photos were compared before and they're being compared now... if you're using iCloud Photos.

>The same checking when you synced things to iCloud. As has been repeated over and over again, this check happens for iCloud Photos. It's not running arbitrarily.

Who said it's running "arbitrarily"? Who said it's not about iCloud Photos?

>Your photos were compared before and they're being compared now... if you're using iCloud Photos.

They weren't always compared, they started being compared a few years ago, and they moved to comparing them with a new scheme now.

Both are bad, and not the responsibility of a company selling phones - and also a bad precedent (now it's "think of the children", tomorrow "think of the country", then "think of those with wrong ideas", then "think how much money insurance companies can save" and what have you).

As for your suggestions to just "stop using iCloud Photos", how about we get to enjoy the features we bought our devices for, without stuff we didn't ask for and don't want?

>Both are bad, and not the responsibility of a company selling phones

Apple is not just a hardware company and there is no obligation for them to host offending contents on their servers - just as Dropbox, Google, and so on would maintain with theirs.

>As for your suggestions to just "stop using iCloud Photos", how about we get to enjoy the features we bought our devices for, without stuff we didn't ask for and don't want?

It's odd to say that a business shouldn't be allowed to police what's on their platform, given we're on a forum explicitly enabling entrepreneurs.

>It's odd to say that a business shouldn't be allowed to police what's on their platform, given we're on a forum explicitly enabling entrepreneurs.

It's odd to say that a business should be allowed to police private user content, given we're on a forum with the name "Hacker" on it, built by ex-hackers, and with part of its member's interests heritage not in and "enabling enterpreneurs" but in hacking (in the MIT sense of yore).

With many more images, many more false positives. One has as a consequence a message or account being deleted, the other - being reported to the police. Very different!

They were reporting to the authorities before as well with what was found on iCloud photos.

In this case, they're explicitly required by law to report this material if it shows up on their servers.

Well, Jim Crow legislation was also a thing once.

This definitely feels like a bad solution provoked by a dubious law; the complaints should be directed at our elected officials, not Apple.

The post office scans your mail through various machines in transit. We accept that when we put the mail in the mailbox.

What if the post office announced they were installing a man with a scanning machine in your home who would scan your letters before they left your house?

It's the same outcome. The same process. Just inside your house instead of out in the mail system. They're exactly the same, except somehow it's not.

This example changes with regards to emotional weight if you remove "a man" and leave it at just "a scanning machine". There is no human scanning your photos on an iPhone, so let's compares apples to apples here.

If that scanning machine didn't reveal the contents of my mail, and then ensured that it wasn't able to be given out in-transit? Yeah, I'd potentially be fine with it - but I'll leave this answer as a hypothetical since it's all theory anyway.

The point here is that you're choosing to use the mail system and you're thus choosing to play by those rules. Given that these checks happen for iCloud you're effectively making the same agreement.

There actually is a man involved: enough similarities and a human will review the photos. Every algorithm, especially perceptual hashing, will have false positives, and at Apple's scale, some people's private and intimate photos will be false positives and be exposed to a man looking at it.

> some people's private and intimate photos will be false positives and be exposed to a man looking at it

and deciding who gets reported to police based on their cultural views on nudity

I think the point of the OP is that it was already the case before when you were using iCloud photos. The scan was server side.

But the barrier between “only happens for iCloud” and “happens for all photos on device” has been reduced to a very small barrier. Before it was the photos actually being sent to a separate server by my choice, now it’s Apple saying their on-device tool only runs given criteria X.

And on a second note I think people are allowed to be freshly concerned at the idea of Apple scanning photo libraries given a government-provided hash list, even if it was already happening before now.

To be clear, I have no qualms about people being concerned. You can find my comments elsewhere on this site that I think people should scrutinize this entire thing.

I'm just very tired of people (not necessarily you) spouting off as if the functionality is new. It dilutes an otherwise important conversation. So many of the threads on this site are just people privacy LARPing.

Agreed. I still think there is a distinction, even if only in principle and mostly psychological, between what a company does with my files on their server, and what they do with my files on my device.

Even if the outcome is theoretically the same, the means are different and it feels different.

> The post office scans your mail through various machines in transit.

That is a totally bogus comparison.

The post office 100% does NOT can the content of every piece mail they handle.

Not even close to the same scenario as Apple/governments being able to continually and silently check your phone/photo library for images on their watch list.

I’m pretty sure lots of mail gets x-rayed, perhaps even more looking for malicious packages or substances.

I agree that data content scanning is more invasive than physical scanning. It was an intentionally simplistic example not meant to defend Apple.

Parcels, maybe. I’d bet it’s a tiny percentage though.

I doubt the entire world has enough X-ray machines to scan even a vanishingly small percentage of the envelopes the postal service delivers every day.

Sorry my metaphor wasn’t good enough.

It's not the same because before the hashing was done in the cloud, but now the model is accessible locally, you just need to take pictures. This means it's easier to hack.

If someone discovers a way to reliably generate adversarial images they can send such images to someone else to iSWAT them.

If your definition of "hack" is "get bob to accept bad file", no, this model is not easier - it's just different.

You could literally piggyback on the directories that Macs use to sync to iCloud Drive, get an image in there, and then it gets scanned by iCloud. This is not some new theoretical attack - and in fact, this would be the "hack" for the new one as well since it requires iCloud sync to trigger anyway.

I was referring to a "white box" adversarial attack, meaning you can try variations of the input to see how the outcome changes, and then construct an input that will fool the system. That's only possible if you have access to the perceptual hashing model, which you do now since it runs locally.

Of course generating an adversarial image is not the final step, the hacker still need to place it in the victim's account somehow, but it's easier now because the image looks legit.