No worries though, the ransom from this round should serve nicely as a Series B round of financing & enable rapid scaling of the post-hack ransom extraction process.
Yes much can be automated but there is usually a human element to these deals and that costs the hackers money.
They also want to be careful to limit their hacks to companies their handlers are happy for them to hack. Go too wide and you risk hitting a company directly or indirectly linked to your state/handler/patron.
There are thousands, if not tens of thousands, of such deals done every year.
Sorta playing into stereotypes about engineers here.
Perhaps not the largest groups, but the smaller ones, posssibly.
What's not is managing big sums of money, turning crypto in to a more traditional currency/assets. That side of the operation probably has more people doing leg work than you'd think.
It's even conceivable that if they go too far and political pressure in the US builds high enough, and Russia &/or their countries of residence are also put under pressure, that they could find themselves on the wrong end of a drone strike or no-knock flash-bank assisted rapid entry to homes and business locations. All they have to do is pick the wrong target that directly leads to deaths-- hospitals the most obvious, but industrial accidents or "rapid unplanned disassembly" of something like a chemical plant...
I was shocked at the pipeline attack, followed by one on the US's food supply. These rise to the level of terrorism, and when fear & anger become dominant motivating factors the event horizon for any ability to predict what happens will become significantly shorter and less certain.
And in the middle of all of that will be a team of techies and support staff struggling to cope with day to day realities of running a thriving organization. There's an IT Crowd satire show somewhere in there that Netflix should consider.
Why couldn't they have bootstrapped years ago? I suspect the real reason is they actually want to avoid extensive media coverage.
1) Scale of the attacks. Taking large portions of a country's petro-chemical/energy pipeline is far above the threat level presented by most prior hacks. The same goes for shutting down ~20% of the nation's pork & beef food supply. And now hundreds of companies impacted as a result of a single breach. Ransomware isn't new, but it is in hockey-stick growth mode.
2) Increased market for crypto currencies. Criminal activity may not, by far, be the dominant activity, but the more legitimate transactions there are, the easier it is to hide criminal transaction.
3) Bootstrapping this type of thing takes time because it's not just about capital in this case. It's also about accumulating vulnerabilities and compromising systems long enough that backups-- for example a week or month old-- are still useless (also encrypted). And going back to earlier backups will lose the company too much essential data.
4) And as you said, avoiding media coverage that will bring too much attention, and with it the potential for a crackdown. The slow burn on increasing ransomware over the years has acclimate people to it in a way that makes even the most recent massive attacks a little more normalized, especially when they pay the ransom & get back up & running in a few days. That limits the amount of public pressure to fight this head on with mandated increased security and massive resources thrown at pro-actively going after these hackers.
5) In 2016 ransomware wasn't quite as mature. 2020 is different, and the political landscape is different: I'm not making a partisan comment here. I'm not saying the previous US administration prevented these things better or the current administration dropped the ball. What I'm saying is that when there's any new administration, there are threat actors that will test the waters, see how far they can go. I definitely thing that's a factor here, especially so close after the Biden administration delivered its list of 16 untouchable sectors to Russia & Putin. There's going to be a lot of adversarial interest in just how firm those limits are, and what the response will be.
Otherwise, from a national awareness standpoint, you do approach an important point: It may not be a new phenomena, but for the vast majority of Americans that don't follow tech news, this is new and, given the scale of recent attacks, somewhat scary.
This is combined with a business model resembling patent trolls: you want to extort just a little less than is worth fighting for. If a company gets hit on its own, it's probably not in a position to really do anything about it, but if there is some major hack affecting tons of companies, the odds of an actor with significantly more tech capability like the US government getting involved go way up, and suddenly fighting seems like a good option.
That doesn't jive with your market manipulation hypothesis.
The reason why 2nd stage was only given to (relatively) small number of organizations - because the attack wasn’t ransomware, attackers didn’t have economical motives (in fact they were spooks on a government payroll).
EDIT: I can’t spell
So it's a spectrum
The administration left it alone for days saying they'll let private business sort it out. (Default investigation notwithstanding.)
When a bunch of news media started reporting the group was Russian and then insinuate it was a state sponsored attack, DarkSide said something along the lines of, "We didn't realize this would start geopolitical conflict. We will be careful to vet clients more carefully in the future."
The FBI investigated the crime as they always do. It was treated as a standard international monetary theft.
It’s as much a political game at this point as anything.
If anyone thinks they can hide behind cryptocurrency and hold truly strategic companies hostage they are deluding themselves.
They’ll either end up hacked beyond their wildest imagination or facing literal hellfires.
It’s brinkmanship. When the devs literally die, they think twice.
Or even a company. Uber's security chief once became annoyed with an attack from Nigeria. They traced the attack to an Internet cafe and sent some "lawyers" to talk to the attacker.
Someone tried a ransomware attack on the Teamsters Union in 2019.[1] The FBI advised them to pay. The Teamsters didn't pay. There were no further attacks. The Teamsters declined to comment. (For those unfamiliar with American labor history, trying to push around the Teamsters Union usually ends badly for the pushers.)
[1] https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/558066-teamsters-re...
Wait, what? Have you notified the Department of State?
https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/
Iran is still on there. I'm pretty sure some people have been "annoyed enough to do something drastic" for quite a while.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Iranian_nucle...
“Ultimately, the union decided not to pay the ransom based on advice from its insurance company, and instead rebuilt its systems based on archived materials, NBC reported.”
Source: https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/252502519/Repeat-...
Was Edward Snowdon "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1GtVt6quoD8&t=78s" or a psychologically manipulated patsy for the good/bad guys & girls?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Full-spectrum_dominance isnt just about hacking a few computers, its about getting inside the brain of each and every one of us/you like a https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lG7DGMgfOb8.
Or is this line of thought just a https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmin5WkOuPw&t=48s ?
The solarwinds attack seemed to be about using a supply-chain attack to gain persistent access for recon and lateral movement. Pivot to Azure via Microsoft via SolarWinds software. Whomever it was tried to stay invisible for as long as possible. Once the game was up, they were not so careful about visible actions.
RansomWare is more smash and grab though it's interesting/sad to see the current trends of Supply Chain attack prevalence and Ransomware attacks converge.
If it was me (it was not), I’d use it to gain persistance in companies like Kaseya, extending my beachhead as first priority. After that is basically game over, cleaning it would take making new IT systems from scratch. And lets not forget firmware…
Sure…
Also, at some point the military gets involved.
Also you want the company to stay in business so it can continue generating revenue to extract future ransoms, and not have it lose a bunch of its customers from your repeated attacks.
Was that down to slow patching cadence at 99% of companies?
In which case those customers have different vulnerabilities to tend to.
I suspect the attackers know this. Or else they aren't in it for the money. One or the other.
If you're evil and out for money, wouldn't you want to cast the widest net possible? Similarly, by encrypting a huge number of corporations concurrently, you'd "exhaust" the ability of a country to respond. There's only so many recovery specialists and IT contractors available to respond in an emergency. Encrypt only a few hundred targets and they can all recover. But if you encrypt a few hundred thousand, then there wouldn't be enough warm bodies available!
Thinking about it, I wonder if these attackers have set up permanent operations, with staff, payroll, and everything. Maybe they just to fly under the radar and collect a nice steady income instead of a risky but potentially huge one-time payoff...