Steering wheels made of cardboard would be easier to manufacture, yet they'd fail safety inspection.
If car makers are actually hooking the bluetooth chip up to anything except the sound system, that's the problem. Although, assuming a class 2 device, it only has a 10 meter range. If an attacker is that close and wants to shut down your car, they can use a nail strip.
The real problem here is hooking up WWAN to control software.
These connections could be physically 'one-way' but in practice most modules are simply wired in parallel on a CAN bus and something like the radio would be set up to send data to the car's CAN bus (for diagnostic purposes at least).
The stereo is way too tightly coupled with the rest of the vehicle.
Not to mention that updates can obviously brick things. Imagine waking up one day and finding out that your car is bricked due to some update.
But car owners are not given a choice, and most systems are then gradually engineered to depend on online access to function.
The reason you hear about security flaws in newer cars with OTA updates is because research on unpatchable cars is regularly silenced. Multiple friends of mine who thought it would be fun to look into bluetooth security in cars have had their work shut down by law enforcement and teams of lawyers, and told to back off.
I'd estimate that at least 90% of cars on the road without OTA updates are vulnerable to some sort of Bluetooth based attack that will never get fixed. Your "write enable" trick does more harm than good in these scenarios.