There are two foreign-policy angles:
The Eastern-European states (mostly Poland and the Ukraine, but also the Baltics) are constantly afraid of Russia. Especially to the Poles it looks a bit like Germany and Russia diving Poland between themselves in WW II.
That's the good foreign policy opposition.
Then there's the bad one: America. America wants to sell liquid gas from fracking.
That gas is more expensive, so Germany builds ports for those LNG ships, but also the pipeline.
America warns that Germany makes itself dependent on Russian gas, but that's bullshit. Germany can switch over to American LNG at any time. The infrastructure is there. As soon as Russian gas stops, gets too expensive, or strings are attached, Germany can almost instantly get American gas.
The only problem is: America wants to sell their expensive gas right now.
And so the impose sanctions, not against Germany, but against everyone remotely connected to that project. It sounds like an exaggeration, but they literally impose sanctions on some janitor working for a port that let a ship enter which was working on that pipeline. And the mayor of the town the port is in. And everyone else.
Is it really so simple? Even if the domestic infrastructure is identical, you need the port facilities (at both ends, with spare capacity), and you need ships.
Anyone know what sort of percentage of the world LNG shipping market today this would be? (To replace the whole Russian supply to Europe, say.) That would influence how easy it is to rent the ships you need.
Edit -- quick googling, Nord Stream 1 & 2 each 55 billion m^3/year max, the whole world's LNG fleet about 90 million m^3, liquid is 615 times the density, thus 55 billion m^3 total capacity of gas. So if every single LNG ship made one trip US-DE, that would replace a year of Nord Stream 1 alone. The trip is about 12 days, one way, at 20 knots.
Maybe I should google more but I thought lead times were also a constraint -- that gas pipelines are close to real-time, unlike oil, while renting some ships to sail across the atlantic would take a while. Anyone know the details?
/me shrugs.
- Germany imported close to 110bn m^3 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/332218/gas-trade-imports...)
- a typical big LNG tanker has a capacity of 266,000 m^3 ( https://www.wartsila.com/encyclopedia/term/lng-tanker)
- 110.000.000.000 / 266.000 = 413,533 trips or 1133 tankers unloading every day.
Against the 90m m^3 "whole world fleet capacity" that's still a factor of 1222, so every single LNG tanker would have to do the USA <-> 4 times every day for this to work.
I have no idea whether it can substitute for the whole of Russian gas, probably not. But for Nord Stream 2, yes.
Plus there is the little thing that most existing terminals can't accept Q-class ships (i.e. vessels with capacity 200 thousand cubic metres), so it is not exactly possible to replace total demand with LNG - it's actually doubtful if you could even replace the ~9 bcma of Nord Stream 2 gas that was actually earmarked for Germany. We are talking different orders of magnitude here.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine#Etymology_and_orthogra...
I think I heard the variant without article in German, as well, but I'm not aware of a similar discouragement.
The German Wikipedia seems not to have anything on it, as well.
It is that simple!
In the cold war, it was the USSR which was more dependent. Without food grown in North America, they were (IIRC) looking at WWII levels of rationing, in the 80s, which would have made people pretty unhappy. They sold oil to buy this food, but most of the west could have got by without this trade. (Not sure how dependent W.Germany was, at that point.)
Germany is more than able to protect itself against Russia.
Germany only have ~300 tanks.
It is not by any stretch of imagination.
France has 530 MBTs, Spain 550, and Italy 480. This compares favourably with the 2600 Russian tanks, and with proper logistical backbone, advanced air support, infantry support, and competent missile defence systems, is way more than necessary to stall a Russian offensive.
Of course, once the Russian offensive is stalled, Germany alone can vastly outproduce Russia, and that's the worst case scenario.
The US is not necessary for Germany to defend against Russia.
It’s not as simple as buying it from someone else when Russia views countries that are beholden to them for energy as a geopolitical asset.
If that were the case then I'd imagine, the combo of Russia, Turkey and Israel as gas suppliers to Europe would be about as diversified as possible to mitigate geo-political risks.
It became quite political due too, IMHO:
- the US wants to sell fracking gas
- the previous US admin wanted to show strength against Russia
- it somehow became a controversial topic in Germany
- Eastern European countries are afraid, maybe rightly so, that now it would be easier for Russia to cut them off (as they did with Ukraine in the past) as soon as Germany and Western Europe wouldn't be affected anymore
Russia, and the USSR before that, pretty much respected contracts. The exception being former Sowjet countries not being part of the EU and NATO. And the conflict between the west and Russia affects Ukraine the worst. These diplomatic aspects, intermingled with economic interests, have been badly handled by Germany.
That being said, it wouldn't be the first pipeline through the Baltic Sea. There is already a Nordtream 1.
The pipe is still a huge problem as it allows Putin to rule over a rich Russia, but the way the last USA hamfistedly tried to strong-arm German politics didn't do any good to US/German relations.
It's hard to see behind immediate benefits. Those of us who can and do resist silly temptations, should be supported.
Very true, and this is why I am equally skeptical about the German determination to get this through, come hell or high water.
..and it's also how Germany became dependent upon the largest foreign threat to its region's security.
That seems to be because you haven't economic studied history. The Soviet Union used its natural resources, and gas in particular, to exert control over its satellites whenever diplomatic methods failed to achieve desired results. Central European countries have not forgotten this, and it behoves us to understand their experience. Moreover, through the person of Schroeder in particular, Germany already has a lite version of that history. Whatever Putin needed done, he had and used an important lever in the form of gas to make Schroeder dance.
Russia spends around 4% GDP on their army.
Otherwise, why shouldn't we buy oil e.g. from Islamic State if it manages to reappear?
But Nord Stream didn't exist back then. And I think that's the really problematic issue for Germany. It's one thing to buy fossil fuels on the open market, and another entirely to lay out tons of infrastructure spending to solidify your dependency on an adversary.
Generally speaking, Germany's foreign policy is deeply tied to its energy policy. It's one of the reasons for its interest in renewables.
I will also note that, say, Thatcher's UK purchased coal from Warsaw Pact Poland in order to crush strikes by domestic coal miners.
What kind of world do you live in where you resist a clear need for self-preserving adaptation to the new reality, simply based on past behavior during a time of upheaval and fragmentation?
I have, however, lived in both East and West, and I have to say, the new reality of Russia's imperial ambitions are... A bit more tempered than the USSR's imperial ambitions over most of its existence.
Now, if my historical and political education only came from modern political pundits, I might see the events of the past decade as something entirely unexpected, unprecedented, and existential.
They aren't, though. They rarely are. The pundits see every crisis as unexpected, unprecedented, and existential. We wouldn't have much use for them if they didn't.
Eastern Germany was an own nation and they got preferencial prices for gas from the USSR as part of their block.
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/energieabhaengigk...
And that was used as the biggest red flag pointing on hollowness of its international policies.
The biggest grey zone here is USA. Europe should have certainly not participated in USA wars in the Middle East.
Without getting too bogged down in the very complicated ethical questions of nation states killing people, a key difference between trading with ISIS and trading with belligerents in other wars, is that the entirety of the world was at war with ISIS. [1]
[1] Peruse the "Opponents" section of the table on the right hand side. As far as I can tell, combining the State Opponents and "Many Others" sections gets you a list of just about every country in the world. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_...
Hmm. But...
ISIS has oil.
Germany wants oil.
ISIS wants to sell it.
Germany is willing to buy it.
All sounds rather simple and commercial to me. If there’s a concern about ISIS influence then the only real solution is to invest further in more diversified sources - eg via The Mediterranean so that multiple supplies exist in the event of geo-political strains.
That's just silly. If you want ISIS to not wage wars then you do not buy oil from them. If you want Russia to not kill Ukrainians and annex parts of countries in Europe then you do not buy oil or gas from them.
Russia has nat gas.
Germany wants nat gas.
Russia wants to sell it.
Germany is willing to buy it.
All sounds rather simple and commercial to me. If there’s a concern about Russian influence then the only real solution is to invest further in more diversified sources - eg via The Mediterranean so that multiple supplies exist in the event of geo-political strains.