But Nord Stream didn't exist back then. And I think that's the really problematic issue for Germany. It's one thing to buy fossil fuels on the open market, and another entirely to lay out tons of infrastructure spending to solidify your dependency on an adversary.
Generally speaking, Germany's foreign policy is deeply tied to its energy policy. It's one of the reasons for its interest in renewables.
I will also note that, say, Thatcher's UK purchased coal from Warsaw Pact Poland in order to crush strikes by domestic coal miners.
What kind of world do you live in where you resist a clear need for self-preserving adaptation to the new reality, simply based on past behavior during a time of upheaval and fragmentation?
I have, however, lived in both East and West, and I have to say, the new reality of Russia's imperial ambitions are... A bit more tempered than the USSR's imperial ambitions over most of its existence.
Now, if my historical and political education only came from modern political pundits, I might see the events of the past decade as something entirely unexpected, unprecedented, and existential.
They aren't, though. They rarely are. The pundits see every crisis as unexpected, unprecedented, and existential. We wouldn't have much use for them if they didn't.
Eastern Germany was an own nation and they got preferencial prices for gas from the USSR as part of their block.
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/energieabhaengigk...
And that was used as the biggest red flag pointing on hollowness of its international policies.