From reading the NRC submission, the support structure for the modules is Seismic Category 1 (rated for design basis earthquake). This includes the entire Reactor Building, its foundation, and requirements for the site on which it is built. The reactor building is also designed to withstand an impact from a large commercial aircraft. Note that conjecture that the modules are top-heavy appears to be unfounded given the configuration described in the NRC submission.
Elsewhere in the probabilistic risk assessment, they address a module tipping over if it is dropped in the operating area-- the most probable scenario for a horizontal module.
In the case where the drop causes the containment to be breached and does not permit inflow of water from the pool (ostensibly due to pressure difference) the result is core damage and a release of radioactive contamination to the pool.
I encourage interested readers to look at Chapter 19 of the NRC submission. Much of the document is at a level where a lay engineer can understand it. NB: I am not affiliated with NuScale or the NRC.
As far as I'm aware we've never had a nuclear reactor go sideways, and it's kinda ludicrous to even ask. It's one of the most massive structures, built on bedrock because it's too heavy to be built on anything else, and even these "small" reactors will be incredibly heavy.
From a planning perspective, if verticality is a requirement then that verticality has to be protected as strongly as any other aspect. Any attachment or mounting points that maintain verticality must therefore be earthquake proof. If, as in the pictures, these reactors are held in place from the top, horizontal shaking from even a small earthquake would put massive strain on that joint. It isn't just the long/thin/heavy reactor but all the water sloshing around too. A super-strong joint and maybe something important bends/breaks under load? A flexible joint to allow the reactor to sway? Sway how much? What happens at the travel limit of the joint? Can we risk the reactor contracting its neighbours? These are not trivial engineering questions.
If it's using gravity, what happens if this whole reactor gets tilted? What happens at 10 degrees? 45? 90? 180? Are there any critical angles where it would melt down?
I'm curious how you would make such a design that would be both using gravity yet tolerate being moved around.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978184569...
Ahh i see, a flat earth believer ;)
Basically: What's so dramatically difficult about doing the same for a terrestrial compact reactor to make something like the NuScale take so long to get approval?
"NuScale spent over $500 million, with the backing of Fluor, and over 2 million labor hours to develop the information needed to prepare its DCA application"
Military reactors don't have to go through this process and those designs (modified to work on land, etc) would.
Thank you for that answer and link. checking further now.
https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurethe-world-s-larg...
Anyway, what if the valves to the backup containment open while it's running at full power? I mean the electronics fail so the valves open. I suppose the steam generator is still running, but even so lots of heat would be dumped into the pool. Maybe there is an interlock so that the reactor scrams in this case.
- The reactor differs substantially from existing PWRs by encasing the primary in double containment, using natural circulation flow for both normal operation and emergency cooling. There are no pumps needed (or installed) to move coolant through the reactor.
- During normal operation, the primary is entirely contained within the primary containment, and circulates naturally, using the differential temperature and gravity. The steam system can is used to remove heat.
- During an emergency, valves open to admit the reactor coolant into the backup containment. These valves are normally held shut by hydraulics with positive control from electronics-- their failure mode is to open with no other operator action in case of a loss of power. No additional operator action is needed to initiate the emergency cooling flow, which is also a natural circulation loop to the backup containment shell, which then conducts heat to the pool.
- The backup containment shell is designed to withstand hydrogen explosions such as those that occurred at Fukushima, and which was possibly prevented at Three Mile Island by venting (whether there was a hydrogen explosion at TMI-2 is not fully understood).
- There is no mechanism for positive reactivity addition via graphite moderator rod such as in the Chernobyl design. The specific failure mode at Chernobyl is not possible with this reactor.
- The pool is specified as a stainless-steel-lined reinforced concrete and designed to withstand earthquakes. The safety systems are such that no reactor electricity supply is needed to remove heat-- the pool could be filled e.g. from a fire truck, and the immediate decay heat from shutdown does not require any additional heat removal or water addition. So the failure mode we saw at Fukushima (inability to remove decay heat due to loss of electricity) and hydrogen explosion breaching containment does not apply to this design.