No one knows what they are doing. Unless you are decompiling and reverse engineering the whole thing you are mostly just blindly trusting its safe. Even on trusted sites people share stuff from other sites not knowing its infected.
Obviously those can be repacked and faked so you'd have to check multiple sources to ensure you get a genuine release, but yeah the scene groups are as usual way ahead of everyone else.
I think the scene groups are a traditional bunch that in some respects are years behind because of it. I remember in maybe 2005 I'd still download releases that were split into floppy sized RAR files. Possibly, this tradition carried on for so long because the scene was so keen to shame groups that didn't package like everyone else. I don't know how it is now but I'm hoping they got over splitting releases.
Like the OP, back in the day I used to have plenty of pirated software (mostly games) and never had a problem with viruses (at least, not that I knew or had any noticeable effects). The threat complexity is probably way worse these days and I wouldn't risk it. Plus, of course, I support games by paying for them :)
I used to swear by Outpost Firewall as it was able to do things like detect applications adding to startup, injecting into other processes, gaining raw disk access, reading your browser profile for passwords, communicating with any unexpected hosts, etc. This is enough to rapidly identify most malware packaged with pirated software immediately. This isn't some advanced targeted attack, it's a script kiddie packing ransomware, password dumpers like iStealer, RATs like DarkComet, etc. The kind of thing these tools are designed to detect.
I’m on my phone so can’t search better, but couldn’t find it at rutracker from a quick search. Not sure if it will be available via some archive.
Sony has a root kit included, Zoom had a web server that could be exploited (at least) to then on your camera.
That’s just off the top of my head.
I don’t remember malware on Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora or Arch’s repository (put there by maintainers like the examples I gave above, or by a hack). And definitely not Gentoo.
But you are right. The bottom line is, you shouldn’t trust that which you cannot verify; but with open source, you have much more ability to verify (but it’s not a panacea - you run to many lines of code to verify yourself, it’s not clear anyone trustworthy verified it all, and there also the “reflections on trusting trust” argument)
Isn’t that why things like heartbleed took two years before being found out? I presume some people using the vulnerable OpenSSL versions felt similar to you.
The worst I have seen is xscreensaver embedding a message in the code to complain about the old version a year after release.
The damage malware can do now is so much deeper - encrypting all your files, which then gets synchronised out through the tool you were using for backups automatically, before holding them to ransom. Then it turns your light bulbs into DDoS nodes to spread that to people across the internet, and probably you won't notice because you're on a fast enough connection for that to fly under the radar.