He runs the basic math, and even if the airlines completely cease to exist, it was still the financially sound decision to return the money to investors. Even if they knew the pandemic was going to happen this year, they made the right decision... and given that this was such a rare event, it would have been extremely foolish to try to maintain a cash cushion for this.
[1] - https://www.amazon.com/Precipice-Existential-Risk-Future-Hum...
The probability any one very rare event is low. Preparing for it helps mitigate risks for many other issues however.
The global cost of the virus is astronomical, but protecting ourselves effectively against a new virus doesn’t have to be crippling. The same is true of many other credible risks the article covers. Such preparations could even offer additional useful benefits. It’s just going to take vision and pragmatism I’m not sure our political leaders have in them these days.
I argue for letting these businesses fail, even if vital, because, it seems, the powers that be have forgotten to take care of them, regulate them, and not get captured by private interests, for decades now. Infrastructure across the the country is literally crumbling. Major dams have failed this year. I fully expect to suffer much more before those with the power to delegate resources where needed will find the will too.
We'll solve the problem eventually, I guess, when it becomes clear that there's no money left for bailouts.
If you start just conjuring money to bridge the gap, you're basically robbing whoever holds money (or other financial instruments denominated in your currency). These parties then work very hard to stop holding money. When that process is done, you're back where you started, only with less trust, higher transaction costs, and elevated risk burdens depressing output across the economy.
It's not so much setting aside money for a certain very rare event, it's realizing that there are a LOT of low-probability events that are close to catastrophic and the chance of encountering one of these events is quite high in aggregate even if the chance of a specific event in the pool is low.
Indeed, and there are a lot of overlapping disaster preparedness steps that make sense no matter what the triggering event happened to be, so it makes sense to establish, e.g.: robust command and control infrastructure that doesn't rely on primary infrastructure, including communications and chains of command; stockpiles of strategic durable goods like medical equipment, rations, batteries, etc.
1970 gas shortages 2000 dotcom bubble burst 2008 housing crisis
All missed opportunities to change broken institutional structures and to do things differently.
However, this has limits. It doesn't work for large scale shortages like the oil shocks of the seventies. If everybody had saved money beforehand, there still wouldn't be more oil available in total. When the oil price doubles, you'll only be able to buy half as much with your savings.
but, a pandemic is not an idiosyncratic risk of individuals or firms, but rather a broad systemic risk, and as such, should be bourne by society as a whole, not each individual and business separately.
Holy Jesus; that's massive.
Capital is not free. Typical costs of capital today are about 8% (1). You're proposing, essentially, an 8% tax — not on a firm's profits, but on a firm's expenses. I don't want you to think, "oh, that will push a few firms into failure, rendering their entire business unviable." I want you to think, "it will spare a few firms." I also shudder to think of what happens to firm formation in the face of the steep, steep barriers to entry this raises.
You propose a very, very expensive way to build resilience. You're right, though, that the costs would be borne by all of society. Maybe it's worth it? But it's a hell of an ask, and I'm skeptical.
(1) if you have better figures than http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/... then I'm all for 'em
and the cost of capital isn't the right rate to be applying here. a better estimate is the spread between the cost of debt and their short-term securities rate (like the interest rate on current assets), which could even be negative (that is, making money). certain businesses can even be financed via their receivables alone.
damodaran is a good reference. his book was the basis of my finance and valuation classes. but it's dense and not easy to implement without going all in. it really taught me that finance and valuation are arguments, not analytical solutions.
If you take a loan to expand your business and pull forward profits, or even rent property instead of buying it, you take tail risk but in normal times tend to outcompete.
I think it's an ironclad argument for regulation (and maybe government intervention) in insurance markets, and a good argument in many others -- Even though I'm generally in favour of some leverage.
Here is a link to the full article on LessWrong - https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/GZSzMqr8hAB2dR8pk/studies-on...
If you explain to your customers what you did to prepare for eventualities, those among them who are risk averse may decide to become customers and pay you a little extra.
FOr example, cloud providers who do not plan for meteor-based regional outages (which occur rarely) believe they can home all their data in a single region. This is much cheaper and will allow the provider a better profit margin, and realistically, not a lot of customers care about their data surviving a meteor taking out US-EAST1.