Are you joking? It's a common trope for bank websites to go down for "scheduled maintenance". Not to mention real-world bank branches keep bizarre hours and close for random holidays like Presidents' Day and Veterans' Day.
Why do banks and credit card companies need to perform "scheduled maintenance" during which users are unable to access their information online? https://www.quora.com/Why-do-banks-and-credit-card-companies...
Imagine if all credit cards with a company failed to process transactions for an hour, or depositing/withdrawing money didn't make a change to your balance. Those types of issues are much more severe than a customer not being able to log in to the website.
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/e-services/...
This site is used for everything. Reviewing your taxes, reading mail and notifications you've received from the government, filing returns, making payments, etc.
As long as the website is only used in a single timezone, I guess it's not too bad.
The password is what secures the more valuable things inside the account (the money). In fact, in nearly every case a password is used, no one really cares much about the password itself, but what's inside. That's why services require password in the first place.
EDIT: Also, don't be so sure that passwords are not useful. If you can compromise a password in one service, there is a significant chance that the user in question is re-using the same password on other (or all?) services. If your password is "joe123" on somewebsite.com, if I can crack that, I can try to use that information to guess your login on somebank.com, somedoctor.com and somegovernmentservice.gov. The more things become "cloud"-based, the higher the value of cracking a password.
I think the bigger consideration is actually how to exfiltrate money from an account that you compromise: If you initiate a wire transfer to some account you control, that leaves a paper trail, and typically has a lag time, during which the institution/customer have a chance to react. This is also why scam centers in India ask you to send them cash equivalents: gift card codes they can redeem/resell.
> I think the bigger consideration is actually how to exfiltrate money from an account that you compromise: If you initiate a wire transfer to some account you control, that leaves a paper trail, and typically has a lag time, during which the institution/customer have a chance to react.
It sounds like your third paragraph contradicts your first - it's not just your password that protects the money, but the institution whose business it is to maintain and reconcile paper trails.
Banks were using signatures(!) to protect depositors' money long before passwords existed - and they have had processes to mitigate fraud since then. While not ideal, plain text passwords are huge upgrade over signatures
I think the broader point of the parent is that in banks, there is actually a lot more than just the password securing the money in the bank. There is careful surveillance of the activity of accounts at the bank--separate from the website login system, and backed by regulatory accountability and ultimately the police.
Unlike a modern service like Facebook or Google, your bank's website is not the same thing as the entire bank. When you log into your bank's website or app, you're logging into a public-facing system that in turn interacts with the "real" systems that the bank uses to manage money. Those "real" systems are secured in various ways too, and not just based on the web password.
I once attended a talk by Bruce Schneier talking about the resilience of the financial system. Beyond the prevention of bad actions (for example by authentication), he emphasized that the financial system is highly engineered to make it possible to recover from bad actions. That includes some technical means, but also methods of accounting, and insurance.
Only access to the account is protected by the password. Sending money isn't protected by a password. It is protected with a second factor on top of requiring access to the account.
This was forgivable 30 years ago. It was bad practice 20 years ago. Someone could have demonstrated leadership and developed a ten year plan to fix their legacy problem then.
They did. And Pi factor came in. And budget was cut because those pesky fintech are a threat, and clearly money was better spent on a more modern offer than on those "security" concerns.
And yes, it's possible to add 2FA to the front layer. However, the remnants of COBOL code running on the mainframe for the last 25 years weren't designed to handle passwords length 9 or more, and the last guy who knew how that code was built has retired some 15 years ago.
It was written when the cost/benefit calculation of writing it involved "downsizing" thousands of clerks who were doing the job manually.
It can't be replaced because the cost/benefit calculation of replacing it does not involve anything like those kinds of numbers. The benefits of avoiding even a major security incident just don't compare to the costs.
Y2K taught me this. Nothing has changed since.
TSB customers have learned how painful it can be if the migration of a core banking system fails: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tsb-it-fail...
And there's the real problem:
The banks will save their money and stick with plaintext if they can get away it.
Put another way, it's an incentive problem.
With a six-digit PIN.
See
- https://www.labanquepostale.fr/ > "Me Connecter"
- https://lcl.fr/ > "Mon Espace"
- https://particuliers.societegenerale.fr/com/icd-web/cbo/inde... > 12345678 > Valider
My experience: built a Web site/app for: a) major bank b) major corp, back in the days when Web presence was kind of a new thing. ~15-20 years ago.
You build a new (Web) app and treat the legacy system (happened to be some mainframe) as a backend or whatever. Add new tables to hold user's credentials, email addresses, and whatever else. Link the "new" credentials with the old "account id on mainframe" or whatever. Not really rocket science.
BTW - there was no such thing as an "old password table with max 8 character", not for retail customers. Retail customer did not have a password, or email.
Oh, I am sure they do. The big question for this thread is: how come this "8-character all-uppercase" password is a thing in States, but less of a thing in e.g. Europe.
There was a forced password reset that enabled real password policies.
Adding a table to hold users' credentials doesn't really solve the problem that is being discussed, which is storing users' credentials. All that does is add a new attack surface, stealing the new credentials, and the original credentials are still in the same position.
There is no technical excuse for not hashing passwords.
?
Not sure if serious.
A lot of the mainframe systems running large organisations were written more than 30 years ago and are still the core of the business, so their limitations are the constraints everyone else works around.
> Someone could have demonstrated leadership and developed a ten year plan to fix their legacy problem then.
The large project I work on is 12 years into replacing the mainframe platforms which have run the business for 45+ years, and we're not even halfway through the portfolio. Do not underestimate the complexity of these mainframes and the time & cost needed to fully replace them.
Are banks running their web interface on 30+ year old legacy systems? I'd expect the web stuff to be on much more modern systems, which call upon the 30+ year old stuff to do the underlying financial stuff.
So instead, it seems like the stuff holding just account holder information was given a password field to use on their fancy new HTML 2.0 webpage, but then just mostly left there ever since. The age of the financial side is fairly irrelevant in this scenario.
I'm definitely interested in examples of this
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/massive-cba-outage-traced-to-...
Not specifically related to password security upgrade, but it illustrates the impact of a bank's IT systems going down. Being able to run a credit card transaction and receive your paycheck is fundamental to the fabric of our society. When these processes are disrupted, people get very anxious and things start to fall apart rapidly. When is the last time you insert your card into the reader and thought "I sure hope this works"?
So a bank system that is "up but insecure" is only a recipe to be horribly hacked later.
I rather my bank be down for a few hours and come back online with my money intact than be hacked and drained and but online.
Are there any standards that doing this violates, and if so do banks have a person in the org (or external to the org) that violations of said standard can report to?
> We are talking about password security in a system domain where there are arguably far more valuable assets to secure.
My worry is that because this is such a simple thing, if we allow ourselves to not do the best practice, where does it end? Especially since large organizations have many parts that don't communicate.
I agree we should think critically about risk, but I've also met lots of people who seem to backdate their logic - first they decide it's too onerous/costly to do a thing, then game out a reasonable enough reason why.
The problem with the latter is eventually your focus on compliance and handwaving will bite you hard, and you may not get a chance to be reactive because the breach will be so bad.
You mentioned that only a few banks have the resources to tear down their systems and create a new secure one. What banks are these?
1. This has electronic transactions freely going in and out.
2. This initiates inbound electronic transactions.
3. This only works with you standing in the bank.
Or some variant thereof.
I know this is an apples to oranges comparison, but I just find it weird that payment processors (not the banks, I know I know) are the main driver behind these restaurant IT security measures, but other financial institutions have things like this that they do.
Is this really true? AFAIK illegal account accesses such as phishing etc is fairly commonplace. Criminals steal low value from lots of accounts, and also the way they steal is not really traceable, not at least easily. How would they even know where to send the guns? And also I'm not really convinced that FBI priorizes bank cases, they probably prioritize all cases based on monetary value and maybe some harm factors, but I dont think banks get special treatment on principle. Sounds like bullshit to me to be frank.
(The more I think the more I think it was the FBI, since the person also relayed that crimes against people often got short shrift since unfortunately one's feelings when threatened or harassed don't have an objective dollar amount)
Your assurance is not reassuring.
A lot of good they will do you when a clever hacker from an unknown country logs in to your account, takes some money, and disappears untraceably because the bank's poor IT practices didn't involve enough logging! The bank might not even realize they need to call the FBI. The only practical security solution is to stop the money from being stolen in the first place: law enforcement rarely recovers all of the stolen assets.
What. The. Fuck?
And so, each time, you've reported them to this US-CERT thing the (current) top comment mentions so that proper steps can be taken, riiiiight?
If you know about this and do nothing that's also part of the problem.
Except when these hackers are in China, etc...
No, I don't care that you've grown accustomed to your fancy lifestyle.
No, I don't care that your spouse is gonna shit on you if you take a pay cut until you can find similar work.
No, I don't care that "someone else will take your place and do the same thing".
Sorry - stand up for what's right, or this shit will continue to get worse.
Engineering/architecture have some principles, why the hell shouldn't we?
Signed, Someone Who Left Their Comfy Salary Because of Unethical Wankers
The risk analysis and mitigation discussion for these institutions goes something like this:
1) We cant have good password storage so we will require a 2nd factor and attempt to ensure these systems reside in our most secure network.
2) There is nothing we can do, so we will simply rely on the fact that if someone logs into an account illegally, we send in the men with guns. For some strange reason when a bank calls the FBI things move with a high level of expediency.
There is much more to this than just the technical aspect of "oh my goodness why aren't you hashing your passwords". How much ripping would HN impose on one of these institutions if they attempted a 100% best practices secure password upgrade and then subsequently had a complete IT disaster unfold (I can certainly link articles). For many banks and other financial institutions, going down for even 1 hour is a complete catastrophe. If people can't get their money out right away, they are leaving for the competition and you will likely get dinged by regulators. Bad people will continue to do bad things until the end of time. Killing your business to handle every edge case, even if it seems obvious, is not a good path to go down.
I would also consider this: These banks' IT systems are storing things that many of us would argue are much more valuable than your passwords. A bank's core system also represents the actual monetary value of every customer's account. We are talking about password security in a system domain where there are arguably far more valuable assets to secure. These assets are already implicitly protected by a massive apparatus extending as far as Ohio Class nuclear submarines patrolling the Pacific ocean.