Read back does not mean confirmed, it's basically a double check. What pilots do when they get an instruction they'll respond with the same instruction (but abbreviated).
Example:
ATC: Descend and maintain FL300
Pilot: Cleared for FL 300, XZ 123
Whereby XZ 123 indicates the flight. By reading back the instructions ATC should notice if the pilot heard everything correctly.
That's entirely different than "confirmed". With confirmed there's no double check. Further, unless there's an emergency AFAIK the pilot must follow ATC so no need to "confirm".
Confusion in units is never a good thing.
Telling people in the industry to use nmi or NM seems a lot like telling computer people to use MiB or GiB instead of MB or GB, or to pronounce gif "jiff". They're just not going to change.
Saying it is not going to change is what makes things harder.
[pic (right-most screen)] https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/liebe... [article] https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/12/apollo-flight-contro...
(Earth isn’t a sphere so it’s not exact, but it’s pretty close)
So that's 375m (1230ft) total for anyone wondering.
The turbulence from the engines is enough to cause issues for the next plane. Enough so, that turbulence alone can cause a crash, even if the airplanes never actually touch.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587
And involved in this one, though the situation is harder to assess:
>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587
Funny you mention 587. That was actually the first thing I thought of. That was the one where the pilot slammed the pedals lock to lock in response to turbulence and ripped the vertical stabilizer off. Aircraft of similar size take off similar distances behind 747s all the time. The pilot really reacted badly in the case of 587 though his training was partly at fault. From wikipedia:
"The first officer repeatedly moved the rudder from fully left to fully right... The resulting hazardous sideslip angle led to extremely high aerodynamic loads that separated the vertical stabilizer. If the first officer had stopped moving the rudder at any time before the vertical stabilizer failed, the airplane would have leveled out on its own, and the accident would have been avoided"
>And involved in this one, though the situation is harder to assess:
>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USAir_Flight_427
427 was a hydraulic failure and any source of turbulence (e.g. weather) requiring rudder movements could have raised that issue. IT was part of a larger issue.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues#Secon...
I originally said "Thank you from changing the wording from "implicated" to "cited" because they mean very different things." but you since edited your comment to say "cause" and "involved" which IMO is as accurate on average as "implicated" but with greater standard deviation.
The correct systemic response is to note that wake turbulence is very dangerous for airliners because it may cause pilots to catastrophically misapply rudder.
(Sorry for my many edits to the parent, I didn't realize you'd already replied.)
I don't know but I suspect United did change their training after that. The fact that the pilot reacted the way he did is as much their fault as the pilots. IMO it is a training/human factors issue, not some fundamental issue with turbulence and current following distances.
On the other hand, I would guess that there is still a risk of people-thrown-around-the-cabin type incidents from abnormally close encounters with wake turbulence, and I do not know if the possibility of structural damage can be ruled out, especially if this were to happen at cruising speeds. I think it is probably safe to say that any structural-risk incident would have been within a whisker of being a collision anyway, in which case the measures to avoid the latter cover the former as well.
Do you know whether ATC large plane same-size spacing guidelines around airports have changed much over the years? I don't know whether airliner spacing would have generally increased or decreased, but I'd be surprised if it hasn't changed at all.
Edit: I read more about these flights and I think I agree with you that I'm overstating the risk to airliners from wake turbulence. I was expecting to find increases in separation distances in response to the American flight and instead it looks like the only change made was a training change for rudder control.
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGQlQFn0euI
Wiki article with the story: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Canada_Flight_759
A plane can ascend/descend fast, but generally stick to either 500 or 1000ft/min.
Initially the Wizz Air plane was supposed to descend to FL300, but missed the first instruction, and the second one was incorrectly given and confirmed (read back by the crew means confirmed?) as FL200. The Air Europa flight was at FL290, and the Wizz Air plane got to FL292 (200 feet from FL290) before being instructed to ascend. The cause of the miscommunication was that the frequency used to communicate from the air traffic control to the planes was saturated and many communications collided, meaning multiple communications happened at the same time and were impossible to differentiate, necessitating repeating.
Edit: wasn’t misheard, instruction was incorrectly given.