Now imagine the government said no one should be allowed to pour cement in their basement because it makes it difficult to investigate suspected murderers. That’s what Barr is advocating.
I work closely with cryptography and think about cryptographic freedom mostly the way other people on HN do. I asked a specific question about the Constitution. The debate about whether we should be "allowed" to encrypt things is incredibly boring, we almost certainly don't meaningfully disagree about it, and I'm not interested in having it.
† or "has a right to" or "has a claim on", depending on whose paraphrase you're reading
This is w.r.t once it is known to law enforcement and courts. But that's beside the point - I think they person you're replying to is not necessarily disagreeing with you, just extending on what you wrote.
I don't see how "every man" would ever allow the government to demand a tool maker change their tool for the purposes of future evidence collection when that tool has "privileged" uses.
Although I agree with you that the fourth amendment was not made to make it hard to get a warrant, only to restrict warrants to specific, narrow searches with evidenced probable cause.
The Fifth Amendment, as I understand it, was added as a protection against torture.
Attorney-client privilege, which is much more limited than people think it is (see: current US drama), is fundamental to the working of our legal system, which depends on attorneys to function.
All you're really observing here is that we order some principles above the entitlement of the state to evidence. That's certainly true! But nowhere above that entitlement is there a countervailing general right to personal privacy; my understanding of the system we live in is that that right, to the extent it exists, is ordered lower than the state's right to evidence.
You are mistaken.
While currently under assault, Roe v. Wade is the paradigmatic case for the recognition of doctor-patient confidentiality (i.e. "privilege") by the Federal government.
> The fundamental right to privacy, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution, protects against unwarranted invasions of privacy by federal or state entities, or arms thereof. As early as in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the U. S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the doctor-patient relationship is one which evokes constitutional rights of privacy. [0]
[0] https://healthcare.uslegal.com/doctor-patient-confidentialit...
With all due respect, I disagree with your assertion that "the federal rules of evidence [doesn't] recognize doctor-patient privilege".
SCOTUS's saying they
> simply hold that this record [Whalen] does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [0]
implies that there could be an invasion of a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, just not in this case.
While you are strictly correct that this is not a representation of doctor-patient privilege, SCOTUS's assertion that Whalen does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment suggests the possibility that some distribution of medical data could violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a side note, your assertion that the "same site says explicitly that it doesn't" recognize doctor-patient privilege is questionable. Would you mind pointing out which passage is explicit about this?
[0] https://healthcare.uslegal.com/doctor-patient-confidentialit...
https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/doctor-patient-privilege/
You'll find this helpful sentence:
In the U.S, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not recognize doctor-patient privilege.
I assume we're just nerding out for its own sake, because none of this has anything to do with my argument.
Thank you for clarifying.
Nerding out is a good way characterizing where we've gotten and--as I suspected earlier and am now certain--I don't understand what "Federal Rules of Evidence" means in the larger discussion of what kinds of disclosure would violate someone's constitutional rights.
<thinking face emoji>
Based on my interested but layperson understanding of the law, my understanding is that it's an open question about the extent to which the Constitution provides a right to privacy. But I do not understand it to be an open question, or at least "as open" a question, about whether the principle of access to evidence is ordered higher than that right to privacy, whatever it may be.
(As, just, like, a person shooting the shit on a message board, I should say that of course I value privacy highly, and can think of a number of situations in which I'd order privacy higher than access to evidence! But I can also think of situations where it'd be the other way around. So, for instance: I highly value my right to discuss sensitive political topics privately, without being susceptible to dragnet surveillance trying to find "terrorists" by combing through everyone's messages. But at the same time, I'd like to see Wall Street executives be held more culpable for the harmful decisions they make to abuse their power and access, and those Wall Street execs no doubt feel a strong privacy interests in protecting their discussions about how to, say, price synthetic securities.)
One Justice cited the fifth amendment to get there, another the ninth -- and plenty of legal scholars have argued the ninth amendment basically acts as justification for finding privacy provisions in the Bill of Rights that aren't specifically mentioned in the other eight amendments.
You're right that right to privacy is an open question of sorts (especially under the Bill of Rights), but there is nearly a century of case law protecting it in various forms.
A challenge is that privacy itself is an emergent concept (this is my view, not one widely shared), which is a response to ever-more invasive or capable technologies. As such, much of the relevant caselaw and legal thinking is fairly new, and reflects advances in publishing (Brandeis and Warren), recording, transmission, and detection.
There are some historical antecedants.
Some of the more interesting non-legal-scholar work has come from Jill Lepore in recent years. I'd suggest her work as at the least a good entry point. She's a historian, and should be copiously documenting sources which may be of interest. Unseen: A History of Privacy (2013) https://scholar.harvard.edu/jlepore/presentations/unseen-his...
The Unwanted Gaze by Jeffrey Rosen (2001) addresses concerns as the Internet age was beginning to mature. https://www.worldcat.org/title/unwanted-gaze-the-destruction...
The EFF and ACLU have extensive resources on privacy, though not necessarily of specific legal focus:
https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology
For current legal opinion, Solve and Schwartz might be a standard (I honestly don't know, though it gets prominant mention):
https://www.worldcat.org/title/privacy-law-fundamentals/oclc...
I think the government is on the wrong side of this issue, but I don't think they're making the broad "going dark" concern up. I think technologists need to engage more fully with the law enforcement concerns here rather than dismissing them.
If Facebook/WhatsApp's system was built to put them in a position to incriminate you after the fact, then probably the kind of criminal who would use it is the kind you'd convict by other means.
That leaves you with the choice of whether or not to incriminate yourself.
If you are talking globally each country has its laws or no laws on the matter (as you’d expect there are also contradictory court rulings within a country/ state )
In a world where my provider encrypts, the more ironclad self-incrimination protection does not apply. And there are various loopholes to pressure the provider to enable bulk collection.
In a world of e2e everywhere, the participants must be targeted, and they have the benefit of the 5th amendment.
I need to think about this some more.
"Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.''
I feel like there are a couple of parallels to public servants/officials in contemporary societies to be made here (completely unrelated to your main point).
You're right that there are warrantless exceptions (most notably, Horton, which clarified the plain view doctrine), but I'm not aware of any case law that compels a third-party to break encryption/build a backdoor in order to satisfy a warrant. That was the genesis of the Apple v. FBI case. Even Lavabit, the rulings were largely procedural and didn't get to the merits of Lavabit's claims against the government's attempts to coerce a service provider into turning into a surveillance apparatus.
"My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognized as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable."
Note that this statement was in agreement to a court decision saying that government wiretapping of a public phone booth was unconstitutional, because when you're in a phone booth with the door closed, you don't expect people to overhear you, and thus it's an unreasonable search and a violation of constitutional rights for the government to record your conversation. Note that this doesn't depend on notions of "trespass" or specific areas, and rather depends on a person's expectation of privacy:
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
OP is almost certainly correct that dragnet, warrantless searching of private message data by the government is a violation of constitutional rights, although it'll take a Supreme Court case to make a real ruling on the subject.
[1] Katz v. the United States (1967) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katz_v._United_States
[2] Carpenter v. the United States (2018) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carpenter_v._United_States
It's not my understanding that the Constitution was designed to make it difficult to investigate crimes. As I understand it, the US largely inherits the common law principle that the public is entitled to every person's evidence. The backstory I understand behind the Fourth Amendment is that the British used "general warrants" as a tool of harassment – where a general warrant was essentially a slip of paper that deputized a group of soldiers to toss houses and confiscate goods on a whim. The intent wasn't to make warrants hard to get, or to gate all conceivable searches on warrants, but rather to make sure that what warrants were issued were at least particularized with a real, defensible purpose.
Another observation that bolsters my particular understanding is the variety of conditions in which the Supreme Court, going all the way back into the era of the founders, authorized warrantless searches. The border search exception, for instance, dates back to the founders.
My feelings about law enforcement and encryption are complicated but hew mostly to the HN party line. However, I feel sometimes like I arrive at my conclusions in a very different way than people who invoke the Constitution here.