His point is that the index funds don't own the stocks at all; they trade derivatives like futures and CDO's that mimic the movement of the stocks in leveraged fashion, and the more people who dump their money into index funds without doing their own research, the more leveraged the funds become.
He's warning that in the next serious downturn, over-leverage may cause cascading collapse of index funds and the economy with them, like it did in the mortgage finance crisis.
This is misleading, I think. Depends on the fund. Some seek to match the benchmark through a certain exposure to derivatives and synthetic things. Others hold the stocks in proportion.
The vanguard funds I'm invested in don't have much synthetics - they own the stocks
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239710/ishares-russell-2...
What? Where did you see that? Not only do the index ETF issuers own the stock but I believe they are legally obligated to do so.
But, granting that Burry is right and you're interpreting him correctly, what is the average person with a couple bucks to invest supposed to do instead of passive investments?
Surely we can't recommend actively managed funds, funds that don't even earn back their fees. And, if not passive investing, and not actively managed funds, then…what, exactly?
As to institutionalizing this stability, it would be nice if index funds offered fund choices that prohibited selling or trading for one, two, three decades. Since you as the investor would be adding information to the market ("I'm not an index fund band-wagoner, I understand buy-and-hold and I will practice what I preach") you would be rewarded with better returns in exchange for signaling your intentions and acting as a cushion when everyone else is panicking.
In 2008, the crash happened because suddenly Wyle E. Coyote realized there was gravity when he ran off the cliff. Mortgages were actually defaulting on a very high rate, but people put blindfolds on and didn't want to see. It wasn't just a "psychological overreaction" but real fear and panic as those same investors were trying to squeeze through the same exit door as everyone else.
There is still some reasonable fear in 2019 that large financial institutions will choose to make money at the expense of the economy.
Panic is quite literally a psychological overreaction.
No strategy/advice last forever
There is no such thing as passive investing per se.
So instead of recommending fund, it's better to recommend them to learn of the fundamentals of investing instead.
Every study has shown that people do not get rewarded appropriately for the risk they take on when they move away from diversification.
Unfortunately it's not clear how to tell which fund managers would actually be able to succeed at this.
That's pretty interesting.
In 2019, the average daily trading volume of Berkshire Hathaway (class A) was 0.04% of the total shares outstanding. If all people that held this stock were forced to sell 1% of the total shares outstanding, look out!
On the other hand, Roku has averaged 15.6% this year, with a standard deviation of 10. 1% of total shares isn't even going to be noticed.
The SP500 has a long tail 150M on a 20B dollar company, which is the median, is 0.75% per day that’s quite a bit of motion normally but you expect volatility to go up on a major sell off.
Anyway, if 1% of all money is removed from index funds on the same day whatever caused that is also going to cause the market is going to crash and crash hard. It would take something like an outbreak of Ebola in NYC to get that kind of a reaction.
In the example you give, this should result in Berkshire Hathaway Class A to have a very small weight in an index fund weighted this way.
Looking at the holdings of VOO, as of July 31, 2019, It holds 806 shares of Berkshire Hathaway (Class A) (worth ~$249 million), but about 37 million shares of Class B, worth ~$7.6 billion.
https://investor.vanguard.com/etf/profile/portfolio/VOO/port...
Or maybe he's counting on their low volume? :-)
I'd like to point out that while this may be the case for traditional mutual funds, it is not for ETFs. ETFs don't redeem shares for cash they redeem them for equities in the underlying index. So ETFs don't actually buy or sell any securities unless they rebalance.
A) the standard lock-up period of a fund, or
B) an ETF under strong selling pressure can be halted by the exchange. Some contracts presumably allow an ETF manager to halt sales if high outflows and low liquidity? Certainly can occur with funds.
Day 1: (before crash) price : 200$ S&P 500 weight : 2%
Day 2 :next day market crashes. Acme is very low volume so price crashes to 1$ .
what happens next ? do all the EFT that follow S&P have to sell all ACME for 1$ because it is not in the S&P 500 anymore.
Day 5 : ACME jump back to 200 $ and is back in the S&P 500.
So my question is what would have happen to a passive investor. if he bought 1000$ worth of ETF right before the crash. Will he still have a 1000$ dollars at the end of it .
Please show me a one day 99% drop on a stock. Trading would be halted well before that to prevent manipulation or errors.
LULD is the one that applies to single stocks. It only results in a five minute halt, as I said.
The market-wide circuit breaker can halt the entire market for a full day, but only in response to a 20% move in S&P500, not a single stock.
More info on the 10% trading halt rule: https://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=TradeHalts
Index funds generally aren't super rigidly defined in terms of 1% Company A to 1 % Company B to 3% Company C, etc. which grants them leeway to precisely not have to sell off their assets in precise ratios to maintain a certain portfolio composition.
Index funds do not seek to perfectly replicate whatever sector/market they're seeking to index, but rather they are trying to approximately track the overall change. You can ignore portions of the market while still tracking it to a very close degree (i.e. sampling a distribution).
Indexes typically don't have a fixed set of underlying securities. CDOs do. Your index fund typically won't tank because one of it's holdings become unprofitable, the fund will adjust reducing shares of said fund and thus reducing risk.
That doesn't happen with a CDO. If you're AAA mortgage holder starts having financial troubles, you can't readjust the CDO to reduce exposure.
Take an S&P 500 index as an example. If company 500 starts having a crappy quarter and falls out, what happens to your index? You dump the old 500 for the new one.
This isn't too say they aren't without risk. Just that it is a completely different financial vehicle than a CDO. So different that trying to make comparisons isn't really prudent.
I share your understanding of the article, it’s not about “index bad active good”, it’s about, “is there a problem when a lot of investors have to move quickly”. I wonder if there is some analysis of this during the last crash.
Flash crash gets resolved quickly and is transparent to non-participants because there is a lot of money willing to buy on dips. But fast trading money only buys and sells what they perceive to be highly liquid assets -- there are few things that scare them more than being stuck with an open trade.
The scenario Burry describes is akin to CDO crash. Naively, most CDO assets were not problematic and many/most of the problem ones had an underlying asset of some value guaranteeing the debt. What caused the crash was lack of liquidity that started a vicious circle.
Index fund scenario could be similar: less liquid stocks that are big components of major indices would crash with unknown systematic consequences. Even if only 10% of passive index investors heads for the exits we could see broad, long term damage. And they could: pension funds have been investing huge sums into indices and a targeted PR / a few headlines of the type "look what those financiers doing with worker's money" may nudge a lot of money out of stocks.
On the other side, it is easy to make conspiracy theories on any subject.
And of course, that company can, subject only to it's own chosen limitations, "print" SPY shares and sell them. So there's never any shortage of those.
When people transact in SPY, the trades are satisfied from those buckets. The cash bucket for investors selling SPY, the reserve shares bucket for investors buying. Those buckets are then refilled by the firm behind SPY buying and selling shares so that their share reserve and cash reserve remain at useful levels.
But let's now say there's heavy selling, for whatever reason. Sells really exceed buys and ... the cash bucket runs dry. Well, now sales stop, potentially indefinitely. The company will try to refill that bucket quickly, but there's absolutely no guarantee they will succeed, and there's no timeframe. Because the price for redemptions is only determined when they refill the bucket, you have no control over when this price is determined. It could be days after your order went through. Most index funds also technically have the right to just suspend redemptions entirely, indefinitely. Because of the amount of money in index funds, this will exhaust liquidity on actual shares relatively quickly and the whole market will freeze (because: no buyers)
Burry's claim is that if this ever happens, and investors find themselves stuck in index funds with no way out, there is nothing that will resolve that situation. Buyers won't want in, because once in, no way out. Sellers will panic and REALLY want out. This situation will self-reinforce until the market is driven into the ground.
0. some random situation causes that sellers exceed buyers for an index fund enough to initially exhaust the liquidity buffer of that fund
1. liquidity buffer in an index fund is empty
2. because of this transactions in the index fund stop
3. this causes panic, meaning less buyers, more sellers
4. goto 1, with situation getting worse every iteration
It won't be a "flash" crash, you'll just be locked in your index funds until the crash is complete.
It's hard to argue that this situation is impossible, that it cannot develop. It also seems to me that his conclusion that if this ever happens, it'll self-reinforce is correct. That said, we are pretty far from this happening.
Even if one of the underlying stocks becomes illiquid, a big enough price divergence on all of the other liquid stocks would make it profitable to eat the loss or hold the illiquid ones (risky, but remember, there are many authorized participants competing with each other so if there is some way to make an easy arbitrage profit, they will find a way). You'd basically need the entire market to become illiquid.
[0]: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/authorizedparticipant.a...
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/24/when-do-circuit-breakers-kic...
Or, for that matter, a bank run?
This is due to his "bigger and bigger crowds, same exits" analogy: individuals easily move through doors at will; but if a crowd rushes out through the same door, injuries happen.
His premise is that many stocks that index funds invest in have low liquidity (small door): half of stocks in SP500 trades less than $150M a day. This is tiny (he quotes total market cap of indices of $150 trillion). What happens if there is a small, but synchronized outflow for any reason? If customers ask for 1% of index funds to be sold, index funds have to sell 1% of their holdings in the exact ratios defined by the index, including stocks with low trading volumes. Which is a problem, as there may be no one to sell them to, so prices of those stocks may crash and create a big panic causing additional sales of index funds bringing down bigger chunks of the market.
That is the gist of it I think.