I was recently chided and reproached by the HN mods for knocking scooter companies (even got the old “this isn’t personal, but don’t...”).
the point is with any SV funded company you don’t need revenue or even to be a viable business. You just need SV money (I think Bird has already burned through $415M and now asking for this $300M) to launch the business and “grow” the user base and/or metrics(someone here once fittingly described the model as selling $5 bills for $1).
So now you raise $500M sell $5 bills for $1, the startup staggers their sales so they show constant growth month over month, in reality you raise additional rounds to get more VCs to buy in and help market the company, then finally when you show tremendous growth (metrics), show revenue of $100M, then you file for a IPO and explain away the losses of $400M by saying at any point you can “flip the switch” and cut costs by no longer reinvesting in growth but make profits. Then at IPO you cash out and dump the shit company that’s never made a dollar on the public because all they see is the media pushed by SV/VCs with the media contacts, the big SV investor names, 100% growth month over month metrics, and the hope they to will get rich.
On the contrary, I chided you for posting in the flamewar style (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20347016), which we don't want on HN and which the site guidelines ask you not to do. We don't care about scooter companies, we care about the signal/noise ratio of HN threads.
Sure, there are examples like Blue Apron that seem to fit your narrative, but they are the exception.
If your narrative was correct, hedge funds or other intelligent investors would quickly catch on and short funds that purely track tech IPO's and make a killing. Obviously playing the markets is not this easy.
Can you even explain what that means?
In my estimation the companies are staying private longer so the VCs can blow up the valuations pre IPO higher than anytime in history, whereas, if the startup IPO’d from the start there is no way to continue the growth while sustaining the loss (in the real world business have to make a profit to continue) and VCs couldn’t make the same profit they do now, but in all other respects the risk would be the same.
Anyway it wouldn’t be to hard to look at the IPO of VC backed tech startups and determine what % had profits vs operating losses (obviously my guess is the majority are IPOing at losses). Then, a further analysis could be done to see if the average startup company valuations/market caps declined post IPO and how much pre IPO investors/shareholders took off the table.
Edit: looks like since 2010 there have been 100+ tech unicorns ($1B+ valuation) and ~2/3 didn’t make profit. Wish I could readily calculate how much VCs made taking those companies public, maybe someone can link an article/data.
Bird seems to fit the cynicism just as well as Blue Apron. I'm unclear how the above ever turns into anything viable.
Here's a counterpoint why it might be a viable business: it unlocks a new market. Scooters enable a new class of trips: trips between 0.5 and 2 miles. There's currently not a lot of trips happening in that distance... below that you can walk, above that you take transit, but that coffee shop 1 mile and change away is just enough of a pain in the ass that it's not worth going there. Unless there was something that made it easy to go that distance.
Scooters are a new modality of transport that opens up an entirely new class of trips. Combined with the fact that the population is broadly trending towards dense urban environments, you have a whole new market you've unlocked.
Scooters aren't about replacing Lyft rides -- no one uses a scooter for a full hour -- scooters are about servicing trips that are too short for an lyft.
You need to walk around and find one. And during rush hour, it won't be at the Caltrain station because they're already taken and distributed around the city.
It's clear as day that there's no way this is going to work at scale in order to justify a multi-billion dollar business.
Lyft and Uber have shown that you can improve matching logistics by bolting on games like demand charges and utilizing various supply-side nudges to direct assets to where you need them to be. These are solvable problems. It seems like you're saying you would happily use the service if there was more of it available.
You need to flood the market with scooters so that people get scooters when they want it but cities won't allow it. Plus, it's cost prohibitive. Creating a new market is NOT a solvable problem, especially at the scale of funding that they have received. You can't throw a billion dollars and expect that a new market will create itself. That's why Bird is going to die, probably by the end of 2020.
Which is a problem when the scooter companies lose money on every single scooter they put into the world.
Being popular alone is enough to grift SV investors who have money to burn, but when that well dries out they can't afford to subsidize these things to the extent required to keep them useful to people. If you can't find scooters they lose their utility, but the companies won't be able to afford leaving so much excess capacity around.
Also, the scooters have widened my options for lunch from maybe 3 choices within walking distance to something like 50. Sure it's a luxury, but for a few extra dollars, it is nice to be able to get a pita or burger instead of always a burrito.
To get that with a bike share program, bike share companies likely need to accept that their bikes get used less than once a day, on average. That means that users must pay for more than one bicycle. That, in turn, would make ownership cheaper than bikeshare programs.
Where I live the scooters are mostly in very concentrated areas that few people would use them for commuting, either because they live in the suburbs (so far away it'd be impractical) or downtown (so close that you could walk nearly as fast as a scooter ride after accounting for sitting in rush hour traffic).
And just like car rentals for regular users ownership is much cheaper. Tourism or some other niche maker surely exists, but the overhead assuming they need to break even is huge.
(I’m not saying it’s for all, but for me, the shared scooter could not be replaced by having my own, which is the argument that kicked of this subthread)
Bike shares have comparable utility with vastly lower costs, and often can’t break even.
It sounds like the problem is that it's never where you need it. Unless you had 10x as many scooters as people and they were littered literally everywhere.
As I understand it the fixed bikeshare costs are controllable and those systems are not losing money at anywhere near the rate of Bird.
EBikes will be rolling out soon for some of these systems too so that solves another one of the disadvantages they have against eScooters.
And this is in Austin. Yeah, right now I'll get sweaty, because we hit 107f heat index every other day. During the winter I can bike ten+ miles in jeans and a t-shirt without getting sweaty.
An electric scooter is a fraction of the cost of an ebike, so you can have more of them, creating a denser transport network. Not as durable, sure, but why not let the investors deal with that risk?
And as much as I'd love the US be like the Dutch and have personal bikes go everywhere, I don't bike to the coffeeshop a mile away because the only bikes I see locked up outside in my city are missing, lets say, critical pieces. Bikeshare and scootershare offload the risk of personal property theft.
That doesn’t guarantee you will have a bike available at all time (if it breaks down, you won’t get a new one in a second), but neither do bikeshare programs.
offload the risk of personal property theft
... which somebody always pays for (the customers, if the business survives, investors if it fails).Perhaps Bird should be looking at hooking up with these sorts of businesses as ways to increase the reach of their locations, either as a co-marketing effort or using the shops as a source of revenue (e.g., sharing value for each ride to & purchase at the shop)?
GP's description just provoked me to notice a new angle
Bird is dumping these scooters in cities, and is now working with them to become the preferred provider who is allowed to do this in that city, while others aren't allowed yet. Having that head start is a significant advantage in capturing marketshare. And while a second or later mover can come along and dump their own scooters and convince people to get their app, Bird can then choose to leverage their relationships with governments and businesses and dent the progress of an upstart.
The whole point of VC funding is to build out the capital-intensive parts quickly and develop moats that make switching to later comers difficult. Discussions about how Uber has no moat come up from time to time, but ventures like Uber Eats that form a captive market are demonstrably moat-like. The real question is whether Bird can develop such a moat, or is simply laying the groundwork for some other knockoff to come along later, by which time Bird is low on cash, and all hurdles that would have impacted similar companies have been cleared by Bird.
Maybe they are holding out to become a future Uber Scooters acquisition like Jump Bikes.
One idea I would like to see is Bird rides sponsored by the business you're going to, kind of like how some businesses reimburse a parking garage ticket. It looks like Uber has started offering a program like this [1] as well.
Guadalajara has a "mibici" bike program ($20/year) where you undock a bike, get 45 minutes on it, and plug it back into a rack somewhere, else the costs mount up. Always assumed these scooter programs worked like that.
Being able to dump the scooter anywhere makes me realize why people consider them such an urban nuisance. Not really something I'd task the average person to do with forethought or courtesy unless it hits them in the wallet.
This business model was never going to work.
One cannot say that there were no previous experiences to learn from...
When it's not, it may seem like they are deluded or scammers. Maybe they are, but a more charitable interpretation is that business -- especially new businesses -- are like six blind men and an elephant, which means people can strongly disagree about the nature of the beast while both parties are simultaneously right about the pieces they know and understand and both are equally wrong in the aggregate.
You make a paper airplane. You toss it into the wind and see if it flies. No amount of debate (concerning what should fly) changes whether it did or did not actually fly.
1) compelling if it all works out. Invest clear-eyed and hope the founding team figures out the roadblocks. Greedy but not stupid; most successful startups start by 'doing things that don't scale.'
2) Pattern-matching / top-down portfolios. Mobile apps. Sharing economy. Subscription businesses. Electric Vehicles. Internet of Things. A lot of investors decide on themes for portfolio before they look at investments. Scooter sharing ticks a lot of boxes.
3) Adverse selection. It's a simple idea - anyone can grasp scooters as subscription. So the simplest-minded investors chose this rather than more subtle ideas.
4) as another comment suggested, investors are playing a game of musical chairs between funding rounds. Chamath Palihapitiya claims this as the reason his firm is stepping back from VC -- so he's walking the talk here https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/10/start-up-economy-is-a-ponzi-...
I have come to the realization that VCs are really bad at distributing resource. For all these pedigrees to show for, they all seems to be playing musical chairs.
Part of the problem I see is that most VCs don't have a founder background and most of them you meet are pretty arrogant.
If you think of VCs as totally independent, open-minded, critically thinking professionals, dutifully providing a financial service, then no. You pick the VC for the idea rather than the idea for the VC.
The second case is the ideal, but assumes highly-competent VCs and founders with equalish leverage. I think the perverse incentives for VC partners (read Palihapitiya) and the lack-of-prestige factors for first-time founders break the model. But this seems to be more true for second-time founders with moderate success under their belt.
There's no way it's that low. Maybe 90% of VC-backed startups, and even then I think it depends on how you massage the definition of 'fail'
The informal definition we think of day-to-day is fairly fuzzy. There's nuance in differentiating a small business operated by a few people from a startup. Being venture-backed is a simple differentiator but there are still legitimate startups this would exclude, e.g., serial founders who don't need to raise or products that make money early.
With respect to "fail"... is an acquihire or an even-money, 1-3x exit etc a "failure". Probably, yes for the VC, but not necessarily for the founder. Accelerators are incentivized to count "successes" liberally as well.
With a more broad definition of startup, it's easy to see the failure rate at 99%+.
90% failure rate comes from research by Small Biz Trends
Also real estate businesses only have a 42% failure? So I have a greater than 50% chance of becoming a real estate mogul? I just don't buy it, and I don't believe those other numbers either.
And the only source they cite on the website, http://www.moyak.com/papers/business-startups-entrepreneurs...., doesn't really lend any explanation to their numbers.
I think their data is wildly skewed by sampling bias, as they claim to get their data from interviewing failed founders. Welp, they never interviewed me - how many other people have they never interviewed because they simply never knew the company existed? How many founders, after failing, go out of their way to talk about their failure?
VCs have a strong incentive to create a story that starting a company has a greater chance of success than it does, because it's low-risk for them and they want a churn of potential investment prospects.
I think 1% is a much more realistic number than 10%, unless we're limiting ourselves to Sequoia-backed post-Series A companies.
I am not joking-- I'm willing to bet that there is a direct correlation between inequality and stupid products/business models making it to market. When you can just keep trying new things until something sticks, you're not going to try very hard or act with much caution.
Bird isn’t WeWork. Yes, they’re unviable on a unit basis now. But that’s a hardware problem. They’ve grabbed market share; now they must build margins through R&D. The traditional model is R&D first market capture second, but there isn’t a fundamental reason not to go the other way when the R&D is reasonably feasible.
If I start seeing them around enough I might go to the trouble, but that requires a fair amount of density to start working.
If some new company with deep enough pockets starts promising No Unlock Fee and $0.15/min, they could quickly capture a lot of Bird, Lime, etc's market share. They'd be burning cash at an unsustainable rate, but there is no moat between these businesses at the moment.
I think it's a social engineering problem. If the scooters didn't get routinely destroyed by people 1. smashing them into curbs because it's fun or 2 tossing them in the river because they're obnoxious / blocking the sidewalk, I believe they'd be already be profitable, or at least close.
People hate the scooters. People who ride the scooters hate the scooters. Hell, I like the scooters, and I hate the scooters. :-)
I would also like to see them ticketing the riders for reckless driving/endangering of the people. I almost had an accident 2 weeks ago because some stupid riders decided to race on the street. I also see some of them riding in the sidewalks zipping through pedestrians and many times hitting their bags.
And you’ll see that most scooter riders on sidewalks are going max speed. It has made walking in cities with these things a lot more annoying, and it was already bad enough with cars but at least cars are separated from walkers.
Strong operations will allow bird to continue to cut costs.
(I'm hoping) There's still room to innovate on winterized, electric, single person products.
They mostly replace walking, which people do year-round, throughout the day, and well into the late night. At least this is true in my neighborhood.
There's almost certainly a viable business. At the end of the day, it's a question of whether the unit economics will work out. These scooters cost $1K and on average, each scooter gets ridden ten times a day with an average fare of $5. It doesn't take rocket science to see a profitable solution even with maintenance costs. The problem right now is that these companies are being extremely wasteful in order to capture market share.
FTA: ”revenue shrank sharply to only about $15 million”. That’s per quarter, so about $160,000 a day. At your claimed $50 revenue a day, that would be 3,200 scooters. Bird operates in over 100 cities worldwide (https://www.bird.co/cities/), so for that to be true, at least one of those cities would have less than 32 scooters.
⇒ it would surprise me if each scooter gets used even once a day, on average.
I know that the self driving bit is far from trivial (understatement of the decade) but at very low speed you can stop, get out of the way, phone home for some help.
Simplified scenario, and likely full of holes, but you get my idea.
If scooters keep to the road, they are perfectly fine. When they drive on sidewalks, eventually one of them will be biting my elbow.
I see scooteridiots going 15+ MPH on the sidewalk all the time.
Not sure what the collaboration/execution would be, but that's my first thought.
The only way they can make it more cost beneficial is if they charge less if the rider drops off their scooters at a charging station and higher costs if they just dump the scooter anywhere. But that is more costs for Bird.
Second is if they franchise out the business to "entrepreneurs" that handle things for them and they just concentrate on the app. But that's not a multi-billion dollar business.
There is no path where Bird becomes a viable business that grows into its absurd valuation.