I think that’s the scenario Google had in mind when designing this feature. For enterprise users, where the enterprise controls the hardware, the policy-level controls actually have teeth, because people don’t have root over the devices in their possession. For everyone else, it’s not “real security”, but rather just a gateway drug to get you used to the workflow that “real security” would provide in an enterprise context.
(Context: I used to work at IBM, and they had a very similar setup—company issued laptop, app that enforces MDM profile installation, VPN that checks with the app to ensure MDM is active before connecting, email servers only accessibly through said VPN, and, on top of all that, a policy-enforcing email app [IBM Notes] where you can delete already-sent things out of other enterprise-users’ inboxes, send expiring emails, etc.)
It's not possible to do what Gmail wants to do without a SCIF.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Inform...
If not, consider that you might be making your own broadly wrong assumptions.
The thing that a lot of these measures protect against is not so much a targeted attack, it's stupid user tricks. It's not protection against Jane the Spy extracting as much information as she can, it's a measure against Danny the drunk who leaves his laptop at a bar or sitting in the back seat of the car where it's visible and stolen.
There are also likely a lot of places where it would be illegal to use something like this with auto expiring messages, though hopefully most such places won't be using Gmail.
This could be a useful feature when dealing with PHI, legal, HR, etc.
This seems like it should be true, but having worked with end users in the past I would not take this for granted
Disc: Googler
Unless you were on a Fedora workstation.
That was a fun discovery. Never figured out who at IT I should inform before I quit.
The only way for this to work is to restrict the user freedom so much it will:
- cost a huge amount of money
- lower the productivity
- kill the mood of everybody
My take on this is that if your industry really needs this kind of feature, either you suck as a human being and I don't want to work for you, or you are doing something amazing and secretive and in this case you don't use gmail.
On the other hand, that means there's no reason to resort to something as complicated as JS injection or dev tools. Screenshots will usually work fine, because messages aren't threaded, so you'll likely get the entire message showing up on one page. They do block Ctrl-S, they use a click handler that prevents it from reaching the browser. Very fiendish, very clever. Except that the save button still works in the menu.
On the plus side, I'm now wondering if that, "go to the top of your menu and hit the file->save button" exploit would make me eligible for a bug bounty, since according to their documentation I should need malicious software to download the message. I guess Chrome falls into that category though?
Wow, so it kills your offline productivity as well, and of course make back ups and archiving harder. I know it's kinda of the point, but I haven't realized the implications of it until you said so.
If you click the "learn more" in gmail it says that ^. Gmail seems pretty upfront about what "confidentiality mode" does.
Even this is really poorly worded. You don't need a "malicious" program on your computer, you just need to go to your browser menu and hit the print button.
This still makes it sound like the average user won't be able to save your email unless they're doing some kind of tech mumbo-jumbo -- that your real risk is if an IT person gets a hold of it. But printing or saving a web page are basically the first thing I would teach anyone to do if I were mentoring them on how to use a computer.
Probably every secretary in your office already knows how to get around this restriction.
Saving the webpage itself works fine though -- which again, is a browser feature your secretary probably knows about and is comfortable using.
I guess my objection to the idea that this is just removing deniability is that it really doesn't feel to me like it's being marketed that way. I wouldn't call a service like this "confidential mode", I would call it something like "auto-delete mode". Maybe I'm just arguing over semantics though.
Doesn't seem to be that easy. You're probably not going to get a copy without taking a screenshot, opening up developer tools or digging into your browser's cache.
Assuming you don't want to save the HTML page, you still might not even need to download a separate program to screenshot it. New installs of Firefox just have a button on the toolbar labeled, "Take a Screenshot". It'll grab the entire page without forcing you to do any scrolling, and doesn't require you to know anything about HTML. I tested, and it bypasses all of the security features on confidential emails.
People are arguing that this is designed to prevent accidental sharing, which is a really good point that I think I agree with overall. However, HN is a tech site and I'm seeing comments that say the only way you could beat this is to dig into your developer tools.
If a nontrivial portion of HN users think this service is more secure than it actually is, how much more uninformed are ordinary users? Saving a web page is not going to be a difficult problem for most people in your office to solve. So my objection here would be, Google isn't doing a good enough job of informing even tech-literate people of just how easy this is to circumvent.
A CEO is going to look at this and think, "well, I guess they're doing voodoo magic so most people in my office won't be able to share." The reality is, pretty much anyone in your office who wants to be able to beat this will be able to figure out how to do so.
Also, I can think of a lot of ways to bypass the “confidentiality” settings that require no malware whatsoever. Not only is their giant asterisk hidden, it’s wildly inaccurate and misleading.
I guess me exercising my right to do whatever I want with my bits on my computer is me having "malicious programs". What in the actual fsck.
Recipients who do not have malicious programs on their computer also may still be able to copy or download your messages or attachments.
Although on further consideration, my previous comment may actually be wrong: "malicious programs" includes ones that attempt to violate the user's right to copy, and recipients who do not have the malicious program Gmail on their computer might not be able to copy or download your messages or attachments.
On top of that self deleting email will make it also a bit harder to prove that the screenshot is real - unless you get a court order to get the senders outbox folder from google and the data still exists there.
Except it isn't deleted from your send folder.
It's not unusual for whole sales organizations in particular industries have all emails archived under legal hold requirements (whether sent or received.) Another set of organizations will purge all of the same email older than than a certain date.
None of these measures are particularly hard to defeat for a bright user, but many of the risks at the company-level are mitigated. This is mostly to solve challenges with regulation or company certification, but it can make a real difference when someone is handling a privacy incident.
I've come to the conclusion that these products are just to cover the low-hanging fruit situations of someone accidentally doing something that they shouldn't have. In other words, it's a UI integrated "DO NOT FORWARD" message from an e-mail.
Nonsense, it does a great job of discouraging people from forwarding, copying, printing or downloading the emails contents.
Sure, it'll do nothing with a malicious recipient but incompetent recipients are vastly more common than malicious recipients.
It's really bizarre that so many people on HN can't seem to understand this. Do you guys ever interact with other human beings?
If they were saying, "this feature makes it clear to your employees that they shouldn't forward this email" then this entire HN thread would not exist.
It can't stop malicious actors, of course.
Or for the less technically inclined, opening the email on your phone/tablet and put it in a photocopier.
Google is making an entirely different claim about controlling the actions of a third party. It's fundamentally impossible to do what Google is claiming.
When I was in college (early 2000s) a local company sold notes/study guides for different courses. But they were printed in black text on dark green paper to prevent photocopying and sharing.
Good idea on their part but I used my digital camera to take photos of the pages and cranked up the details to make them look like blackish text on whiteish paper. Ended up selling them to all my friends.
I do remember some app not "letting" me screenshot something with stock Android, which I felt to be a violation of my freedom. Obviously in my case just use a modified Android ROM without the silly anti-screenshotting logic, or screenshot it with adb over USB, but for the less-technically inclined, take a picture of the phone.
Bank apps tend to do that. When I first hit this issue, it also felt like a violation of my freedom, and it was also very annoying because I badly needed to make that screenshot.
Source - same discussion years ago at Microsoft when Windows introduced this at an OS level to prevent screenshots of confidential mail.
I actually tried the "wiresharking my own cables" approach, but because it's encrypted, you also need to dump the ephemeral encryption keys. There's a simple guide on how to do this here: https://jimshaver.net/2015/02/11/decrypting-tls-browser-traf...
Their silly UI won't, but what about HTTPS? Won't wiresharking your own cables only get you the ciphertext from the HTTPS session which would be useless to you without the ephemeral key?
And if even this is still too "technical" for a user, I have seen people take literal shots of their screens, with their phone camera or whatever.
However, I've found you can print confidential emails if you comment-out/disable all the @media print rules using Firefox developer tools: https://grokprivacy.org/2018/06/24/archiving-self-destructin...
Nobody believes fences stop criminals, and nobody believes Gmail has ended the DRM arms race.
I agree with the thrust of your comment, but this isnt true. Measures like this do prevent some crime. When i didnt lock my car and someone stole the gift cards out of it, locking the doors would have prevented it. Just because the car is still stealable doesnt mean door locks are security theater. Putting an unlocked package cabinet for deliveries on your porch lowers incidences of theft without making it impossible.
Then why is every military base surrounded by a fence?
I simply don't understand how they think they can get away with this foolishness. I can forward, copy, print, or download ANYTHING that passes over my ethernet cables. Your silly UI will ultimately never stop me from wiresharking my own cables in my own home and doing whatever the hell I want with any bits of information that enter my space.
All it does is fool a bunch of less-tech-savvy people into a false sense of security.