Either way, as I understand, it wouldn't matter with the MCAS-related MAX aircraft crashes. The elevator trim is able to move the entire elevator (literally, the entire elevator moves in response to the jackscrew controlled by the trim system) to such an extent that, depending on CG, airspeed, and other factors, it cannot be overpowered by moving the control surface to its full deflection. So whether or not the MAX had boosted controls or fly-by-wire probably wouldn't have mattered in the case the aircraft were trimmed fully nose-down. The pilots would have been struggling to maintain control either way. That's why there's stabilizer trim cut-out switches and manual trim.
I'd highly recommend Mentour Pilot's videos on the subject, links below:
Runaway Stabilizer: How to stop MCAS - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xixM_cwSLcQ
Boeing 737 Unable to Trim! Cockpit video (full flight sim) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoNOVlxJmow
Five questions about the Boeing 737 MAX Answered - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD0JabYjF3A
Start at 13:20 to skip straight to the relevant bit.
Much appreciated!
I agree, this is the main issue. In both cases if pilots had a clear option to just switch off MCAS we would have not lost over 500 lives.
In an emergency it has repeatedly been shown that pilots often forget complicated/rare recovery procedures. We need to stop relying on humans to perform at a superhuman level in these situations; better automation is the only way out.
Maybe the 737 Max is just too complex and relies too much on automation to fly correctly? I'm reminded of the Quantas QF32 flight, where pilots were nearly overwhelmed by the endless amount of errors and checklists they had to perform. [2]
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lIusD6Z-3cU
[2] https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-advice/flights/inside-...
And in the case of MCAS, physically unable to exert the effort to overcome the automated trim settings. (Posted above):
If a human is pulling back on the thing that says "plane needs to go UP" believe what they're requesting.
The problem here is nearly identical to the problems with self driving cars. The automation is capable of handling 95% of situations, but the 5% it's not capable of is not clear to either the operators or the software itself.
I firmly believe that both car and air travel need to be either 100% completely automated, or 100% under the control of the operators with well defined areas where the automation systems will ASSIST but always yield to the well trained (pilots) or poorly trained (car drivers) when requested. A human operator is able to think outside the box, and is not limited to what code has been conceived and written.
In any event, the situation where the humans aren't processing the data correctly and doing illogical things as a result would always lead to failure outcomes, until the point where we no longer allow humans to be pilots/operators at all.
1. "they didn't even get as far as switching off the stab trim" means they were incompetent.
2. MCAS, obviously, was a bad design
3. there was a physical issue with the sensor, possibly due to a bird strike
Fix any one of those, and the flight wouldn't have crashed.
I thought a central part of this was that there was according to Boeing no need to train on this particular aircraft because it was so close operationally to the 737NG. But that in fact the correct response in the particular situation is vastly different. So yes, kinda "incompetence" but more "ignorant due to Boeing's assertions that training wasn't needed"; ie the blame should not primarily rest on the pilots.(?)
I'm ignorant on the details, but this sort of article seems convincing:
> It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610. They learned that holding against the trim stopped the nose down, and then they could take action, like counter-trimming or outright CUTOUT the trim servo. But it didn’t. After a 10 second trim to a 2.5° nose down stabilizer position, the trimming started again despite the Pilots pulling against it. The faulty high AOA signal was still present.
> How should they know that pulling on the Yoke didn’t stop the trim? It was described nowhere; neither in the aircraft’s manual, the AFM, nor in the Pilot’s manual, the FCOM. This has created strong reactions from airlines with the 737 MAX on the flight line and their Pilots. They have learned the NG and the MAX flies the same. They fly them interchangeably during the week.
> (https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for...) //
When did I say it has anything to do with it?
> The 737 does not have artificial feel in any case, as far as I know. There's a direct mechanical linkage from the yoke to the control surfaces, so no artificial feel is necessary.
Modern planes come with stick shaker-pusher systems: https://www.flyingmag.com/how-it-works-stick-shaker-pusher
That's what I was referring to. Also whilst the 737 does have mechanical linkages to the control surfaces, they are there primarily for redundancy so the plane is flyable in case of hydraulics/power failure. By definition any hydraulics assisted system requires artificial force feedback.
Hmm? You were talking about systems that mimic the yoke feel of an aircraft with manual controls. A stick shaker is an emergency warning system that would never once activate on a normal flight. It has no effect on the feel of the controls.
>When did I say it has anything to do with it?
In the comment I replied to:
"To give pilots this feedback, Boeing simulates it mechanically by exerting force on the yoke. Normally this is fine and dandy, until the critical AoA sensor malfunctions and makes the computer think the plane is in a different attitude than it actually is in."